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FOREWORD 
With the beginning of the second stage in January 1994, the transition towards Economic and Monetary Union is  well 
under way. The European Monetary Institute has taken up its duties as the forerunner of the European Central Bank under 
the leadership of Belgian professor Alexandre LAMF  ALUSSY. 
According to the Economic and Social Committee, the fundamental steps for a careful preparation of the 
EMU are as follows: 
the economic policies of the Member States must be more rigorously coordinated and subject to multilateral 
surveillance; in view of current unemployment and recessionary conditions, they must aim at a parallel deve-
lopment; so that a consensus may be reached, the economic and social circles must be briefed and consulted 
on the convergence and recovery programmes drawn up to that effect; 
the preparation of the Common Monetary Policy requires that the concepts and instruments of monetary poli-
cy be harmonized, including the policy of  minimum reserves mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty; 
the move from national currencies to a European currency must be prepared - from the printing of bank notes 
and the minting of coins to the conversion of bank accounts and bookkeeping, portfolio management and tra-
ding of securities, mortgage registering and pricing; 
the regulations on the application of a few articles of the Treaty on European Union must be legally imple-
mented, especially those regarding the financing of budget deficits by the Central Banks, alreading prohibited 
during the transition period, as well as the privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions; 
the legal obstacles to the use of the ECU, under its current form of basket currency, must be overcome; the 
ECU clearing system must be made to operate smoothly and the use of the ECU spread more widely; 
comparable and accurate statistics, in particular on monetary aggregates, gross national products and public 
budgets should be made available in good time in order to prepare, survey and judge policy measures and 
their effects on the monetary and economic policy which the Maastricht Treaty provides for. 
Lastly, the Committee is, as ever, in favour of the convergence criteria and the timetable agreed in Maastricht for Economic 
and Monetary Union. Success will depend on visible progress in cutting unemployment, promoting economic growth and 
achieving nominal, and ultimately real, convergence between all Member States. 
In this brochure, the Social and Economic Committee presents Mr LAMFALUSSY's observations on the mandates of the 
European Monetary Institute which he chairs and the perspectives of the EMU, as delivered before the Section for 
Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions on 6 September 1994, as well as seven Opinions, for all of which 
Dr. MEYER-HORN, a German member of the Committee and representative of credit institutions, was rapporteur. 
Over and above its technical Opinions, the Economic and Social Committee considers it important that the public be in-
Conned in due time about the consequences of Monetary Union and that a consensus of the economic and social circles it 
represents among the European institutions be reached. 
Brussels, September 1994 
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Susanne TIEMANN 
Chairman of  the 
Economic and Social Committee Statement by 
Mr Alexandre LAMFALUSSY 
President of the European Monetary Institute 
held in Brussels, 
at Committee headquarters, 
before the Section for Economic, Financial 
and Monetary Questions, 
on 6 September 1994 Statement by Mr LAMFALUSSY 
Thank you,  Presiden~ for your amiable words of 
welcome.  I apologize for being a little late.  I would have 
liked to speak to your Committee even prior to this occa-
sion bu~ as you know, the Institute's beginnings were not 
particularly easy:  the choice of the seat and the nomination 
of the President were later than the schedule foreseen in the 
Treaty of  Maastrich~ and these decisions, instead of being 
taken at the end of 1992, were only taken at the end of 
October 1993, and fmalized in December of that year, and 
we were supposed to start functioning the next day or 
nearly, without having the initial phase of one year foreseen 
by the Treaty. 
All this means that I am doing two jobs at once:  I 
am making an  Institute, which was skeletal to start with, 
work.  It now has flesh on its bones:  our institutions, the 
Committee, the Council, are working as planned since the 
beginning of January.  Simultaneously,  we are building, in 
all senses of the word, the Institute in Frankfu~ with all the 
recruitment and all the works this entails.  I am doing more 
than one job as I said.  This phase will be over in a few 
months, we will be installed in Frankfurt in a few months' 
time, at the end of  November.  I have put at your disposal a 
sort of profile of the Institute with a brief summary of the 
main points of our mission and a description of the organi-
zation, and I am here to answer the questions you  would 
like to put to me.  I do not think, however, that it would be 
useful to dwell on the organizational aspects which are very 
important, but which are perhaps not of great interest to 
yourselves. 
The introduction I wished to make will comprise 
two parts:  firstly,  I would like to recall before you,  in my 
own words as well as according to the Treaty, the Institute's 
terms of reference, that I consider paramount and decisive, 
and secondly, I would like to speak to you of the perspecti-
ves of Economic and Monetary Union as I see them today. 
First part: the Imtitute's terms of reference 
Things are never simple.  I would like to say that 
there are two points in the terms of reference which I consi-
der to be absolutely fundamental.  They are of equal impor-
tance, I believe.  The one has no priority over the other. 
The first poin~ for which we are particularly com-
petent and have decisional responsibility, is the setting-up 
of the structure, logistics and organization of the future 
European Central Bank.  One could say that the Treaty 
gives us the responsibility of creating a Central Bank that is 
ready to work.  In that field,  we have decisional power 
without any outside intervention: it is the Institute's 
Council which is entrusted with the decision.  The Treaty, 
of course, has defmed the basic aims of the Central Bank, 
and has also spelled out a number of responsibilities and 
made clear that the conduct of the single monetary policy is 
the bank's main responsibility.  This monetary policy must 
be  pursued with the aim of ensuring price stability.  The 
Central Bank must be independen~ it must not receive or 
solicit instructions from anyone in conducting monetary 
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policy, and it cannot lend the governments money, directly 
or indirectly.  All this is described in the Treaty which sets 
the framework in which we shall be  working, but the de-
tails are lacking.  Perhaps, there is a good reason for this. 
For instance, it is said- I quote from memory, please forgi-
ve any failings  - that, as far as possible, the organization 
must be kept decentralized: in other words, the national 
Central Banks must keep the power that is theirs, as much 
as possible.  This is said but, obviously, we must see what 
is possible and what is desirable. 
What is the work that we must accomplish to set 
up this Central Bank?  The heart of the problem is the set-
ting-up of the technique of monetary controls, i.e. determi-
ning with what instruments and through which channels the 
European Central Bank will define and conduct the 
Monetary Union's single monetary policy.  This is a techni-
cal field, indeed it is very technical bu~ behind the cloak of 
technicity are hidden quite a few very defmed interests that 
we are going to look at as our work makes progress.  I 
should say that, in six months' to a year's time, we are 
going to be looking at important problems, which will cer-
tainly be at the heart of  many discussions. 
Already spoken of now, as the subject looks less 
technical, is  the question of knowing whether an interme-
diate objective should be fixed in monetary policy.  Of 
course, the final objective is not in doubt, it is defined by 
the Treaty:  the stability of prices.  But, should we or not 
have an objective as to the amount of money in circulation 
as  practised in certain countries, in particular, in Federal 
Germany, or should we keep to the final objective, simply, 
as is now the case in Great Britain, while using a much 
more varied series of  other objectives and indicators? 
Finally, we come to a  long-debated question, 
which will perhaps arouse no major difficulties, but perha-
ps many controversies.  But, behind all this, there are much 
more practical aspects which are very important in the con-
duct of monetary policy:  should compulsory reserves be 
imposed, and if so,  to which institutions, and are these 
compulsory reserves remunerated or not?  Just look at the 
interest certain banking professions are taking in the deci-
sions about to be taken:  all this is a very vast field, that we 
must define and for which we must be ready in the course 
of 1996. 
A second field,  which is also very delicate, is the 
precise, functional relationship between the Central Bank in 
Frankfurt with its Council whose structure is  well defmed 
by the Treaty, and the various national Central Banks. 
There is no doubt that the national central banks will conti-
nue to function, but we can wonder what kind of relations 
will be established between them and the centre.  There is a 
wide variety of models throughout the world, the American 
model, the German one, and others can be invented.  There 
is no doubt that a single monetary policy can be achieved, 
that is  obvious, but to which degree can one decentralize, 
not the decision-making process as to the stance of the cen-
tralized policy, but the implementation?  To which degree-
can implementation be decentralized?  There is a problem, 
but, behind this problem, there are many others. The question is:  to what degree can the various 
central banks continue to function rather on the national 
model, looking after a certain number of functions which are 
not only monetary policy functions?  There, we are going to 
come close to problems very important because practises 
have evolved in very different directions.  In our various 
countries, some Central Banks have been substantially scaled 
down, and have got rid of quite a few functions.  Reality is 
very varied in this respect.  Is this variety harmful for mone-
tary policy inasmuch as this policy is a single one?  I can see 
no reason to want, absolutely, to harmonize everything.  1be 
principle of subsidiarity will naturally exist, and the details, 
as I have said earlier on, have not yet been gone into. 
So, here is a particular field of our responsibility -
the organization and setting-up, ready to work, of a Central 
Bank.  We shall be ready.  We shall be ready, even if this is 
not easy as, the more we get down to details, the more, ob-
viously, the details start becoming controversial and impor-
tant, but I can assure you that I will do all that is in my 
power so that we are ready, and this is the case of the 
Council too.  Then, the politicians, as this is their role, must 
say whether, how, with whom and when,  we effectively 
start running the Central Bank.  We will have provided the 
instrument necessary for the political decision to be taken 
at a certain moment to be effectively carried out. 
The second part of our mission is what I will call 
the management of phase two.  I have just been speaking to 
you of phase three, but we are already living in phase two. 
In this phase, we have a whole series of very specific func-
tions.  I would like to concentrate on a single one, which is 
central, and that is the present coordination of  monetary po-
licies with which the Institute is entrusted today.  It will 
keep this role all along its life, that is to say, up to the esta-
blishment of the future Central Bank.  You know that,  in 
this second phase which we are now going through, the na-
tional monetary authorities fully retain their right to decide 
as regards monetary policy.  In other words, the Institute's 
Council has no power over the monetary policy carried out 
by the various Central Banks.  This is absolutely clear, and 
it is for this reason that very often, I am told: but, you are 
going to coordinate monetary policies without the power of 
coercion, without being able to  impose the coordination, 
this is an impossible task. 
I do not share this .  opinion, and I do not share it 
for several reasons.  The main one is  that the aim of the 
coordination is quite clearly defined by the Treaty.  The 
Treaty says:  coordinate monetary policies today in order to 
ensure price stability.  So, the mission is very clear, the 
fmal objective is clearly assigned.  I would even say that it 
is not only a question of the Treaty, because the de facto 
evolution of the various national monetary policies was al-
ready set on this track, even before the drafting of the 
Treaty of Maastricht.  Indeed, it is for this reason that, on 
this particular aspect, there has been, as far as I know, no 
very lively debate.  In fact, for ten or even fifteen years, it 
has been a known fact that monetary policy must, first and 
foremost, work on the main task of monetary stability, and 
ensure internal and external monetary stability.  This took 
place following on a sort of cultural revolution which took 
place both in economic thought in the 1960's and 1970's 
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and after the stagflation experience of the 1970's.  Finally, 
whatever the origin of this evolution, it is there and has 
been codified in the Treaty. 
If  you do not have a debate or any kind of doctri-
nal divide between the Central Banks, represented at the 
Institute's Council and which take part in the proceedings, 
the debates no longer bear on the final objective because, if 
they did, there would obviously be little coordination.  The 
debate deals with the means of arriving at coordination. 
How can this be achieved?  What is the best way to go 
about things?  In this field, we have very diversified expe-
rience and the Central Banks are on an equal footing. 
There is no single line of thought, at the very least because 
the objective of price stability is one of the  Community's 
main achievements, and has been, for a number of years. 
We have attained, I believe, throughout the Union, 
a rate of inflation which is an historical minimum and which 
is very evenly distributed.  There are countries, France nota-
bly, where the rate of inflation has now been lower than 2% 
for a few  years, and what is more, even in countries which 
have devalued their currency or let it depreciate, the rhythm 
of inflation has diminished.  This shows the effective con-
vergence of policies.  In this climate, however, the tools are 
varied, and the various Central Banks have recourse to dif-
ferent ones.  From this point on, the debate going on is a de-
bate on the means, a technical debate, a very balanced deba-
te.  There is no single recipe in this field and I think that, in 
this situation, coordination can take place without too many 
difficulties.  That is what I can observe at the Institute's 
Council since the beginning of the year. 
There are the two great missions I  wanted to 
speak to you about.  We also have a number of very speci-
fic missions on which I would like to dwell, if you like. 
Let me have a quick look at the second theme at the heart 
of the debate and that everyone is thinking of.  Here is the 
Institute, put in charge of setting up a Central Bank, but 
what are the chances of this Central Bank effectively seeing 
the light of day, even if it is well designed as to structure? 
Will there be a political decision, or will there be none?  Of 
course, I have no answer to the question.  But I would like 
to go back on events and outline some general ideas. 
There is no doubt that we were invaded one year 
ago (it had started one year before this) by a very strong 
wave of pessimism concerning the possibilities of eventual-
ly achieving Monetary Union.  We entered the different cri-
ses of the European Monetary System two years ago, these 
went on, and then, it lead to the widening of margins to 
15% about a year ago. 
At that moment,  speaking of the perspectives of 
Monetary Union would have aroused smiles.  I think it was 
difficult to  broach the subject without running the risk of 
running into sarcasm.  I observe that this is not the case 
now.  We are not in a climate of euphoria, and I hope we 
will not be going back to the climate of euphoria of three 
years ago, which brought us onto a fairly dangerous path.  I 
think we  are now in a situation of greater serenity, which 
allows us to look at things squarely, with a degree of objec-
tivity, and to have a balanced debate on the chances of sue-cess of the building of European Monetary Union.  Why 
did this evolution take place? 
I will, once again, try to put things simply.  It is 
difficult, in a few minutes, to give all the nuances to the ob-
servations I would like to make, but I shall try.  The crises 
we have known between the summer of 1992 and the au-
tuum of 1993 were set off, I believe, by the convergence of 
three very different influences which, however, lent each 
other strength.  It is their convergence which leads to the 
gravity of the crisis.  These factors are difficult to unravel 
and, no amount of good will could help me to tell you 
which of the three I consider the more important.  An histo-
rical approach is difficult and not always interesting.  So, 
my enumeration will not be by order of importance. 
There is an indisputable fact:  some of the nominal 
exchange rates got frozen sometime in 1991 because people 
started to consider the European Monetary System as a de 
facto Monetary Union.  This simply means that divergent 
trends in the real rates of exchange started to be felt as from 
1991,  as  the  inflation  rates  remained  divergent. 
Convergence took place, but the mere fact of convergence 
did not make the absolute difference disappear, and as it had 
remained very considerable, competitive positions started to 
diverge for a number of countries.  For a whole series of 
reasons, good or bad, it was not possible to make the EMS 
function as planned, namely as a fixed but adjustable system 
of  exchange rates.  Adjustable, if possible, in small steps.  It 
was not possible to do this.  I do not pass judgement on 
those who did not do it, because there is a series of  historical 
explanations which are not important, but they constitute a 
fact.  And, the more decisions were delayed in this field, the 
more difficult it was to implement them.  It was known that 
a change in one of the exchange rates or one of the pegged 
rates would probably lead to others, and a chain-effect was 
feared through the play on anticipations.  This blocked the 
situation completely.  This factor, which is a cause, was 
seen very clearly to appear during the summer of 1992. 
The second disturbing factor is the dose of compo-
nents within macro-economic policy in Germany, following 
on the unification process.  This is a subject which has wi-
dely been discussed.  You know that, to be able to finance 
unification in Germany, there has been a sudden and radical 
change - an extremely important one - in the budgetary ba-
lance of Germany.  There has been a passage from a situa-
tion of  relative balance to a situation with a major deficit. 
This took place at a moment when the German eco-
nomy was already rather near to a quasi full use of production 
factors.  It was near the end of a fairly long period of circum-
stantial upturn, and this change in the German policy mix 
gave a major boost to expansion, flfSt in Germany, and then, 
by propagation, in the rest of  Europe.  The flfSt effect this had 
was to prolong quite considerably the phase of circumstantial 
expansion, which was already quite long everywhere. 
The first effect of German unification was one of 
major expansion, perhaps too great an effect, leading to the 
danger of inflationary sliding.  The Bundesbank, in 
carrying out its duty, could do but one thing, try to use mo-
netary policy to act against the gradual appearance of infla-
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tionary tension in Germany.  The Germany policy mix was 
a policy of budgetary expansion counterbalanced by a po-
licy of monetary restriction, which led to high short-term 
interest rates in Germany.  Probably not too high from the 
German point of view, but certainly too high from that of 
the other countries of Europe, who were not feeling the 
same degree of inflationary tension.  You there have the 
normal conflict between a national monetary policy and 
objectives of international stability.  This factor undoub-
tedly played an extremely disturbing role in the functioning 
of the European Monetary System. 
The third factor is recession.  Recession was ine-
vitable, because I do not think anyone has managed to abo-
lish circumstantial cycles.  Many would like to do this, but 
it is an old dream which certainly cannot come true, and 
there had been a long circumstantial upswing beforehand. 
The reverse in trend was deeper and the recession more la-
sting than what could normally be expected.  With the ac-
cumulation and interaction of these three factors, distor-
tions in the rates of exchange, a very particular policy mix 
on the part of the largest European economies and, thirdly, 
a recession, we need not wonder that the working of the 
European Monetary System was obscured. 
If  I decided to give you  this long account which 
looks rather historical, it is to tell you that the disturbing 
character of these factors is now exhausted.  We have turned 
a page.  The distortions in exchange rates have been correc-
ted, and perhaps this has even been overdone, but these 
great imbalances in exchange rates have been cleaned out, 
the mix of German macro-economic policies has improved, 
and German budgetary policy seems to me to be on the way 
back to control.  It is not entirely under control, far from it, 
but,  considerable progress has been made and at the same 
time, without mentioning any figures, let us say that the 
Bundesbank has relaxed its monetary policy during the past 
year rather radically, so German short-term interest rates 
have gone down notably.  This factor also has disappeared. 
And thirdly - good news - we are getting out of  re-
cession at a surprising pace, and what is also surprising is 
the very fmn and very general exit from recession of all the 
countries of Western Europe. 
I do not know what events will be in  the two or 
three coming years, specific disturbances can always crop 
up.  But it looks very unlikely to me that we should again 
have such a disturbing coincidence of three specific events 
which, I believe, was a circumscribed accident of history. 
Perhaps there will be another political event somewhere in 
the world which could lead to something, but I think that, 
for the moment, the climate has become much more serene, 
we have come out of recession.  I think that monetary poli-
cies are harmonized within Europe and that exchange me-
chanisms are good. 
This, it seems to me, creates a new, serene climate 
favourable to an examination of the situation and which, 
with a bit of luck, can last during the coming years. 
Consequently, political decisions which have to be taken in 
two, three, four, five years' time will be able to be taken in 
a more relaxed atmosphere and with less agitation than 
what we have known during the last two years. OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on 
The analysis of policies to be pursued in the Community 
during the transitional stage of EMU Procedure 
On 19 October 1993 the Economic and Social 
Committee, acting under the third paragraph of Article 20 
of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an Additional 
Opinion on: 
The analysis of  policies to be pursued in the Community 
during the transitional stage of  EMU. 
The  Section  for  Economic,  Financial  and 
Monetary Questions, which was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the subject,  adopted its 
Additional Opinion on 26 October 1993. The Rapporteur 
was Mr  MEYER-HORN. 
At its 310th Plenary Session (meeting of 24 
November 1993) the Economic and Social Committee 
unanimously adopted the following Additional Opinion. 
1.  General comments 
The Economic and Social Committee discussed 
the policies which it deemed to be most suitable for the 
transitional stage of Economic and Monetary Union. At the 
end of October it issued a separate Opinion on the econom-
ic policies needed to recover from the recession, taking into 
account the decisions adopted at the European Council 
meeting in Copenhagen  1,  whilst the present Opinion will 
concentrate on policies considered to be appropriate for the 
transitional stage of Economic and Monetary Union but 
which are being hampered by the recession. Chapter 1 con-
tains general comments on the policy. Individual policy 
areas are dealt with in Chapter 2. 
1.1.  Compatibility of short term economic 
policy with convergence policy 
All Member States of the Community need to pur-
sue more vigorous and parallel economic policies in  view 
of the unacceptably high level of unemployment and the 
persistence of the economic downturn. If  economic policies 
are not now harnessed to launch an energetic and urgent as-
sault on unemployment2, the result may be a situation 
which leaves Economic and Monetary Union looking 
utopian. If, however, the economic policies needed to tack-
le the recession, and the convergence programmes which 
will have to take into account anti-recessionary policies, are 
coordinated, the economic policies, and in particular the 
budget policies of the Member States will have a firmer 
foundation. 
1.1.1.  Clearly, economic policy faces a dilemma: 
on the one hand, unemployment must be cut and the re-
cession ended as soon as possible; 
on the other hand, the process of integration, which has 
hitherto been successful, must not be placed in jeop-
ardy. The underlying conditions for reducing unemploy-
ment and bringing about an economic recovery could 
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worsen dramatically if,  under the effects of the reces-
sion,  Member States adopted devil-take-the-hindmost 
policies and flouted the objectives agreed in Maastricht. 
1.1.2.  With the Internal Market and freedom of capital 
movements largely in place, economic interdependence and 
interpenetration is so great that any Member State which 
goes it alone on economic and monetary policy hurts both 
itself and its neighbours. Therefore, economic and mone-
tary policy must be closely coordinated within the 
Community and multilateral surveillance stepped up.  The 
convergence programmes must be adjusted to reflect there-
cession and be developed into convergence-and-recovery 
programmes. If economic policy is coordinated at 
Community level within the framework of multilateral sur-
veillance, preparations for EMU can also continue. 
1.2.  Common European strategy 
Faltering or even negative economic growth, in-
vestment cut-backs and, above all, a level of unemployment 
which climbed from 8.3% in  1990 to 10.5% in mid-1993 
require a common European strategy. This must go further 
than the Edinburgh growth initiative and, in accordance 
with the decisions taken at the Copenhagen summit of 21-
22 June 1993, be expected to cover not only employment 
but also infrastructure development in  the lower income 
Member States (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain)3. The re-
sources and operating methods of the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds must be tailored to this objective, particu-
larly with a view to the rapid deployment of resources. 
1.2.1.  Growth initiatives must, however, in the medium 
term help enhance the Community's competitiveness vis-a-
vis non-Community countries, eliminate the economies' 
structural weaknesses and permit a return to successful 
anti-inflationary policies. 
1.2.2.  The recession must be countered by coordinated 
economic action in all the Member States. This is a pre-req-
uisite if the Community is to make progress on conver-
gence of  economic conditions, even in times of recession. 
1.3.  Lessons to be learnt from the EMS crisis 
At first sight the EMS crisis of late July 1993 
seemed to undermine the credibility of EMU. It is now seen 
as a valuable lesson, however. 
ESC Opinion on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment- Medium-term 
considerations (CES 1010193). 
2  Its actual level is higher than indicated in statistics since figures do not include 
workers being retrained, in short-term work or on job-creation schemes. 
3  The trend in per capita GDP* (as a percentage of the EC average) is as follows 
(Source: EC Commission, DG II, II 396-93, Table 3, page 28): 
1986  1992 
GR  50.6  47.4 
IRL  60.1  70.5 
p  50.6  51.5 
E  70.6  76.7 1.3.1.  It highlighted the following: 
1.3.1.1.  Achieving convergence of the economic funda-
mentals (inflation rate, employment, progress on productiv-
ity, trends in wage costs and interest rates) of twelve coun-
tries is always difficult. It becomes still more difficult, 
however: 
if external pressures occur such as recession, collapse of 
the Eastern European economic system and its markets, 
the strain on the German economy arising from the inte-
gration of the new "Lander", and the economic conse-
quences of disarmament for the arms industry, and 
if these extraordinary events coincide with a serious re-
cession, which in addition has some structural causes. 
1.3.1.2.  Under these conditions, the Member States have 
ceased to converge and have in  fact,  at  times, diverged to 
some extent. But convergence is a precondition for EMU. 
Without progress on convergence, a  system of stable but 
adjustable exchange-rates may repeatedly fall prey to spec-
ulation, 
if the political will is lacking to adjust parities promptly 
to reflect divergent trends in economic fundamentals, 
if,  instead, exchange-rates which the market regards as 
misaligned are retained for too long 
and, finally, if political statements cast doubt on the im-
plementation of the Maastricht Treaty. 
1.3.2.  The following lesson should, therefore, be learnt 
from the recession: 
1.3.2.1.  Efforts must be stepped up in the fields of eco-
nomic policy coordination and multilateral surveillance in 
order to assure joint, coordinated action to tackle the reces-
sion and, simultaneously, tangible progress on conver-
gence. The inadequate coordination of economic policy on 
the basis of common guidelines was one of the reasons for 
divergent trends in economic fundamentals from one 
Member State to another. The result was that currency pari-
ties were not always in line with the market, thus under-
mining the real foundation for a narrow exchange rate fluc-
tuation band In  the properly coordinated economic policy 
we hope to see in future measures to counter unemploy-
ment and the  recession are a precondition for,  rather than 
an alternative to the convergence policy required during the 
transitional stage of EMU. This will, of course, only be 
possible if  currency parities are in line with the market and 
are not maintained for political reasons at levels which cur-
tail economic growth. 
1.3 .2.2.  The breathing space obtained from the widening 
of the ERM fluctuation bands may be used to adjust parities 
in the wake of completion of the Internal Market, in line 
with individual Member State's progress on convergence. 
With the new 30% fluctuation band it is  to be hoped that 
parity shifts will be possible without political drama or the 
immediate speculative testing of the new parity. This would 
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facilitate gradual- and hopefully coordinated- stabilization 
at new parities. 
1.3.2.3.  The temporary widening of the fluctuation bands 
will thus help establish a correct system of parities, which 
will be irrevocably fixed in the third stage of  EMU. 
1.4.  Widening of the EMS fluctuation bands 
Our reaction  to  the  decision  taken  by  the 
Economics and Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors on 2 August 1993 to widen the ERM fluctuation 
bands temporarily from 2.25 or 6% to 15% in either direc-
tion is as follows: 
1.4.1.  Parities already overtaken by manifestly divergent 
economic trends and no longer supported by the market 
were, in the past, sometimes retained, not least for reasons 
of political prestige. Given free movement of capi~, the 
result was abrupt devaluations and currency-market msta-
bility. With fluctuation bands widened to a  total of 30%, 
there is now no need to defend parities as soon as an ex-
change rate slides by one or two percentage points. 
1.4.2.  The widening of the fluctuation bands gives the 
Member States a certain amount of scope in economic poli-
cy.  If the need to preserve monetary stability so dictates, 
interest rates can be kept relatively high for a time in one 
country, whilst other countries pursue lower interest ra~es 
in order to combat recession and high unemployment. W1th 
wider fluctuation bands, such interest-rate differentials are 
possible, without every change in the interest-rate structure 
immediately giving rise to speculative "testing" of the sus-
tainability of a  given exchange rate. However, in some 
Member States the defence of the exchange rate seems, at 
least at times and within certain limits, to take precedence 
over changes in interest rate policy. 
1.4.3.  In the past, currencies sometimes entered the ERM 
at parities which were already regarded by the market as 
out of date. Under the old, narrow fluctuation bands, a mis-
take of this kind soon made itself felt. The 30% fluctuation 
band allows a currency scope to find its right level. 
1.4.4.  Wider margins will make it easier for those cur-
rencies which left the ERM at the end of 1992, because 
their fluctuation bands were too restrictive, to rejoin. 
Return ought clearly to be accompanied by suitable eco-
nomic policy measures. The same applies to applications 
for ERM membership by the currencies of the EFf  A coun-
tries wishing to join the Community in 1995. 
1.4.5.  Retaining the narrow fluctuation bands in August 
1993 might have forced other currencies to leave. An EMS 
effectively comprising only a handful of currencies would 
have undermined confidence in progress towards EMU. 
1.4.6.  The temporary wider fluctuation bands discourage 
speculation, as upper and lower intervention points 30% 
apart permits much greater fluctuations now before a cur-
rency needs to be de- or revalued. 1.4.7.  The burden of intervention on the central banks 
has been lightened; sometimes they were required to com-
mit their entire foreign exchange reserves to support a cur-
rency which had within a short time fallen to its floor in the 
narrow fluctuation band. 
1.4.8.  Temporary widening of the fluctuation bands 
should not be construed as support for a system of fully 
floating exchange rates. It is,  rather, a priority decision to 
counter escalating speculation and to maintain the EMS as 
such. The maintenance of the EMS is essential if the EC is 
to continue down the road to EMU; this had been in doubt 
since the EMS tensions of August 1992. 
1.4.9.  The temporary widening of the fluctuation band 
should not be seen as an invitation to relax economic policy 
efforts. On the contrary: economic policy should be so suc-
cessful that the wider margin for exchange rate adjustments 
is used as little as possible. 
1.4.10.  The central banks should continuously monitor -
from 1994 onwards within the framework of the EMI - the 
extent to which the enlarged fluctuation bands are actually 
being used and consider the timescale within which gradual 
coordinated narrowing could be envisaged. 
1.5.  The convergence criteria and the EMU deadline 
The Member States should stick to the conver-
gence criteria agreed in Maastricht and the EMU timetable. 
This requires political will. In all the Member States, there-
sult of economic policy efforts will depend on visible 
progress in cutting unemployment, promoting economic 
growth, and at the same time, achieving nominal, and ulti-
mately real, convergence between all the Member States. 
1.5.1.  Adjustment of the convergence criteria at this 
stage would undermine confidence in the feasibility of 
EMU and inhibit efforts to achieve greater convergence, 
e.g. in respect of budget discipline and consolidation. On 
the other hand, keeping to the EMU deadline (as in the case 
of the 1992 Internal Market project), despite the recession, 
would be a positive signal. This would make it clear that 
the prospect of EMU has not been allowed to recede as a 
result of the recession. 1 January 1999 now seems a more 
achievable deadline, however, than 1 January 1997. 
1.5.2.  Well-founded confidence in the ability of a  suc-
cessful, properly coordinated policy to promote employ-
ment and economic growth, and at the same time confi-
dence in the feasibility of Economic and Monetary Union, 
are psychologically important for consumer confidence and 
the investment climate. Confidence rather than uncertainty 
may contribute to a revival in the economic cycle and fmal-
ly to renewed progress on the convergence of economic 
conditions. 
1.6.  Public  information  and  consultation  of 
the ESC 
Policies for the transitional stage of EMU should 
include adequate publicity, the appropriate briefmg and in-
19 
TRANSITION TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
volvement of the economic and social interest groups, in-
cluding the social partners, and consultation of the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, 
and the future Committee of the Regions. There has been 
an extraordinary lack of official comment on the crisis in 
the EMS  and the prospects for EMU, as agreed at 
Maastricht. The psychological component of consumer be-
haviour and the propensity to invest, referred to in 
point 1.5.2. above, also make publicity important. 
1.6.1.  It would be helpful during the transitional stage of 
EMU if suitably presented public information, e.g. a 
Commission White Paper, were made available on the caus-
es of the EMS crisis and the consequences of EMU, in par-
ticular the disappearance of national monetary policy - and 
consequently of interest rate policy - and the replacement of 
national currencies by a single European currency, the ECU. 
To avoid disappointment it would have to be made clear that 
Economic and Monetary Union will not solve all problems 
from one day to the next, particularly unemployment and in-
come differentials within the Community. When the time it 
ripe, the help of national media should be enlisted in order 
to provide a comprehensive explanation of EMU and boost 
confidence in the new system. 
1.6.2.  National parliaments must follow the example of 
the European Parliament's Monetary Committee in dis-
cussing the transitional stage policies. Implementation of 
the economic convergence programmes requires that the 
economic and social interest groups affected be informed, 
and that they support the process. It is therefore not only 
the European Parliament which should be consulted on the 
multilateral surveillance of economic and monetary policy 
and the monitoring of the convergence programmes; the 
Economic and Social Committee should also be appropri-
ately involved, as the institution representing economic and 
social interests. 
1.6.3.  Given the scale and seriousness of the recession, 
social dialogue should be instituted/stepped up at national 
level too.  This is necessary as each Member State is re-
sponsible for implementing its convergence and recovery 
programme. Social dialogue should deal with the compati-
bility of the various sectors of economic policy with the 
convergence and recovery programmes. This applies in par-
ticular to tax,  wages and social policies. These policies 
must be compatible with each other and with the concentra-
tion of economic policy on combatting unemployment and 
defending monetary stability. Without such a  social dia-
logue and efforts to achieve consensus, it will be difficult to 
progress towards nominal (and particularly real) conver-
gence. 
1.7.  Cooperation on monetary policy and supervi-
sion in the EMI 
Closer cooperation on monetary policy will re-
quire better coordination of monetary policy decisions, in 
the framework of the European Monetary Institute from 
1994 onwards; this will include the joint assessment of the 
appropriateness of exchange-rate parities. 1. 7 .1.  Even with wider fluctuation bands, the problem of 
speculation will not go away entirely; closer cooperation is 
therefore needed between the central banks on currency-
market intervention. The larger banks active on the foreign 
exchange markets should perhaps also be involved in this 
cooperation. Cooperation between Central Banks will be 
made easier if,  as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, 
they become independent as soon as possible. 
1.7 .2.  The faster the currency markets react, and the 
greater the financial flows resulting from capital movement 
freedom,  the more important closer cooperation between 
Central Banks becomes. According to statistics of the Bank 
for International Settlements, such capital movements 
amount on average to about 880,000 million dollars per 
day,  i.e.  more than  three times the combined foreign cur-
rency reserves of the Community's Central Banks (approxi-
mately 300,000 million dollars). 
1.7.3.  Speculation has been made easier by shortcomings 
in the hannonization of prudential banking regulations. The 
EMI should, therefore, attempt to secure rapid closer coop-
eration between the central banks and other supervisory au-
thorities, particularly as  regard~ the off-balance-sheet trans-
actions referred to in point 1.8.2.1. 
1.8.  Guidelines for action to counter currency 
speculation 
It would be wrong  to  attempt to curb currency 
speculation by reintroducing controls on capital move-
ments. This would be an unacceptable setback for the 
Internal Market. 
1.8.1.  The most effective way of tackling speculation is 
of course to  remove the reason for it.  The Member States 
would have to do more to bring their currency's exchange-
rate into line with economic reality, and ensuring that their 
successful economic policies do not give rise to over- or 
under-valuation which would encourage speculation. There 
has at times admittedly been speculation against EC curren-
cies, e.g. the French Franc, whose economic fundamentals -
apart from unemployment - hardly suggested an  incorrect 
exchange rate. 
1.8.2.  Instead of controls on capital movements, rules to 
restrain currency speculation could be envisaged. The mea-
sures referred to in points 1.8.2.1. and 1.8.2.2. below could 
be coordinated with major non-Community countries in the 
framework of the Group of Ten in Basel. 
1.8.2.1.  Stricter supervision of the speculative use of 
swaps, futures, options and other off-balance-sheet banking 
transactions are required. The value of some banks' off-bal-
ance-sheet transactions exceeds their balance sheet totals. 
1.8.2.2.  Compulsory interest-free deposits with the central 
bank to cover open currency positions could be considered. 
1.8.2.3.  The introduction of a two-tier currency market, as 
used to exist in  Belgium without any restriction on capital 
movements, has had little success in  the past owing to the 
considerable administrative work involved and the  loop-
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holes. This would mean however that most currency trans-
actions not directly connected with trade in goods and ser-
vices, i.e. including monetary and capital movements, were 
carried out at an exchange-rate freely set by the currency 
markets, with a certain premium vis-a-vis the official rate. 
Without affecting the exchange-rate for external trade, this 
would make cross-border monetary and capital invest-
ments, including speculative ones temporarily more expen-
sive. 
1.9.  Joint economic policy efforts 
Since economic policy must now be directed frrst 
and foremost at combatting unemployment and promoting 
economic recovery, many people have begun to have 
doubts about whether the timetable for achieving Economic 
and Monetary Union can actually be observed. Despite this, 
consistent and coordinated economic policies are perfectly 
capable of making conditions more conducive to the com-
pletion of Economic and Monetary Union by the end of the 
century. 
1. 9 .1.  The prospects of achieving EMU would nonethe-
less be diminished if confidence in the feasibility of 
Economic and Monetary Union were undermined by the 
discussion of less stringent convergence criteria during the 
general economic crisis. It is more important to retain the 
existing convergence criteria even if such criteria cannot be 
met in the manner hoped for during the present economic 
crisis. This does not, however, mean that the budget policy 
criteria do not need interpretation. This applies in particular 
to the criteria concerning the ratios of government debt and 
net borrowing to GDP. 
1.9.2.  The recession makes the time allowed for conver-
gence policy in preparation for EMU seem short, even if 
the earlier deadline of 1 January 1997 is abandoned and the 
third stage begins on  1 January 1999. Under the conver-
gence protocol, even the major economic variables need to 
converge strongly enough by 1995-1996 to enable curren-
cies to fluctuate within a 2.25% band without undue strain 
in the final two years (1997-1998). This would require ex-
traordinary economic policy efforts. 
1.9.3.  The efforts referred to in point 1.9.2. above would, 
however, be worthwhile, as  the economic interdependence 
between the Member States, achieved via integration in the 
Internal Market, must be secured for the long term. The 
opening-up of Eastern Europe, problems of (partly structur-
al)  unemployment, demographic and structural develop-
ment, migration and environment protection mean that, 
without the agreed EMU (despite the progress made to-
wards integration) the EC might revert to the classic pursuit 
of national self-interest. Without the constraints of EMU, 
inflationary full-employment policies, based on protection-
ism and exchange controls, might be pursued in some 
Member States. 2. 
2.1. 
Comments on individual policies 
Short-term economic policies and convergence 
policies 
2.1.1.  The convergence sought for economic and 
Monetary Union, is not fundamentally called into question 
by the economic policies dictated by the recession and un-
employment. The economic and budget policies required 
by the recession are necessarily similar in all Member 
States of the Community. Because of this, the conditions 
which need to be met to achieve Economic and Monetary 
Union are changing along similar lines in all Member 
States. 
2.1.1.1.  Some of the convergence criteria, notably budget 
criteria, can in the present recession only be given medium-
term priority. However, in some Member States the bud-
getary policy criteria are clearly still being interpreted very 
restrictively, which limits the scope for the necessary short-
term policy measures. In a recession the budgetary criteria 
should not be allowed to result in, or even be used as a pre-
text for, economic measures which are likely to exacerbate 
the crisis even further. 
2.1.1.2.  By contrast, the policies needed everywhere in 
Europe to bring down unemployment and stimulate eco-
nomic growth may at the same time help lay the common 
foundations for Economic and Monetary Union, provided 
such policies are coordinated at Community level within 
the framework of multilateral surveillance. Further cuts in 
long-term interest rates will be of crucial importance here. 
This is the only way for some Member States to make up 
lost ground on convergence - which was one of the main 
causes of the currency realignments. 
2.1.2.  There is a close link between the policies needed 
for cyclical and structural reasons and those needed for 
convergence. This can be seen from some of the conver-
gence criteria themselves. These are in no way geared sole-
ly to "fine weather periods". Rather, a series of relative 
convergence criteria are tailored, as a precautionary mea-
sure, to those Member States whose economic and mone-
tary policies are the most suecessful in comparative terms. 
It is worth noting that the convergence criteria, particularly 
inflation and interest rates, are currently being met by many 
EC countries. Convergence is possible even in recession. 
2.1.3.  Budget convergence criteria are expressed in ab-
solute percentages, i.e. new government deficit to be no 
more than 3% of gross domestic product, accumulated gov-
ernment debt to be no more than 60% of gross domestic 
product. Articles 104c(2) and 104c(3) of the Treaty, how-
ever, explicitly provide for a discretionary margin in as-
sessing whether the ratio of government debt to GDP "is 
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference 
value at a satisfactory pace" and, subsequently, "whether 
the government deficit exceeds government investment ex-
penditure", etc. 
2.1.4.  The Committee endorses the suggestion made by 
Commission President, Mr DELORS, that additional crite-
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ria relating to youth and long-term unemployment be con-
sidered as indicators of  real convergence. 
2.2.  Economic policy 
2.2.1.  The sixth recital of the Treaty on European Union 
asserts the Member States' resolve to work towards eco-
nomic convergence and an Economic and Monetary Union, 
including a single and stable currency. 
2.2.1.1.  An economic policy aimed at sustained conver-
gence (Article 103(3)) is to be closely coordinated and sub-
ject to multilateral surveillance. To this end the conver-
gence programmes, to be adjusted to recessionary condi-
tions, some of which run until 1996, and the ban on budget 
deficit financing by the Central Banks (Article 104(1)) 
must be put into effect. 
2.2.1.2.  The downturn has revealed a number of weakness-
es of the EC economy: 
its inability to generate and maintain sufficient new 
jobs; 
- its relative lack of progress on innovation, technology 
and research; and 
- the Community's current loss of global competitive-
ness, admittedly determined in part by external trade re-
lations4. 
2.2.1.3.  The Commission should submit its forthcoming 
White Paper on a medium-term strategy for growth, com-
petitiveness and employment by the end of 1993 at the lat-
est. Anti-recessionary policy should as far as possible take 
account of the requirements of  convergence policy. 
2.2.2.  The fact that ten Member States have already sub-
mitted convergence programmes is to be welcomed. The 
two remaining Member States are also expected to do so. 
2.2.2.1.  The convergence programmes must be expanded 
to become convergence-and-recovery programmes. Cutting 
unemployment must take priority over strict compliance 
with all convergence criterion. 
2.2.2.2.  With the drawing-up of convergence programmes 
still the responsibility of individual Member States, the 
joint discussion and evaluation of such programmes in the 
Council of Economic and Finance Ministers helps to ensure 
that Member States are dissuaded from taking isolated na-
tional economic policy decisions which would in any case 
be open to question given the ever-closer enmeshment of 
national economies. Moreover, coordinated convergence 
programmes encourage the growth of a genuinely common 
money market, as well as the general formation of savings 
4  cf. ESC Opinion on the Annual Economic Report for 1993 (CES 1011193, point 
2.2.8.). beneficial to such a market. The convergence and recovery 
programmes should, therefore: 
be based on common assumptions and forecasts: 
be for the same period; and 
be discussed and assessed together at EC level. 
2.2.3.  In the current recession the monitoring of national 
budgets to  identify "excessive" government deficits takes 
on a different meaning (Article 104c(2)). 
2.2.3.1.  It is now more a question of limiting the unavoid-
able new borrowing required to  finance extraordinary ex-
penditure, not only because of the convergence criteria (cf. 
point 2.3.5.), but also because of the already considerable 
burden imposed by debt servicing on the budgets of some 
Member States. If the cost of servicing government debt 
absorbs a high proportion of the budget, the debt must be 
gradually reduced, quite independently of the constraints of 
EMU. 
2.2.3.2.  The extraordinary expenditure referred to in point 
2.2.3 .1.  should be concentrated on public-sector invest-
ment, which: 
creates new jobs; 
promotes training and retraining; and 
makes specific improvements to infrastructure, thus at-
tracting additional productive investment from the pri-
vate sector. 
2.2.4.  The economic constraints affecting Germany are a 
special case for Community convergence policy. 
2.2.4.1.  German economic policy,  and above all manage-
ment of the money supply, are being hindered by an event 
unique in this century: the integration into the Federal 
Republic of the former GDR, a State with a population of 
17 million, ruined by 40 years of central economic plan-
ning. The resultant considerable strain on Germany's econ-
omy and budget can be gauged to some extent from  the 
scale of the financial transfers to the east and the new bor-
rowings of the Federal Government. 
2.2.4.2.  The Bundesbank has reacted to relatively high in-
flation by German standards with higher interest rates than 
the  depressed state of the economy would otherwise war-
rant. The Bundesbank's stability-orientated policy bolsters 
confidence in the D-Mark. But the resultant interest rate 
differentials complicate the economic and monetary poli-
cies of Germany's neighbours and impede the achievement 
of consensus at EC level, particularly as the D-Mark is still 
seen as the EMS' anchor currency. 
2.2.5.  In the transitional stage of EMU a partnership 
should  be  developed  between  Central  Banks  and 
Governments not only in respect of economic and monetary 
policy, but also in respect of subsequent cooperation be-
tween the European Central Bank and the Council of 
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Economic and Finance Ministers. Cooperation will be 
needed as its common monetary policy will be run by the 
European Central Bank, whilst economic policy is to re-
main in the hands of national governments even though 
there will be coordination in the Council of Economic and 
Finance Ministers. 
2.2.6.  The tensions it is  already possible to foresee be-
tween the common monetary policy and national economic 
policies lead to the conclusion that further progress towards 
political union will need to be made in conjunction with 
economic and monetary union. 
2.2.7.  A policy which seeks to  achieve greater conver-
gence also calls for progress in the harmonization of direct 
taxation of companies and households, particularly with-
holding taxes on investment income. The EC Commission 
should publish a White Paper containing proposals at an 
early opportunity. 
2.2.7.1.  Harmonization of direct taxes must extend to the 
entire financial area of the Community, including the "tax 
havens" which still exist on  the territories of individual 
Member States.  As  far as  is possible, harmonization must 
also embrace third countries, in effect the OECD countries, 
in  order to counter the exodus of capital for tax reasons. 
Lower direct taxation would only be acceptable when 
agreed at EC  level under the common regional policy for 
the purpose of bolstering economic and social cohesion. 
2.2.7 .2.  Differences in the  taxation of investment income 
and the distinction made in this connection between for-
eigners resident in a country and nationals resident abroad, 
and between residents and non-residents of a particular 
area, have no place in a Single Market in the run-up to 
EMU. With free movement of capital, this differential taxa-
tion leads to the diversion of financial flows, usually within 
the Community, but in  some cases also to  the benefit of 
non-Community countries. There is no justification for this 
in a European financial area.  It depresses tax revenues, an 
undesirable development at a time of budget consolidation 
and the control of burgeoning budget deficits. 
2.2.8.  Structural, Investment and Cohesion Fund re-
sources must be used efficiently to secure the desired multi-
plier effect, with the involvement of  national bodies and the 
financial participation of regional lending institutions, to be 
encouraged by the provision of public guarantees. 
2.2.9.  The specific promotion of SMEs, particularly 
through investment incentives, is of particular importance. 
SMEs have a major part to play in economic recovery and 
especially job creation. 
2.2.9 .1.  The promotion of SMEs through increased global 
loans by the European Investment Bank and the provision 
of Structural and Cohesion Fund finance (e.g.  the Interim 
Cohesion Fund) is particularly important to those Member 
States with income levels at less than 90% of the 
Community average. These countries already have much 
ground to make up,  relatively speaking, to meet the nomi-
nal convergence criteria, and their efforts to bring their eco-
nomic fundamentals closer to the average and to make progress on real convergence must be supported, i.e. by re-
course to the Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
2.2.9.2.  We need of course to remember that the provision 
of finance from Community Funds was intended first and 
foremost to make it easier for countries to advance further 
towards the convergence necessary to prepare the way for 
Economic and Monetary Union. The financing  available 
from such Funds, however, is such that all it can do is com-
plement the measures now needed to fight the recession; it 
certainly cannot replace such· measures. 
2.2.10.  Economic and financial policy must be framed in 
such a way that the priority attached to economic growth in 
order to cut unemployment does not lead in the medium 
term to neglect of the convergence criteria. Given the reces-
sion, we cannot expect government debt and budget deficits 
to be reduced and come rapidly into line with the conver-
gence criteria reference values (Fifth Protocol, Articles 1 
and 4)5. This is already impossible because most Member 
States did not use the opportunity of the sustained econom-
ic boom in  the 1980s for budget consolidation and disci-
pline, so that there is now little scope per se for deficit 
spending. We must also take into account the fact that, be-
cause of the scale of unemployment and the depths of the 
recession, Member States have been less successful than 
expected in meeting the government debt and budget deficit 
criteria, whilst some Member States have even started to 
move further away from such targets. However, a circum-
spect approach is adopted by the Maastricht Treaty (Article 
104c(2)) which stipulates that attainment of the conver-
gence criteria is to be assessed in the final analysis not on 
the basis of an exact percentage, but rather in terms of sub-
stantial and continuous progress towards the reference 
value. This assessment should take account of the econom-
ic policies dictated by the scale of the recession. 
2.2.11.  The convergence programmes so far drawn up by 
nine Member States must be brought into line with the 
Commission's revised growth forecasts and expanded to 
become convergence-and-recovery programmes. This ap-
plies to countries which have submitted particularly ambi-
tious convergence programmes, e.g. Greece which has pro-
posed a programme aimed at reducing government debt 
from  106% of GDP in 1992 to 92% in 1996. It would also 
be helpful if the two countries which have not yet submit-
ted convergence programmes (invoking economic funda-
mentals so far broadly in line with the convergence criteria, 
or an EMU opt-out clause) were to do so. 
2.3.  The convergence criteria 
2.3.1.  The convergence criteria were drawn up  in  better 
times.  This does not however mean that they should now 
simply be adapted to reflect recessionary conditions. It 
would be a serious mistake to water down the convergence 
criteria and/or postpone the 1999 EMU deadline because of 
currently unfavourable economic trends. This would under-
mine confidence in a determined policy stance on EMU, 
and in the feasibility of EMU. It is by no means certain that 
the historical opportunity for monetary union will come 
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again in "better times" with less stringent convergence cri-
teria. 
2.3.2.  On the other hand, it would also be a mistake to 
apply all the convergence yardsticks simultaneously in  the 
current recession. The scale of unemployment and the re-
cession, along with the economic and budget policies need-
ed to tackle them, mean that,  with perhaps one exception, 
no Member State of the Community is currently able to ful-
fil  the budget criteria. We should not however leap to  the 
conclusion that the convergence criteria cannot be fulfilled 
at a later stage of the transitional phase and that monetary 
union by 1999 will be totally out of the question. Many 
would seize on such a conclusion as a welcome pretext for 
rejecting monetary union outright here and now. 
2.3.3.  It would be equally dangerous to use a snapshot of 
the convergence criteria as a basis for speculating as to 
which Member States will be among the founder members 
of a monetary union in five years time, and which will not. 
This black and white approach is inappropriate and unjusti-
fied.  Statistics covering a number of years (on inflation 
rates,  government debt, budget deficits, interest rates and 
exchange-rates) give a clearer impression of the prospects 
for progress on convergence in the near future. In assessing 
the statistics and calculating the convergence criteria per-
centages, it should be ensured that the data are comparable 
and that financial policy data include any separate govern-
ment budgets and assets. 
2.3.4.  The convergence criteria are important mainly be-
cause they have been, and are, interpreted as a quality stan-
dard for the  future monetary union,  a guarantee of mone-
tary stability, which the Maastricht Treaty makes the main 
plant of the European Central Bank's monetary policy. 
Most Member States endorsed the Maastricht Treaty be-
cause of this confidence in the stability of a European cur-
rency. This makes the inflation rate criterion particularly 
important, even though it is only a relative standard, based 
on the performance of those Member States with the lowest 
inflation rates at any given moment. 
2.3.5.  Discussions about reducing budget deficits and 
consolidating government debt should not however be re-
duced to a simple reference to the two relevant conver-
gence criteria in the  field of budget policy (Fifth Protocol 
and Article 104(c) of the Maastricht Treaty). 
2.3.5.1.  The most important question on budgetary policy 
is that of the structural problems which resulted from care-
free public spending during the boom years6.  The level of 
expenditure incurred during those years cannot now be sus-
tained in the context of a competitive world economy. This 
is  true not only of social spending but it also applies to 
other areas such as industrial and agricultural policy, and to 
the expansion of spending on public-sector administration. 
5  According to the Commission's 1993 Annual Economic Report, average budget 
deficits in  1992 rose from 4.6% to 5.3% of GDP, and government debt from 
60.4% to 62.8%. 2.3.5.2.  The structural problems of central budgets even 
throw up the question of how far,  under the given circum-
stances, public expenditure can actually bring down unem-
ployment, which is also to some extent generated by struc-
tural factors. 
2.3.5.3.  The cost of servicing government debt has risen 
by several percentage points on average throughout the 
Community in the last few  years.  Irrespective of conver-
gence criteria in the monetary policy sector, this is in itself 
a dangerous development for which a solution has to be 
found. 
2.4.  Monetary policy 
2.4.1.  The Section concurs with the view expressed in 
the second Annual Report of the Committee of Governors 
of the EC Central Banks tha~ EMS parity changes must re-
main possible during the transitional stage of EMU in the 
event of serious economic imbalances. 
2.4.1.1.  But parity changes alone are not enough; they 
must be backed up  by stabilization measures. Only if this 
happens can there by any guarantee that the European 
Monetary System will once again come to be regarded as 
an area of relative stability. 
2.4.1.2.  The discipline imposed by the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the EMS has in some EC countries led to ad-
justments in inflation rates, productivity, as well as produc-
tion and labour costs, not however in interest rates. The 
EMS  will be called into question if the wider fluctuation 
band means that a deterioration of the relevant economic 
fundamentals simply results in the exchange rate being al-
lowed to float downwards. On the other hand, is it right for 
a central bank to oppose a slide in the exchange rate, there-
by imposing excessively high interest rates? 
2.4.2.  The Committee welcomes the decision taken by 
the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at 
Kolding on 21 May 1993 on closer joint monitoring of eco-
nomic and monetary policy to make it possible to examine 
the need for realignments in  good time. This still applies 
with wider fluctuation bands. The European Monetary 
Institute (EMO, which is due to start work in January 1994, 
has an important role to play in this respect. 
2.4.3.  It is therefore regrettable that a decision on the lo-
cation of the EMI and on its President was delayed until the 
European Council meeting of October 1993. The delay in 
taking this important decision has itself contributed to un-
certainties on the foreign exchange markets. 
2.4.4.  An open, reciprocal flow of information on ex-
change-rate policy as recommended by the  Committee of 
Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States, is 
needed. Even given wider fluctuation bands, exchange rate 
policy remains a matter of common interest, as the EEC 
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Treaty Article 107 states. A prior reciprocal flow of infor-
mation on exchange-rate policy would help to prevent com-
petitive devaluation. EMS cooperation, and convergence 
towards the conditions for monetary union in the transition-
al stage, would be seriously hampered if there were to be 
even a hint of the kind of "beggar my neighbour" policies 
seen in the 1920s, when individual countries sought a com-
petitive advantage for their exports by devaluing their cur-
rencies. 
2.4.5.  The scope for still closer monetary cooperation 
from January 1994 onwards under the aegis of the 
European Monetary Institute should be fully exploited. This 
will require the preparation of a common monetary policy 
and uniform policy machinery for monetary union. The 
participation of all the Central Banks in this closer coopera-
tion and in  paving the way for monetary union would be 
the best way of ensuring that as many Member States as 
possible join monetary union from  the outset and that oth-
ers will soon flow. 
2.4.6.  It would be a mistake for a handful of countries to 
form a sort of mini-monetary union on the basis of separate 
intergovernmental agreements outside the scope of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Seriously planning for such a step would 
split the EC and possibly even necessitate the renegotiation 
of a - different - EMU: instead it is important to adhere to 
the principle that EMU, as agreed on in the Maastricht 
Treaty,  should be open to all Member States on an equal 
footing, including those EFT  A countries joining the 
Community over the next few years. 
2.4.7.  Under Articles 109g and h of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Economics and Finance Ministers and the 
European Council will decide which Member States will 
participate in EMU from the start. This decision should not 
discourage the joint efforts to achieve an EMU embracing 
all the Member States. An EMU with initially limited me.m-
bership should encourage the other Member States to con-
verge and to join EMU themselves before long. In its time, 
the EEC itself demonstrated the feasibility of an economic 
community, which six other countries subsequently joined. 
Similarly, the Internal Market and the prospect of EMU 
have encouraged the remaining EFT  A countries to apply 
for EC membership. 
2.4.8.  Over the next few years it will be crucial for the 
Member States to combine their efforts to reduce unem-
ployment and end the recession, without however renounc-
ing economic convergence in preparation for EMU. 
6  cf.  ESC  Opinion on the Annual  Economic Report for  1993  (CES  1011/93, 
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APPENDIX 
MAIN ECONOMIC DATA 
for the European Community 
covering the period 1992-1993 
(estimate* drawn up by Commission DG II as of  July 1993) 
1992  1993  1994 
GDP rate of % change at constant prices  2.5  -0.4  1.3 
Inflation rate  4.8  4.2  3.8 
Unemployment rate  9.8  11.5  11.9 
Public sector net 
new borrowing*  4.4  6.3  5.8 
Government debt*  60.0  68.8  72.1 
Real long-term interest rates  4.3  5.0  4.3 
Unemployed in millions  14.5  16.7  17.3 
Employed in millions  130.9  128.9  128.7 
Government*  5.4  5.6  5.6 
Interest payments 
Public sector consumption*  18.3  18.5  18.5 
1995  1996 
2.2  3.2 
3.3  2.8 
12.0  11.5 
5.1  3.5 
74.3  74.5 
4.0  3.5 
17.5  16.9 
129.3  130.6 
5.5  5.2 
18.3  17.9 
*  in %of  GDP. The estimate is based on the data contained in the convergence progranunes submitted by the Member States and on a number of assumptions. (D-396-93, pp. 
20-25). 
25 OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on 
Monetary Policy Procedure 
On 24 February 1994, the Economic and Social 
Committee decided, in accordance with Article 20, 
4th paragraph of the Rules of Procedure, to issue an 
Initiative Opinion on 
Monetary Policy. 
The  Section  for  Economic,  Financial  and 
Monetary Questions, which had been instructed to carry out 
the preparatory work, adopted its Opinion on 6 September 
1994. The Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN. 
The Committee unanimously adopted the follow-
ing Opinion at its 318th Plenary Session (meeting of 
15 September): 
Mandate 
The Economic and Social Committee decided to 
draw up an Initiative Opinion on Monetary Policy, as the 
ESC wished to express its views on the realization of 
Economic and Monetary Union, even though consultation 
of the Committee is not mandatory. Monetary policy is of 
great importance for the recovery and convergence of the 
Member States' economies, and thus for the transition to 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) scheduled for 1999 
at the latest. Experience of institutionalized cooperation 
between central banks in the European Monetary Institute 
since early 1994, and progress on the preparations for a 
common monetary policy will be taken into account at the 
intergovernmental conference scheduled for  1996 and in 
any revision of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 
1.  Monetary policy during the second 
stage of EMU against the background 
of the recession 
1.1.  Monetary policy, whether during the second stage 
of EMU or thereafter, cannot be seen in isolation. It is not 
an objective in itself, but rather a component of economic 
policy - designed where possible to promote steady growth 
of national output, to create and safeguard jobs, and at the 
same time to prevent inflation. In the EU, economic policy 
is also geared to economic convergence (Art. 103(3) Treaty 
on European Union), eventually leading to economic and 
monetary union, without which the advantages of the inter-
nal market cannot be fully exploited. 
1.2.  Under Article 109j(4) of the version of the EEC 
Treaty adopted at Maastricht, the third stage of EMU is to 
begin on 1 January 1999, if no earlier deadline is set. At the 
starting date of the third stage, the Council will adopt the 
conversion rates at which the currencies will be fixed and at 
which rates they will shortly afterwards be replaced by the 
ECU (Article 109(1)(4). A mere four years before the 1999 
deadline, however, public interest is focused on mass 
unemployment and the persistent recession, rather than on 
feverish preparations for monetary union. A Eurobarometer 
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(40 - 12/93) opinion poll showed that for 67% of respon-
dents, unemployment was the major problem; inflation and 
exchange rate instability were considered the main pro-
blems by only 9 and 10% respectively. 
1.3.  Even in 1991 during negotiations on the inter-go-
vernmental conference considerable doubt was expressed 
as to the feasibility of  EMU. Would it be possible: 
- on the one hand to transfer a future common monetary 
policy to an independent European central bank; 
and on the other, to leave economic and financial policy 
with the national governments, subject only to coordi-
nation in the ECOFIN Council in accordance with com-
mon guidelines and without a joint economic and fman-
cial policy adopted by some form of "European govern-
ment"? 
1.4.  The most severe recession of the second half of 
this century and (partly structural) mass unemployment 
have given rise to new doubts about the EMU decided at 
Maastricht: 
1.4.1.  Is there not a contradiction between a) the econo-
mic and financial policy needed to cope with  17  million 
unemployed and b) that dictated by convergence in prepa-
ration for EMU? 
1.4.2.  Does the reaction? to the Commission's White 
Papers on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment not 
show how differently these challenges are assessed, e.g. in 
relation to the investment of ca. ECU 400 bn. in trans-
European transport, telecommunications and energy 
networks in the period to 1999? 
1.4.3.  Can twelve, and perhaps soon sixteen, Member 
States regularly reach consensus on the coordination of 
their economic policies? Can such a consensus be expected 
after the experience with the first broad economic policy 
guidelines recommendation of December 19939, and in par-
ticular the Commission's recommendation that the 
Community should aim to  create 15 million jobs by 2000 
and thus to halve the present rate of unemployment (1994: 
12%)? 
1.4.4.  Does the prospect of a European Council Decision 
(under Articles 109g and h of the EEC Treaty) to establish 
EMU with only half the Member States not threaten to split 
the Community? Do the convergence requirements of the 
second stage not already expect too much of Member 
States with relatively low incomes? Are the resources to be 
made available from  the  Structural and Cohesion Funds a 
1  Cf.  the ESC's Opinion on the economic, social and industrial aspects of the 
White Paper: CES 750194, CES 751194 and CES 752194. 
8  Cf. COM(93) 700 final of 5 December 1993. 
9  See  Commission  Framework  of  10  November  1993,  Commission 
Recommendation of 24 November 1993, Council Recommendation of 22 
December 1993, based on the Conclusions of the European Council of 
10/11 December 1993, in European Economy 55194. suitable way of bolstering efforts by these countries to 
make progress on real as well as nominal convergence? 
1.4.5.  In view of these doubts should the deadline for 
EMU not be postponed and the convergence criteria relaxed 
to reflect the deterioration in economic circumstances? 
1.5.  The doubts expressed in point 1.4. have prompted 
the ESC to supplement its October 1993 OpinionlO on poli-
cies to be pursued in the Community during the transitional 
stage of EMU with this Opinion on monetary policy. The 
ESC asked how, against the background of the recession, 
monetary policy could be coordinated and an EMU with a 
single currency be prepared; it came to the following con-
clusion. 
1.5.1.  If  economic policies are not now harnessed to 
launch an energetic and urgent assault on unemployment, 
the result may be a  situation which leaves Economic and 
Monetary Union looking utopian. If the economic policy 
required by the recession is properly coordinated, it need 
not automatically run counter to convergence policies re-
quired for the preparation of EMU. 
1.5.2.  The convergence programmes must be adjusted to 
reflect the recession and be developed into convergence-
and-recovery programmes. With mass unemployment and 
recession, greater efforts must be made to coordinate eco-
nomic and monetary policy in  the Community, to observe 
the common guidelines and ·to strengthen multilateral sur-
veillance. A new recommendation on broad economic po-
licy guidelines (see point 1.4.3.) could place more emphasis 
on active support of economic growth, without however ne-
glecting the medium-term objectives of convergence 
policy  11.  With the Internal Market and freedom of capital 
movements largely in place, economic interdependence and 
interpenetration is so great that any Member State which 
goes it alone on economic and monetary policy hurts both 
itself and its neighbours. 
1.5.3.  For the ESC, merely softening the convergence cri-
teria is no solution. An adjustment of this kind is  not even 
necessary as the convergence criteria are to some extent rela-
tive, i.e. related to the Member States with the best relative 
performance (Article 109j(l)) or open to interpretation 
(Article 104c(2)). Moreover, GDP must also be calculated in 
a uniform and reliable manner; taking account of the black 
economy poses problems. It has been demonstrated that the 
recalculation of GDP, Portugal's for instance, would enable 
the government debt/GDP criterion to be met. Closer coope-
ration on statistics is therefore particularly important12. 
1.5.4.  Adjustment of the convergence criteria would also 
have the twofold disadvantage that: 
confidence in the feasibility of EMU, already dimin-
ished, would be further undermined, and 
efforts to achieve convergence would be relaxed. 
1.5.5.  In some countries, the budget convergence criteria 
can in the present recession only be given medium-term 
priority. In a recession,  the budgetary criteria should not 
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trigger or even be used as a pretext for, economic measures 
which are likely to exacerbate the crisis even further. An 
excessively tight interpretation of the budget policy criteria 
could reduce the scope for cyclical fine tuning and would 
reinforce the cyclical downturn rather than counter it.  On 
the other hand, the unavoidable new borrowing required to 
finance extraordinary expenditure should be limited becau-
se of the already considerable burden imposed by debt ser-
vicing on the budgets of some Member States. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that gradual reduction of budget 
deficits and government debt would place a heavy burden 
on these Member States in the run-up to EMU. (See point 
3.1.4.). 
1.5.6.  The convergence criteria are important mainly be-
cause they have been, and are, interpreted as a quality stan-
dard for the future monetary union, a guarantee of mone-
tary stability, which the Maastricht Treaty makes the main 
plank of the European Central Bank's monetary policy. 
Most Member States endorsed the Maastricht Treaty becau-
se of this confidence in the stability of a European currency 
(see point 4.2.4.). The ESC shares the view13  that the 
Member States' policy and behaviour up to  1996 should be 
consistent with the objective of an inflation rate of no more 
than 2  to  3%. Lack of such coherence would constitute a 
major macroeconomic obstacle to  growth, overload mone-
tary policy and make it necessary to pursue the stability 
objective by means of high interest rates. 
2.  The institutional framework of 
monetary policy 
2.1.  Role and responsibilities of the EMI 
2.1.1.  The EU Treaty does not give the EMI any mone-
tary policy responsibilities of its own, correctly the ESC 
feels,  as there would otherwise be conflicts of interest in 
view of the fact that, during the second stage, responsibility 
for  monetary policy will continue to rest exclusively with 
the central banks. The possibility of the central banks coor-
dinating their monetary policy to a limited extent via the 
EMI towards the end of the second stage should be consi-
dered however. Intervention on  foreign exchange markets 
and common money supply targets would be possible areas 
for joint action. 
2.1.2.  Foreign exchange market intervention by the 
EMI would however require the national central banks to 
transfer some of their foreign exchange reserves to the EMI 
and the Central Banks to agree in  the EMI Council on a 
common exchange rate policy. This would, however, be 
difficult because of the possible need for further parity 
adjustments in the event of different rates of progress on 
10  ESC Opinion, OJ No. C 352 of 31 December 1993, pp. 3-8. 
11  see CES 750194 of 1 June 1994, point 2. 2. 7. 
12  See ESC Opinion of 27 April 1994, OJ No. C 195 of 18 July 1994, p. 1. 
13  European Economy 55193, foreword, paragraph 6. convergence and in view of the varying extent to which 
Member States have used the wider (ERM) fluctuation 
band of 15%  either side of the parity, introduced on 2 
August 1993. 
2.1.3.  The establishment of common money supply tar-
gets by the EMI could be considered by the central banks 
as  an additional, non-binding guideline. But the money 
supply is defined and calculated differently from one 
Member State to another. The central banks of the Member 
States do not all attach the same importance to the money 
supply as  a component of monetary policy. The monetary 
policy of some central banks is aimed, rather, primarily at 
the exchange rate and/or interest rates.  In some countries, 
money supply targets are even regarded as an obsolete cri-
terion. In others control of government debt is considered 
to be of particular importance for monetary policy. 
2.1.4.  The initial joint monetary policy measures throu-
gh the EMI would require it to carry out the tasks allocated 
to it14 successfully, i.e. strengthening cooperation between 
the national central banks and coordinating their monetary 
policies with the aim of promoting price stability and 
taking  over  the  tasks  of the  European  Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF) and monitoring the functioning 
of the EMS. 
2.1.5.  The EMI also has statutory responsibility for pre-
paring the third stage of EMU, in particular: promoting the 
efficiency of cross-border payments15, drafting the rules for 
operations to be undertaken by the national central banks in 
the framework of the future European system of central 
banks (ESCB) and promoting cooperation on statistics16 in 
areas within its field of competence. The ESC feels that the 
EMI should also promote cooperation on banking supervi-
sion, which is partly the responsibility of the central banks 
themselves and partly that of independent supervisory 
authorities, to some extent separately from credit insurance 
and the securities markets. With regard to cooperation on 
banking supervision, common initiatives should in particu-
lar be looked at to bring derivatives transactions within the 
scope of supervision (see point 4.2.7.). 
2.1.6.  The ESC sees the EMI'  s two most important tasks 
as the coordination of the monetary policies of the partici-
pating central banks (see point 2.2.) and the preparation of 
the instruments and procedures needed for carrying out a 
single monetary policy (see point 4.5.). 
2.1. 7.  The ESC feels  that the EMI should provide the 
public with timely, comprehensive and comprehensible 
information on two of  its other statutory responsibilities: 
- supervising the technical preparation (design, denomi-
nations) for the issue of approx. ECU 15  billion ban-
knotes and 100 billion coins, and 
facilitating the use of the ecu. 
2.1.7.1.  The ESC refers to its suggestionl7 that when the 
time is ripe, the national me~ia should be enlisted in order 
to provide a  comprehensive explanation of EMU, and in 
particular the replacement of national currencies by a single 
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currency, the ecu, and to boost confidence in the new sy-
stem. The introduction of the ecu as a currency will mean 
an unprecedented adjustment to a completely new structure 
of prices and incomes in all the participating Member 
States; expressed in national currencies one ecu will be 
equivalent to an amount ranging from four places before 
the decimal point to four places after the point; in no case 
will the conversion rate be a round figure. 
2.1.7.2.  Reports should be published by the EMI and its 
competent working party to keep the public informed on 
the progress of the discussions on the design of the new ecu 
banknotes. Unlike format and paper quality, design is not 
something which can be decided behind closed doors. 
2.1.7.3.  The ESC believes that ecu banknotes should be 
identical in all the Member States. Each denomination 
could feature front and back a different national, but uni-
versally familiar, figure from science or the arts, or a natio-
nal monument; in this way each Member State would be re-
presented on at least one of the eight banknotes (e.g. 1, 2, 5, 
10, 20, 50,  100 and 200 ECU). This approach would reflect 
Europe's common cultural heritage. The appearance of the 
ecu banknotes must not remain a  secret until 1999, howe-
ver. 
2.2.  Coordination 
2.2.1.  The ESC expects monetary policy cooperation to 
be stepped up between the national central banks within the 
institutional framework of the EMI, i.e. over and beyond 
the cooperation which already took place in the EC 
Committee of Central Bank Governors. Without step-by-
step closer cooperation in the second stage, it is difficult to 
imagine that a  European Central Bank would be able to 
operate a single monetary policy from the beginning of the 
third stage. 
2.2.2.  The practical coordination of monetary policy is 
even  more  important  than  its  legal  framework. 
Coordination will of course be made more difficult by the 
fact that: 
the central banks will guard their monetary policy re-
sponsibility and independence jealously until the end of 
the second stage; 
- it is  impossible to imagine an overnight transition to a 
common monetary policy under the aegis ECB. 
The central banks ought therefore to confer as fre-
quently as possible, and certainly before all major deci-
sions. The EMI is the appropriate forum for this. In addi-
tion to these, generally informal, coordination meetings, the 
central bank governors should meet regularly, perhaps 
every two weeks, for a session of the EMI Council. This is 
essential if the central bank governors are to be able to as-
14  See Protocol4 annexed to the EU Treaty, Articles 4, 5 and 7. 
15  See ESC Opinion of 6  July 1994 (CES 854194). 
16  See ESC Opinion of 27 April 1994, OJ No. C 195 of 18 July 1994, p. 1. 
17  See ESC Opinion, O.J. No. C 34, 2  February 1994, pp. 25-35. sume responsibility for a common European monetary po-
licy at the beginning of the third stage, in their capacity as 
members of the ECB  Council. Successful coordination of 
monetary policy, which in the second stage will still be na-
tionally based, will depend on the willingness of the central 
banks to be guided increasingly by Community objectives, 
in particular with regard to price stability. 
2.2.3.  The EMI should use its, albeit non-binding, opi-
nions and recommendations frequently and at an early stage 
to contribute to closer cooperation between the central 
banks and the coordination of their monetary policies. 
Opinions and recommendations are adopted by the EMI 
Council by a two-thirds majority. Unanimity is required for 
the publication of opinions and recommendations. The ESC 
feels that such opinions and recommendations, if not publi-
shed, should at least be commented on by the EMI 
Chairman. The EMI will secure the credibility and public 
confidence it needs in its activities as a precursor of the 
European Central Bank by  ~ssuing well founded opinions 
and recommendations18  based on thorough analysis. 
2.2.4.  The ESC welcomes the arrangement whereby the 
President of the ECOFIN Council and a member of the 
Commission may attend the meetings of the EMI Council, 
and under which the Chairman of the EMI will be invited 
to meetings of the ECOFIN Council when it discusses mat-
ters falling within the EM  I'  s area of responsibility. This re-
ciprocal participation, provided for in Article 11 of the EMI 
statute, would appear appropriate. 
3.  The relationship between monetary 
policy and economic policy coordination 
3.1.  Recommended economic policy guidelines 
3  .1.1.  In parallel with closer cooperation between the cen-
tral banks and coordination of monetary policy, the Member 
States's economic policies must also be more closely coordi-
nated. The success of monetary policy will depend on  the 
successful coordination of economic policies. The central 
banks' monetary policy will be overloaded and coordination 
of policy in the EMI hampered if monetary policy is expec-
ted to  remedy the mistakes and shortcomings of economic 
policy in general and budgetary policy in particular. On the 
other hand, reducing budget deficits and govenunent debt in 
line with the budgetary policy convergence criteria will faci-
litate monetary policy, as it will lay the foundations for a 
further reduction of the  inflation rate and for lower interest 
rates, thus fulfilling two other convergence criteria. 
3.1.2.  On 22 December 1993 the ECOFIN Council 
adopted, in the form of a recommendation, the broad guide-
lines of economic policies as defined in  Article  103(2) of 
the EU Treaty. These broad guidelines will serve to gear 
national economic policies towards Community objectives. 
One of these is achieving sufficient convergence between 
the economies for the transition to the third stage. 
3  .1.3.  The ESC welcomes the fact that the guidelines are 
from now on to be reviewed and adjusted in mid-year, 
before the  budget for  the  following  year is  adopted. The 
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guidelines of 22 December 1993 include important measu-
res from the White Paper (growth, competitiveness and em-
ployment) submitted by the Commission to the European 
Council on 10 December 199319. 
3.1.4.  The economic policy guidelines of 22 December 
199320, which were reaffirmed by the ECOFIN Council on 
11  July 1994, include efforts held by the Member States to 
prevent any  further deterioration in  their budgetary situa-
tions in  1994 and to achieve budget consolidation. In  1995 
they are required to pursue action to make their public fi-
nance positions sustainable again. The ESC welcomes these 
recommendations. It points out however that some Member 
States will need more time than others to consolidate their 
budgets. They may not be able to  fulfil  the 22 December 
1993 conditions until after 1996. 
3.2.  Multilateral surveillance and the convergence 
programmes 
3.2.1.  The coordination of economic policy, compliance 
with the guidelines referred to in point 3 .1.2. by the various 
Member States and the implementation of their convergen-
ce programmes are all to be the subject of multilateral sur-
veillance21. Apart from the initial economic policy guideli-
nes, the ESC feels that two innovations in the second stage 
will improve multilateral surveillance: 
3.2.1.1.  The ECOFIN Council, acting by qualified majo-
rity, may decide to make public its recommendations to in-
dividual Member States in connection with multilateral sur-
veillance (Art. 103(4) EU Treaty). 
3.2.1.2.  On a proposal from the Commission, the ECOFIN 
Council may adapt the multilateral surveillance procedures 
to  the requirements of economic policy coordination (Art. 
103(5)). 
3.2.2.  The ESC ha~ already commented on the new pro-
cedure provided for in Article 103 of the EEC Treaty in its 
Opinion on the 1994 Annual Economic Report22. The ESC 
regrets that the old consultation requirement has been drop-
ped.  It is  particularly important that the economic and so-
cial groups represented in the ESC be consulted on the is-
sues of monetary stability, employment, investment and 
production costs, which are dealt with in the Annual 
Economic Report, the country reports it produces and the 
broad economic policy guidelines. 
3.2.3.  In accordance with the decision of the ECOFIN 
Council of 8 July 1991, most govenunents drew up conver-
gence programmes at the beginning of the second stage. 
The convergence programmes list the measures whereby 
the Member States hope eventually to be able to meet the 
18  See Hearing of EMI Chairman  Lamfalussy by the European Parliament on  10 
November 1993. 
19  The ESC has adopted Opinions on the subject- see footnote 1. 
20  European Economy 55/1993, Part A, I, Point 2.2. and No. 58/1994. 
21  Decision 90/141  EEC, OJ No. L 78 of 24 March 1990. 
22  ESC Opinion of 27 April1994, OT No. C 195 of 18 July 1994, pp. 44-52 point 6. convergence criteria for transition to the third stage. The 
ESC considers that the convergence programme must be 
adjusted to reflect economic conditions and be developed 
into convergence - and - recovery programmes23. The ECO-
AN Council assesses the convergence programmes submit-
ted to it in restricted session. Only a summary of the results 
of  the discussions is made public. The ESC regrets this. 
3.2.4.  The ESC considers that national convergence and 
recovery programmes should not be drawn up in isolation, 
but rather on a  coordinated basis. Cooperation between 
Germany and France on drawing up their respective pro-
grammes is an initiative to be welcomed. In this way the 
possible repercussions of national measures on other 
Member States can be better assessed and taken into ac-
count in the convergence programmes, whose timescales 
should as far as possible be coordinated. 
3.2.5.  All the convergence programmes24 require deficits 
to be reduced in the medium term and the reference value 
of 3% of GDP to be achieved by 1996. Government debt, 
which rose from an EC average of 58% in 1991 to 66.4% in 
1993, is first to be stabilized, and then reduced. The ESC 
welcomes these ambitious objectives, but wonders whether 
the political will exists everywhere actually to put the con-
vergence programmes into effect; this would certainly be 
desirable. 
3.2.6.  The ESC feels that the procedure for pursuing 
convergence programmes after the beginning of the third 
stage should be decided now. In so doing, thought should 
be given a) to the continuation of the convergence pro-
grammes for those Member States not participating in the 
currency union from the beginning and b) their coordina-
tion with the countries forming the ecu zone. This would 
make it easier for the first group of Member States to join 
the ecu zone at an early stage. 
3.2.7.  Under Article 104c(6) the ECOFIN Council deci-
des whether an excessive deficit exists and makes recom-
mendations to the Member State concerned with a view to 
bringing that situation to an end within a given period. If  no 
effective action is taken, the recommendations may be 
made public. The ESC expects that the excessive deficit 
procedure will be invoked only where an overshoot of the 
reference value is not purely a  result of the recession and 
mass unemployment. On  the otber band, compliance with 
the prohibition on deficit financing by central banks and on 
privileged access for the public sector to financial institu-
tions should be enforced. 
3.2.8.  Because of the  s~ale of the recession most 
Member States will not be immediately able to meet both 
budgetary convergence criteria25.  In 1993 eleven Member 
States exceeded the deficit criterion and seven the debt cri-
terion; only Luxembourg fulfilled both criteria. 
3.2.9.  The budgetary problems of most Member States 
make it more difficult to pursue a monetary policy aimed at 
price stability. This in tum adversely affects the relation-
ship between the central banks working together in the 
EMI, and in particular between the central banks which are 
already independent on the one band, and the economics 
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and finance ministers meeting in the ECOAN Council on 
the other. 
3.2.10.  The  ESC  feels  that  the  EU's  Monetary 
Committee (established under Article 109c) could play an 
important role here, as its membership includes senior re-
presentatives of the central banks, the fmance ministries and 
the Commission. Differences between the ECOAN Council 
and the EMI on economic and monetary policy and their 
coordination could be thrashed out and eliminated at the 
Monetary Committee stage. The ESC feels that the 
Monetary Committee holds the key to the desired progress 
on coordination, both of economic policy and monetary po-
licy. If  no consensus is achieved in the Monetary Committee 
neither the ECOAN Council nor the EMI Council will be 
able to work for coordination where obstacles exist. 
3.2.11.  In its Maastricht Declaration26 the Community af-
firms its intention of contributing to stable international 
monetary relations. To this end tbe Community is prepared 
to cooperate with countries with which it bas close econo-
mic ties. Under the Agreement (Article 46) on the 
European Economic Area (EEA), the EU intends to discuss 
common problems of economic and monetary policy with 
its EEA partners. The ESC is pleased to note that tbe mee-
tings initiated in April 1993 are in future to be held twice a 
year. 
4.  Major areas of mmonetary policy 
cooperation 
4.1.  The EU, the G7 and the OECD 
4.1.1.  The major areas of cooperation between tbe cen-
tral banks in the EMI include securing price stability, EMS 
exchange rate policy, interest rate policy and tbe approxi-
mation of  monetary policy instruments and procedures. 
4.1.2.  Monetary policy cooperation in tbe EMI must also 
take account of economic trends in the main industrialized 
countries, the Group of Seven and the OECD, with which 
most EU countries have close trading relations. In particu-
lar, the reaction to trends in the exchange rates of the US 
dollar and the yen must be as far as possible coordinated. 
4.1.3.  It would facilitate the EU's monetary policy if the 
USA were, in the framework of its otherwise highly suc-
cessful economic policy, to make efforts to cut its budget 
deficit and if the Federal Reserve Bank were not to raise its 
discount rate any further. The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) bas estimated that US government debt is rising 
faster than national income. Government debt is forecast to 
more than double as a proportion of GDP within a genera-
23  See Opinion on policy during the transitional stage of EMU (OJ No.  C 352 of 
30 December 1994, pp. 3-8, points 1.1.2. and 2.2.2.1.). 
24  European Economy 5511993, Part B, I, Point 2.2.2. and tables 3  and 7. 
25  Under Article 104(c)(2)(a) budget deficits may not exceed 3% of GOP.  Under 
Article 104(c)(2)(b) government debt may not exceed 60% of GOP. 
26  Fifth Declaration appended to the Final Act of the EU Treaty. tion. This far-reaching projection is based on the fact that 
over half of govenunent spending is currently required by 
law, i.e. social security, and in particular pensions and med-
ical cover, and that demographic trends will cause this 
spending to continue to rise. The USA faces similar prob-
lems to some EU Member States; i.e. it must attempt to 
curb its budget deficit rather than simply raising interest 
rates. Because of the dollar's importance for payments in 
international trade, for the currency markets and for central 
banks' reserves, the US budget deficit and interest rate ad-
justments have a direct impact on the monetary policy envi-
ronment for the EU and its ·Member States. A successful 
US budget policy would thus benefit the monetary policy 
of the EU and its Member States. 
4.2.  Price stability 
4.2.1.  The primary objective of monetary policy (under 
Art. 105(1)) is the maintenance of price stability. 
Monetary policy will also support general economic poli-
cies in the EU, without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability. 
4.2.2.  In 1993 the average inflation rate in  the EU was 
3.8%. The four countries with the lowest inflation rates 
were Denmark with 1.4%, the Netherlands with 2.1 %,  and 
France and Ireland each with 2.3%. Under the convergence 
criterion, the inflation rate in the other Member States 
should not have been more than  1.5% higher. In fact,  five 
Member States had an inflation rate above 3.8%27, including 
Germany with 4.3%, Italy with 4.4.% and Spain with 4.7%. 
4.2.3.  In its broad economic policy guidelines the 
Community sets itself the objective28 of achieving an annu-
al inflation rate not higher than 2-3% in most of the 
Member States by  1996. All economic policy and behav-
iour should be consistent with this objective. 
4.2.4.  The Commission believes29 that an  inflation rate 
not higher than 2-3% is in keeping with a monetary policy 
stability target which is not usually spelt out explicitly. 
This seems realistic as an initial objective. The ESC be-
lieves that an average Community inflation rate of 2-3% 
can be achieved as early as 1995, although admittedly more 
as a result of the recession than of the central banks' mone-
tary policies. This is not entirely satisfactory from the 
saver's point of view. The ESC would like to see the 
Council of the EMI, regardless of the then prevailing aver-
age inflation rate, specifically recommend an ambitious 
monetary policy stability target for the ecu before the third 
stage, offering the prospect of a stable common currency 
within a monetary union. 
4.3.  Exchange rate policy 
4.3.1.  The Council Recommendation of 22 December 
1993 stated that the high degree of integration and the reap-
ing of the benefits of the internal market demanded that the 
Community continue to aim for exchange rate stability built 
on common efforts to make progress on convergenceJo. 
4.3.2.  The Commission has established31 that the Member 
States have not made use of the greater potential to differen-
tiate their monetary stance offered by the temporary widen-
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ing since 2 August 1993 of the EMS exchange rate mecha-
nism's fluctuation bands to  15% either side of the parity. 
Instead, after some major rate adjustments in the wake of the 
foreign exchange market turbulence of July 1993, they have 
maintained their commitment to monetary policy coopera-
tion based on stable exchange rates and have pursued a "cau-
tious" interest rate policy. As a result, since the beginning of 
1994, exchange rate movements have in effect been limited32 
to a fluctuation margin of less than 4.5%. 
4.3.3.  In its Opinion of 24 November 199333, the ESC ar-
gued that the central banks should, through the EMI, contin-
uously monitor the extent to which the wider fluctuation 
bands are actually being used. On this basis the ESC felt that 
a timescale for gradual coordinated narrowing could be con-
sidered. 
4.3.4.  The ESC welcomes the Commission's assessment 
contained in its convergence report, submitted in accordance 
with Article 109(1)(2)b34. The text reads as follows:  "Any 
effort to re-establish narrow bands without improved eco-
nomic convergence among Member States would almost cer-
tainly not be accepted by the financial markets and would in-
cite renewed speculative attacks on the ERM grid. The expe-
rience of the recent crises has demonstrated that a necessary 
condition for exchange-rate stability is achieved by the pur-
suit of credible and consistent economic policies designed to 
foster economic convergence in conditions of economic 
growth, while focusing on the fundamentals of  price stability 
and sound public finances." 
4.3.5.  Art.  109j(l) of the EU Treaty states as a third con-
vergence criterion: "the observance of the normal fluctuation 
margins provided for by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of 
the European Monetary System, for at least two years, with-
out devaluing against the currency of any other Member 
State." The EMI should perhaps decide what is to be consid-
ered as ''normal" with a view to the third stage of EMU fol-
lowing the "temporary" widening of the fluctuation margins 
on 2 August 1993. In this connection, the view35  that the 
reintroduction of a general, narrow fluctuation band is no 
longer an absolute precondition for transition to the third 
stage of EMU, is particularly striking. The ESC considers the 
"normal fluctuation margins" referred to in Article 109j(l) 
as a concept which need not yet be quantified. 
4.3.5.1.  Retention of the "temporarily" widened fluctua-
tion margins reduces speculative pressure on the ERM grid 
and makes it possible for exchange rate adjustments neces-
sitated by divergent progress on convergence to be carried 
27  European Economy, No.  55/1993:  Broad economic policy guidelines and con-
vergence report, Part B, table 1. 
28  European Economy, No. 5511993, part A, I and II, point 2.1. and No. 58/94. 
29  European Economy, No. 55/1993, part A, III, point 2.1. 
30  European Economy, part A, I, point 2.1. 
31  European Economy No. 55/1993, part A, lll, point 2.1. 
32  European Economy No. 55/1993, part B, I, point 2.2.5 and table 53. 
33  OJ No. C 34 of 2  February 1994, pp. 23-25, point 1.4.10. 
34  European Economy No. 55/1993, part B, I, point 2.2.5., p. 7. 
35  Financial Times, 27.10.1993. out without drama36.  The general retention of the "tem-
porarily" widened margins does not prevent individual cen-
tral banks agreeing among themselves on narrower fluctua-
tion margins for their currencies, as has already been done 
in the case of the German mark and the Dutch guilder. 
4.3.5.2.  The retention of the wider margins would also 
make it easier for the Italian lira and pound sterling to re-
join the ERM, and for the Greek drachma finally to join, 
the ERM. The EMI can play a constructive role here 
through its recommendations and opinions, and through 
proposals for improved application of the EMS rules capa-
ble of commanding consensus support. In the framework of 
the EMI a  general lesson can be learnt from the EMS 
crises, namely that the EMS should again be regarded as a 
system of fixed, but adjustable exchange rates. 
4.3.6.  A once again fully operational EMS exchange rate 
mechanism would not only facilitate transition to the third 
stage of EMU, but would also prevent the damaging effects 
of  parity changes on common farm prices. 
4.3.7.  In the context of exchange rate policy, a coordi-
nated EMI initiative should be considered to bring deriva-
tives within the scope of banking supervision. The banks' 
off-balance-sheet transactions in futures, options and swaps 
often exceed their balance sheet totals. And yet prudential 
controls such as solvency or liquidity ratios do not as yet 
extend to derivatives transactions. Bringing derivatives 
under the Member States' banking supervision - if possible 
in concert with the OECD countries - would reduce the vol-
ume of speculative monetary movements on the foreign ex-
changes, or at least curb their growth. 
4.3.8.  For the reasons set out above, the coordination of 
exchange-rate policy in the EMI is one of the main tasks 
for monetary policy. This task will be facilitated if: 
the signs of recovery of economic growth are con-
fmned, 
in particular, unemployment can be  reduced; (here the 
Commission's White Paper has proposed important mea-
sures for the creation of  fifteen million new jobs), and 
- in general, further progress is made on price stability, as 
is already suggested by the fall in the average Commu-
nity inflation rate from 5.3% in 1991 to 3.8% in 1993. 
4.3.9.  Under these conditions the EMI can afford to be 
less concerned about possible unilateral national monetary 
policy action and look forward with greater confidence to 
generally more stable exchange rate relationships. 
4.4.  Interest rate policy 
4.4.1.  The Commission37 rightly notes progress on con-
vergence of long-term interest rates. Between 1990 and 
1993 average long-term interest rates in the Community fell 
from 11.0% to 8.1% and the reference band from  11-13% 
to 8.7-10.9%. The fall in interest rates was accompanied by 
an improvement in convergence: in  1993 only two coun-
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tries were above the reference band, as against four in 
1990; seven countries were below the reference band, com-
pared with  five in 1990. The interest rate spread has thus 
narrowed. 
4.4.2.  Measuring convergence on interest rate policy is 
made more difficult by the fact that reported interest rates 
are determined differently. The Commission's draft 
Regulation on Community action in the field of statistics 
will improve matters. The ESC welcomes this in its 
Opinion38. 
4.4.3.  These cautious interest rate cuts demonstrate two 
things: 
- that progress towards lower inflation has created a 
sounder basis for cuts in short and long-term interest 
rates; 
- that the scope for differentiated monetary policy created 
by the widening of the EMS fluctuation margins has not 
led to precipitous interest rate cuts. 
One may therefore hope and expect that closer 
monetary policy cooperation in the EMI will lead to further 
interest rate convergence. 
4.4.4.  The respective importance of short and long-term 
interest rates varies from one economy to  another. This is 
explained by the varying approaches to financing the bank-
ing system, the use of debt finance by the public sector and 
the open market policies of the central banks. One much 
quoted example is the different approach to financing home 
ownership/building in Great Britain and Germany. The pre-
dominance of short-term finance in Britain has a greater 
impact on short-term interest rates there than in Germany, 
where housing loans are made at long-term interest rates, 
financed mainly by the issue of special long-term debt in-
struments ("Pfandbriefe"). Closer cooperation between cen-
tral banks on interest rate policy is hampered by differences 
of this kind (See point 4.5.3.). 
4.5.  Monetary policy instruments 
4.5.1.  The EMI must as a matter of priority work for ap-
proximation of monetary policy instruments and procedures. 
The monetary policy of the central banks places differing 
emphasis on the classical instruments of discount, open mar-
ket and minimum reserve policy. Moreover, these instru-
ments and procedures differ from one country to another. 
4.5.2.  Step-by-step approximation is necessary not only 
in preparation for the single monetary policy to be adopted 
with the beginning of the third stage of EMU. The degree 
of integration achieved with the completion of the internal 
36  See ESC Opinion of 24 November 1993, OJ No. C  34 of 2  February 1994, pp. 
25-35, point 1.3.2.2. 
37  European Economy No. 55/1993, part B, I, point 2.2.4. and table 9. 
38  See ESC Opinion of 27 April1994 on COM(94) 78 final of 10 March 1994, OJ 
No. C  195 of 18 July 1994, p.  1. market also makes a certain approximation of monetary 
policy instruments necessary, in particular with regard to fi-
nancial and capital movements and the growing cross-bor-
der activities of credit institutions and insurance companies. 
4.5.3.  In the field of open market policy, the range of 
money market paper, treasury bills, treasury bonds and 
other securities issued and purchased by the central banks 
in  order to influence the liquidity of the banking system, 
and to some extent that of the whole economy, needs to be 
brought into line rapidly. A gradual approximation of the 
maturities of central bank open market liabilities and of se-
curities taken on deposit and lent on by the central banks is 
of great importance. This would lessen the remaining diffe-
rences in the impact of interest rate policy based on the di-
scount rate from  one country to  another. This disparity is 
clearly illustrated by the different impact of discount rate 
adjustments in Great Britain and in Germany (see point 
4.4.4.): 
in Great Britain the short-term interest rate has an im-
mediate impact on credit which is mostly financed short 
term; 
in Germany a higher proportion of loans are refinanced 
longer  term  by  the  issue  of  mortgage  bonds 
(Pfandbriefe), municipal or bank bonds and other secu-
rities with maturities of ten  years or more. The short-
term interest rate, and discount rate adjustments by the 
Bundesbank, thus do not have the same impact as in 
Great Britain. 
4.5.4.  For the purposes of the interest-rate and open-
market policy of a European central bank, intended to apply 
evenly throughout the Community, it would be a good 
thing to have convergence in the use of these monetary po-
licy instruments during the second stage. This is also true 
of the central banks' minimum reserve policies. In its 
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Opinion of 24 March 199339  the ESC compared the diffe-
rent extent to which credit institutions are affected by the 
requirement to  maintain (generally interest-free) minimum 
reserves with the central bank and by compulsory invest-
ment in securities. These differences, now less pronounced, 
lead to distortions of competition in the financial sector and 
to transfers of banking activity to countries with lower mi-
nimum reserve requirements, or none at all. The require-
ment still imposed by central banks on credit institutions in 
some Member States to buy government securities conti-
nues to affect competition in cross-border banking. Such a 
requirement is also in contravention of the ban on the fman-
cing of public-sector deficits via the central banks. 
4.5.5.  In addition to the monetary policy instruments and 
procedures, the  parameters also need to  be approximated. 
The main benchmark in most Member States is money sup-
ply trends.  But this is differently calculated and defined, 
e.g.  with regard to  the  inclusion of savings accounts and 
term deposits. The EMI should therefore make proposals 
for a common definition of money supply  (Ml or M2) and 
for its uniform statistical calculation40. As the next step, the 
EMI could consider ways of achieving agreement between 
the central banks on attaching comparable weight to money 
supply targets in the second stage, and finally on a certain 
approximation of money supply targets or margins (see 
point 2.1.3.). 
4.5.6.  Approximation of monetary policy instruments 
and procedures presupposes preparation for a single mone-
tary policy. Drawing up a plan acceptable by consensus du-
ring the second stage is an important task for the EMI. 
39  See OJ No. C  129 of 10 May 1994, pp. 10-17). 
40  See ESC Opinion on COM(94)  78  final  of  10 March  1994, OJ  No. C 195 of 
18 July 1994, p. 1. OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on the 
Communication and Draft Proposal for a Directive on the 
Transparency and Performance of Cross-Border Payments 
(SEC(93) 1968) Procedure 
On 22 April 1994 the Economic and Social 
Committee decided, in accordance with Article 20(4) of its 
Rules of Procedure, to draw up an Opinion on the 
Conununication and Draft Proposal for a Directive on 
the  Transparency and Performance of Cross-Border 
Payments 
(SEC(93) 1968.final). 
The  Section  for  Economic,  Financial  and 
Monetary Questions, which  was responsible for preparing 
the Committee's work on the  subject, adopted its Opinion 
on 14 June 1994. The Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN. 
At its 317th Plenary Session (meeting of 6 July 
1994) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the fol-
lowing Opinion with one vote against and five abstentions: 
1.  Preliminary Remarks 
1.1.  Under pressure from  the Commission,  the 
European credit sector associations (ECSAs)41  prepared 
guidelines for customer information on cross-border pay-
ments which,  after consultations with the Commission and 
its Payment Systems Users Liaison Group (see point 1.3) 
were submitted in March 1992. The Commission suggested 
that these guidelines be implemented by  the banks by the 
end of 1992, obviously with an eye on the deadline for the 
implementation of the single market. The associations there-
upon declared themselves ready to work towards having  the 
guidelines  applied by their member institutions as soon as 
possible. To the guidelines was appended a Commission 
working document entitled "Easier Cross-Border Payments: 
Breaking Down The Barriers"42 in which  the Commission 
stated it would monitor the guidelines' implementation. 
1.2.  To do this the Commission ordered a study to be 
carried out in February 1993 ·which looked at: 
- the quality of the written information given in 287 bank 
branches to customers wishing  to make a cross-border 
payment; and 
- the actual performance of carrying out around 1,000 
transfers of ECU 100 each between accounts with  34 
banks in all Member States. 
1.3.  The study's findings were discussed in September 
and October 1993 in two Commission advisory groups: 
- the Payment Systems Technical Development Group 
(PSTDG); and 
- the Payment Systems Users Liaison Group (PSULG). 
Both advisory groups had already expressed their 
views on the implementation of the  1990 Commission 
Recommendation on the transparency of banking conditions 
relating to cross-border fmancial transactions (90/1 09/EEC, 
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OJ L 67 of 15 March 1990, page 39). The PSULG discussed 
and agreed with the guidelines referred to in point 1.1. 
1.4.  The study's findings and the advisory groups' 
Opinions on them were summarized in a Communication to 
the Commission on Transparency and Efficiency in  the 
Performance of Cross-Border Payments43.  In  this 
Communication the Commissioners responsible, Mr 
VANNI d' ARCHIRAFI and Mrs SCRIVENER, suggested 
the following  line of action, which was approved by the 
Commission on 14 December 1993. 
1.4.1.  The banking industry would be given a further 
deadline for achieving the desired results in terms of trans-
parency and performance through self-regulation. 
1.4.2.  The Commission would examine the progress 
made before August 1994 by conducting a second and de-
finitive  study in  March/  April  1994, which would be sub-
mitted at the end of July. 
1.4.3.  As a precaution, a draft proposal for a Council 
Directive on Transparency and Performance of Cross-
Border Payments would be prepared. If insufficient 
progress had been made in  this field,  the Commission 
would immediately initiate legislative action in the form of 
a Directive. A first draft proposal for such a Directive was 
attached to the Communication. Since April1994 this draft 
Directive has  been under examination by  the Commission 
working party of government experts. 
1.4.4.  Finally the Commission began talks in the 
PSULG (see point 1.3 .)  about guidelines in  which the 
fullest possible instructions about "face-to-face" payments 
are  to be laid down44.  This covers cross-border payments 
which customers of a credit institution in a Member State 
arrange themselves by means of a card or cheque while 
they are in another Member State. It remains to be seen to 
what extent guidelines on what information should be given 
to  customers before and after face-to-face payments may 
supplement the "Code of Best Practice"45  drawn up by the 
three ECSAs on 14 November 1990. 
1.5.  The ESC has general and specific comments to 
make in chapters 2 and 3 below on: 
- the Communication to  the Commission and the studies 
referred to in  it, together with the Opinions of the 
PSTDG and PSULG; and 
- the frrst draft proposal for a Council Directive appended 
to the Communication, which is  to be enacted in the 
light of the Opinions of the European Parliament and 
the Economic and Social Committee. 
41  The Banking Federation of the European Community, the European Savings 
Banks Group and the Association of Cooperative Banks of the EC. 
42  SEC(92) 621 of 17 March 1992. 
43  SEC(93) 1968. 
44  See Commission document XV /106194. 
45  Code of Best Practice of the  European Banking Industry on  Card-Based 
Payment Systems (doc. 135190). 2.  General Comments 
2.1.  The  ESC  welcomes  the  attempts  of  the 
Commission and the  credit industry to improve the cross-
border payments market, as regards: 
the transparency of conditions; and 
the speed, reliability and costs of such operations. 
The ESC regrets that these attempts were not un-
dertaken earlier and that the 1990 Commission Recom-
mendation referred to in point 1.3 has been put into effect 
so late. 
With the completion of the internal market in 
1993 and the transition to an economic and monetary union 
by no later than 1999 scheduled by the Maastricht Treaty, 
cross-border payments, especially large-scale transfers of 
smaller amounts, are becoming increasingly important. The 
ESC therefore thinks it is of pressing importance that cross-
border transfers become more transparent and efficient and 
that the steps still necessary to this end be taken soon (see 
point 2.9). 
2.1.1.  According to the Banking Federation of the 
European Community (1991  and 1992 Annual Reports), 
cross-border transfers by cheque, transfer or cards totalled 
some 323 million in 1990 and around 398 million in  1991. 
This represents around 1.2% of all payments in the 
Community in 1990 and 1.3% in  1991  (out of 26 billion 
and 31 billion transactions respectively). 
2.1.2.  The number and value of cross-border transfers of 
sums below ECU 2,500 have been of little significance to 
date. So, the banks at first hesitated to invest in standardis-
ing and automating cross-border transfers of small 
amounts. As a result, processing here is still comparatively 
labour-intensive and is  more expensive and slower than 
payments within a country. 
2.2.  The Commission therefore thinks it only right to 
ensure that cross-border payments within the internal mar-
ket are as quick, reliable and cheap as is the case now for 
payments within the same Member State. But cross-border 
payments are subject to different conditions from those ap-
plying to domestic payments. 
2.2.1.  Among these are (still) differences in currency, 
language and even types of writing, the need to report pay-
ments abroad to the central banks and, above all, the differ-
ent means of payment used. For instance, cheques used for 
cross-border payments may not be machine-readable (or 
only partially), unlike those used for domestic payments. 
2.2.2.  Cross-border transfers are hampered above all by 
differences between countries in  the  structure and density 
of bank branch networks, the processing of data and in re-
gional and national clearing arrangements within and be-
tween individual banking groups.  According to the statis-
tics of the three European banking associations (mid-1993) 
there are: 
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2,762 commercial banks with 85,300 branches; 
1,580 savings banks with 63,800 branches; and 
10,590 cooperative banks with 55,800 branches. 
2.2.3.  There is a need for comprehensive technical mea-
sures and the corresponding agreements in order to handle 
cross-border transfers between so many banks of varying 
size with operations ranging from  the local to the inter-re-
gional and with branch networks of varying density. It 
should particularly be borne in mind that very often the 
banks of the sender and recipient have no business relations 
and belong to different banking groups. 
2.2.4.  The ESC drew attention to these factors in its 
Opinion of 20 March 199146. It will not be possible without 
more ado - and certainly not in the short term - for cross-
border payments to become exactly like domestic pay-
ments, even though such a goal is  desirable in itself.  But 
the ESC thinks that considerable improvements in the per-
formance of cross-border payments are both necessary and 
possible. 
2.2.5.  On 17 December 1992 the ECSAs (see footnote 1) 
set up the ECBS47,  a joint body for  the standardization of 
cross-border transfers.  The ECBS  works  with  the 
Commission, the European Monetary Institute, Europay 
International, Visa International, the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Telecommunication and the standards commit-
tees of the CEN and ISO. 
2.3.  The ESC welcomes the Commission's intention to 
discuss guidelines for customer information regarding 
cross-border face-to-face payments (see point 1.4.4.) in the 
first half of 1994 with the parties represented in the PSULG 
(banks, consumers, commerce and SMEs). 
2.4.  The ESC recommends that the second study on 
the performance of cross-border payments announced by 
the Commission, and referred to in point 1.4.48, be given a 
wider remit than the frrst study of  February 1993 referred to 
in  point 1.2. The second study would be more representa-
tive and its pronouncements carry greater weight if it were 
given a broader basis. A  broader study should not be 
blocked because of the additional costs borne by the 
Commission in the field. The findings of the second study 
would be more representative than those of the first if the 
following suggestions by the ESC were taken into account: 
2.4.1.  The study should cover more banks, and not just 
34, in all twelve EU Member States.  It should preferably 
include banks which constantly- and not just occasionally-
make cross-border transfers to many EU countries for a 
large number of customers. 
46  ESC Opinion on the discussion paper on payments in the internal market (OJ 
No. C 120 of 6 May 1991). 
47  ECBS:  European Committee for  Banking Standards/Comite Europeen de 
Normalisation  Bancaire/Europll.ischer  AusschuB  fUr  Bankstandards 
Secretariat: Place Jamblinne de Meux 34/35, B 1040 Brussels. 
48  Invitation to tender 94/C/5/09, OJ No. CS/15 of 7 January 1994; this study 
should not be confused with that on the cross-border payments services offered 
by large credit institutions, which was requested by the Commission's con-
sumer policy department from Mr Bruno Dupont. 2.4.2.  It should include institutions in other banking cat-
egories such as regional, savings, cooperative and private 
postal banks, in addition to big banks. Instead of simply 
covering four banks in the larger and two in  the smaller 
countries, the study's sample should be as representative as 
possible. It could then reflect more accurately the impor-
tance and market share of the institutions and individual 
countries concerned in cross-border transfers. Otherwise, 
the percentages mentioned have little value. 
2.4.3.  In connection with the study there should be an 
examination of the cross-border payment initiatives taken 
(or announced) by European banking groups, such as 
IBOS, Europartners or TIPANET as well as B.EPSYS and 
the ACH (Automated Clearing Houses) alliance, and the 
experiences of, for instance, the Banco Popular Espaiiol in 
transferring annuities on behalf of the social security insti-
tutions of several countries (Switzerland, Italy, France, 
Germany, Netherlands) for 1.8 million Spanish workers 
formerly working abroad. 
2.4.4.  Also worth looking at by the Commission in con-
nection with the study are the possibilities offered by bank-
ing groups with closely-knit member networks of mostly 
small banks with branches in all - or almost all - Member 
States. These banking groups use their own transfer facili-
ties,  network operators, clearing houses and "gateways", 
such as  the private postal banks' "Euro-Giro" or the sav-
ings banks' "Eufiserv". Within these networks, and thanks 
to their common institutions, they can avoid correspondent 
banks and make direct payments to accounts with members 
institutions in other countries. 
2.4.5.  Instead of just considering schematically the 
fastest possible performance of 1000 transfers of ECU 100 
each, the study should also look at how long transfers take 
when the sender is more interested in cheapness than speed. 
Finally, as well as ECU 100 transfers, the study should in-
vestigate cross-border transfers for sums of ECU 1000-
3000 made by both private households and smaller busi-
nesses. 
2.5.  The ESC welcomes the Commission's intention to 
encourage useful forms of co-operation between banks 
aimed at improving cross-border payment systems. It asks 
the Commission to check first under what conditions the 
competition rules in Article 85  et seq. of the EEC Treaty 
would be applicable, by analogy with the  waivers granted 
under the Eurocheque agreement. 
2.6.  Cross-border payment systems can only be based 
on the principle of agreement between all the institutions 
involved. In Annex C of its  working document of March 
199249  the Commission itself declared that cross-border 
payment services could not be provided efficiently without 
agreements. 
2.6.1.  Without agreements it is not possible to make 
large numbers of payments via several institutions in both 
the sender's and recipient's countries on terms known in 
advance, because not all the institutions involved have 
business relations with each other. Such agreements must 
cover technical specifications and banking standards. 
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Cross-border payment procedures and the calculation of 
costs and fees must also be the subject of common accord. 
Only joint agreements make it possible to work out flat-rate 
fees  which are independent of the distance between the 
countries and locations of the sender and the beneficiary. 
2.6.2.  Equally, the desired transparency of the condi-
tions which are to be the subject of customer information is 
only possible on the basis of agreements. And if the various 
cross-border payment systems are to be mutually accessible 
- and therefore accessible to the customers of other banking 
groups - agreements must also be concluded between these 
systems and with the credit card companies, which operate 
worldwide. 
2.6.3.  The Commission has defended the following prin-
ciples since its Decision of 10 December 1984 on the 
Eurocheque Agreement (OJ L35 of 7 February 1985, page 
43). 
2.6.3.1.  Agreements between institutions on the fees to be 
charged to clients are incompatible with Article 85  of the 
EEC Treaty. 
2.6.3.2.  Exceptions can be made for interbank agreements 
on the fees to be charged between institutions under Article 
85(3). According to the Commission5° exceptions are justi-
fied if the agreements bring about an improvement for cus-
tomers and if only maximum rates are laid down for  fees 
and these rates may be  undercut by the banks in competi-
tion with each other. Under no circumstances may the max-
imwn rates be systematically applied across-the-board and 
passed on to customers. 
2.6.4.  Exceptions  have already been made  under 
Regulation No.  17  for interbank charges on Eurocheques. 
Such exceptions under Article 85 seem all the more justifi-
able in the case of large-scale cross-border payments involv-
ing  thousands of mainly smaller institutions which are not 
all linked together in their business relations. An agreement 
on  maximum charges for interinstitutional business would 
give the network operator a base for calculating how to off-
set some of his costs within a payments system embracing a 
multitude of countries, banks, means of payment, gateways 
and settlement houses. The ESC asks the Commission to 
consider these arguments with regard to  cross-border pay-
ments systems which compete with each other in offering 
services to their customers. The Commission has already 
considered this matter in Annex C, paragraph 3C, of its 
working docwnent of March 199251. 
2.7.  Subject to the study being widened as recom-
mended in point 2.4.1., the ESC agrees with the following 
49  SEC(92)  621  of  17  March  1992;  see too  the  Report of the European 
Commission on Competition Policy (COM(94)  161  fin of 5 May 1994) chapter 
m  119 and 120. 
50  See C.D. Ehlerrnann  in the Quarterly Review of European Law  3/1993, page 
457 et seq. and 'The Vanni d'  Archirafi Doctrine" in European Institutions and 
Finance, No. 1a (March 1994), page 2. 
51  SEC(92) 621, of 17 March 1992. criteria for measuring progress in the performance of cross-
border payments. 
2. 7 .1.  As regards the requirement that full written cus-
tomer information in accordance with the guidelines set out 
in point 1.1. must be provided in at least two-thirds of the 
branches of the banks surveyed, it should be borne in mind 
that there are some 200,000 bank branches in the 12 
Member States. The constant provision of written customer 
information in such a big branch network should mean that 
this information is available to customers on demand. 
Account should also be taken in this part of the survey of 
verbal information and advice given to customers by bank 
staff. 
2.7.2.  Double charging (i.e. of both sender and benefi-
ciary) is unacceptable and inadmissible. In accordance with 
the criteria laid down the Commission would only consider 
progress to have been made in cross-border transfers if 
double charging occurred in less than 10% of cases. It 
would be more realistic for  the evaluation of the study to 
relax this criterion to 25% of all cases. Banks interested in 
discovering the reasons for double charging should be 
given the means to carry out an investigation so that such 
cases were no longer repeated. Double charging should be 
defined as follows: charging both the sender and the benefi-
ciary for the performance of a cross-border payment even 
though the sender has given instructions that all transfer 
costs are to be borne by him alone and these instructions 
have been accepted by the sender's bank. 
2.7.3.  A cross-border transfer should be considered to 
have been performed on time if the deadline agreed with 
the customer is not exceeded. The processing of a payment 
order no later than one working day after the day on which 
it is received should be subject to the entry of the amount of 
the payment itself. 
2.8.  The ESC supports the call of the European Bureau 
of Consumer Unions (BEUC) for a ruling on liability in the 
event of improper execution of  mass cross-border payments. 
The ESC understands the Commission's Recommendation 
of February 1990 on the setting-up of complaints centres. In 
its Opinion of 20 March 199152 the ESC had already spoken 
of the success of such centres in Belgium. The complaints 
centres set up in the Member States could work together in-
formally at European level (see point 3.7 .3). Customers 
could then apply to a complaints centre in their own coun-
try, which could contact complaints centres in the beneficia-
ry's country for an explanation. 
2.9.  The ESC prefers a code of good conduct to a di-
rective. The ECSAs' guidelines referred to in point 1.1. 
amount largely to  such a code. The users of cross-border 
payment systems represented on the Commission's PSULG 
(consumers, commerce and SMEs) were consulted on these 
guidelines. The guidelines could be further developed into 
a code or charter in which the provider of cross-border pay-
ment services would have to assume certain obligations. 
For instance, the obligations in Article 4 of the draft pro-
posal for a Directive (point 3.3.4) would be better regulated 
in  a code or charter. The idea of a charter is particularly 
supported by the Commissioner responsible for consumer 
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protection, Christiane SCRIVENER  53.  In her view such a 
charter would be signed by the ECSAs, consumer associa-
tions and the Commission. To this extent it would be a 
binding charter and a charter that the public has heard of. 
2.9.1.  The self discipline of a code of good conduct 
would, in particular, include individual banks having to ad-
vise their customers on the advantages and disadvantages 
of various means of payment (transfer, cheque, card) in-
cluding the time actually taken by these means and the ap-
proximate costs involved. For customers the conditions 
must be clear and it must be possible to compare the offers 
of competing banks. Since more and more customers have 
accounts with several banks, competition will make for 
greater transparency. 
2.9.2.  If a Directive is proposed at all it should be limit-
ed to setting out a  very general framework.  A European 
Directive which imposes detailed binding conditions on 
banks for cross-border transfers could bring consumers 
more disadvantages than advantages. It is to be feared that 
many, above all smaller, banks would then simply refuse 
orders for cross-border transfers because they would be un-
able (or unwilling) to comply in advance with the obliga-
tions laid down in detail in the Directive. 
2.9.2.1.  Such orders for transfers could be refused on prin-
ciple, especially transfers to beneficiaries in areas situated 
far from financial centres or to accounts with small local 
banks. This could give rise to significant gaps in a Europe-
wide, all-embracing cross-border transfers market. 
2.9.2.2.  According to the Commission's study of 
February 1993 some 7,800 of the total of some 10,000 
credit institutions in  the  12 Member States are active in 
cross-border transfers, i.e. less than 80%. This figure could 
fall sharply if cross-border transfers were made subject to 
detailed legislation. That would be the very opposite of 
what the Commission, the credit industry and customers 
want. 
2.9.3.  The gaps which might arise in a Europe-wide, all-
embracing cross-border transfers market if a Directive were 
introduced could at best be filled by the public postal ser-
vices. Only the public postal services, as part of the public 
sector, could, and indeed would have to,  accept orders for 
cross-border payments at any branc~ and indeed would have 
to meet all the obligations relating to these operations which 
would be regulated in detail in a European Directive. In this 
connection cash-carrying postmen could make payments to 
beneficiaries in isolated areas who do not have an account. 
2.10.  The specific comments which follow in chapter 3 
will state the ESC's position on the proposed Directive 
which the Commission took the precaution of announcing 
in its Communication of December 1993. 
52  ESC Opinion on the discussion paper on payments in  the internal market (OJ 
No. C 120 of 6 May 1991). 
53  See contribution of Christiane SCRIVENER to the colloquium on cross-border 
payments in Paris on 1 March 1994. 3.  Specific Comments 
3  .1.  If the Commission decides to send the Council a 
proposal for a Directive on the transparency and efficiency 
of cross-border payment systems, this should only lay 
down minimum requirements for the whole EU.  The ESC 
is pleased that Article 1(3) leaves it up to the Member 
States to enact, where appropriate, additional provisions in 
which the structure of the credit industry and the special 
features of cross-border transfers can be taken into account. 
The Commission has justified the initiatives it has taken 
since 1990 by stating that the large-scale transfer of small 
amounts should be encouraged. This aim is not expressly 
mentioned in the draft of the proposal for a Directive. 
Neither is the scope limited exclusively to cross-border 
transfers of small amounts on a large scale (see point 3.2.). 
3.2.  Scope (Article 2) 
It should be made clear that the proposed 
Directive is designed for large-scale cross-border transfers 
of small amounts, and not for the larger amounts involved 
in traditional foreign trade, which are now already sent via 
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication). The fourth recital stresses the need to 
make a distinction between cross-border transfers of large 
sums and transfers of large numbers of small sums. But 
mention is simply made of a threshold of ECU 10,000, 
above which cross-border payments have to be reported for 
statistical purposes in many Member States. Moreover, in 
Article 7(2) payments over ECU 10,000 are exempted from 
the refund obligation. If  this upper limit is to be used - even 
if only implicitly - as a definition for large-scale transfers 
of smaller amounts, it should be made clear that the 
Directive would apply to transfers by private households 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
3  .2.1.  It should also be made clear that the Directive does 
not apply to cross-border transfers in non-EU countries. 
3.2.2.  The Directive should apply not only to credit in-
stitutions within the meaning of Article  1 of Directive 
77/780/EEC (OJ L322 of 17  December 1977) but also to 
other institutions which perform cross-border payments as 
part of their professional duties, such as credit card compa-
nies. It should include all means of payment such as trans-
fers and cheques and all processes such as  standing orders 
or POS (point of sale) debiting. It therefore seems advisable 
for Article 2d to mention Eurocheque cards and credit 
cards, since these plastic cards are increasingly being used 
across borders for "tele-shopping" and mail orders, espe-
cially in frontier areas. 
3.2.3.  Credit institutions which cannot make cross-bor-
der payments (or which do not wish to do so because of the 
terms of the proposed Directive) should be excluded from 
its scope, especially from Article 3. 
3.3.  Transparency (Articles 3 and 4) 
3.3.1.  The written information which must be given to 
customers before a cross-border transfer is made largely 
corresponds to the voluntary obligation which was taken 
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over by the member institutions of the three big European 
credit industry associations in their guidelines of March 
1992 (neither the public postal banks nor the British build-
ing societies belong to any of the ECSAs). 
3.3.2.  An important complement to the written informa-
tion is the  verbal advice normally given by most banks to 
customers about the most advantageous way for them  to 
make a cross-border transfer. On the basis of such advice 
customers can decide, for example, to make out a 
Eurocheque to a beneficiary for small amounts or accept a 
longer delivery time for non-urgent payments so as to avoid 
the higher costs of a "premium speed service". 
3.3.3.  Some information about a cross-border transfer, 
especially in remote regions, cannot be given to a customer 
in advance with absolute certainty. Such matters, especially 
about exact delivery time, cannot therefore be covered by a 
European Directive. 
3.3.3.1.  In many cases,  when an  order is given, the bank 
can only give the customer an estimated delivery time for 
payment based on experience. Very often cross-border 
transfers involve several successive banks which have no 
business relations with the sender's bank (see point 
2.2.1.2.). In "network to network" transfers in particular 
(i.e.  to an account with a branch of a bank from  another 
banking group) the sender's bank possibly has no experi-
ence in the rapid forwarding  of funds abroad or in how to 
use foreign clearing systems. So, customers cannot be 
given a binding figure for the exact time  taken before the 
amount is credited to the beneficiary's account. The second 
indent should therefore read: "the approximate time". 
3.3.3.2.  The sender can only be told in advance the value 
date of the debit from  his account, not the date on  which 
the beneficiary's account is credited. 
3.3.3.3.  It seems obvious that the customer should be noti-
fied in advance of the exchange rate for a cross-border 
transfer.  However, some currencies can undergo massive 
exchange rate fluctuations. This was shown particularly in 
autumn 1992 and again in 1993. Since 2 August 1993 pari-
ties in the EMS exchange rate mechanism can each fluctu-
ate 15% above or below their central rates. It would there-
fore be a good idea to tell the customer the current ex-
change rate when the order is given and indicate it on a no-
tice alongside the counters. However, conversion rates can-
not be given in  printed brochures and other written infor-
mation for customers because it would soon be out of date. 
At any event, this would have to be pointed out to cus-
tomers, who expect written information to include the exact 
exchange rate. 
3.3.3.4.  The beneficiary should be told the exchange rate 
used if conversion is not carried out until the payment 
reaches his country. It is not necessary to inform the benefi-
ciary about the exchange rate if it was agreed to transfer a 
given amount in the currency of his country, as is normally 
the case. In  these cases, the beneficiary does not need to 
know the amount paid by the sender in his currency, espe-
cially as the sender may JX.lSSibly have been granted special 
terms which are covered by banking secrecy. However, the beneficiary can rightfully expect to be told the name of the 
sender and the purpose of the payment. 
3.3.4.  As regards information for the sender after a 
cross-border transfer, most banks comply with the industry 
guidelines of March 1992. This means that senders receive 
the evidence referred to in Article 4 about the performance 
costs charged with a listing of fees, commissions and taxes 
and an exchange rate statement, which according to the 
February 1993 study happened in over 80% of cases. 
3.3.5.  In cases where the sender also bears performance 
costs in the beneficiary's country, these should be commu-
nicated to  the beneficiary with the proof of payment. The 
February 1993 study shows that this is clearly not always 
the case. Banks should therefore take care to ensure that 
when a cross-border payment is forwarded the sender's 
wish to pay the  costs charged by the beneficiary's bank is 
also passed on to the various institutions involved. 
3.4.  Obligations to execute in good time (Article 5) 
3.4.1.  The ESC supports the wish that a cross-border 
transfer should be performed as quickly as possible unless 
the sender agrees otherwise. This seems in any case to be 
normal banking practice. 
3.4.2.  There are reservations about the deadline of  six 
working days laid down in -Article 5.  Some cross-border 
transfers are not made directly between two correspondent 
banks in major financial centres, as  would ideally be the 
case. Take, for example the cases where the sender and/or 
beneficiary are based in areas away from the financial cen-
tres and have accounts with branches of small local or re-
gional banks. In these cases several institutions from the 
same banking group - or even from  another group - often 
have to be involved; not all of them have business relations 
with each other. This means: 
3.4.2.1.  Transfers can take much longer if they have to go 
through several parties (e.g. from the branch of a local bank 
in the sender's country to another regional or national insti-
tution with correspondents in the beneficiary's country and 
then on again through a national or regional institution to a 
local institution and its branch). 
3.4.2.2.  In the beneficiary's country there are often foreign 
banking groups with which the sender's bank has no busi-
ness relations. The latter then has no more influence on the 
execution of payment in the other country or on any omis-
sions which may arise there. 
3.4.2.3.  A further consequence is  that a bank involved in 
the transaction cannot be obliged to ensure payment no 
later than the working day following receipt of the order 
when it itself has not yet been credited with the payment. 
On  the contrary, it must be left up to this bank to decide 
whether or not to take the risk and pay out the money be-
fore it has received cover itself from the foreign bank. 
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3.4.3.  According to the February 1993 study, a cross-
border transfer takes 3.2 days on average if one counts the 
time taken between the debiting of the sender's account and 
the crediting of the beneficiary's account, and 4.6 days if 
one counts the time taken between the sender placing his 
order and the crediting of the beneficiary's account. This 
result can already be regarded as satisfying even if it is 
largely made up of the present large number of direct trans-
fers between correspondent banks in  the major financial 
centres. The banks use the "value" definition for calculat-
ing the time taken for a transfer, which is important in the 
case of larger amounts because of the losses or gains of in-
terest involved. The Commission, however, thinks it better 
to count the time taken from the giving of the order. The 
ESC supports this method, which is also contained in the 
UNCITRAL framework provisions. 
3.4.4.  A binding deadline for cross-border transfers 
seems inadvisable, for the reasons given in point 3.4.2. 
Even the Commission's Legal Framework Group doubts 
that such conditions are necessary (point 19 of the Report 
of the Legal Framework Group and XV  154/93 of 
3 December 1993). 
3.4.5.  If  a binding deadline is introduced, many banks -
especially smaller ones- may simply refuse to accept trans-
fer orders when they themselves have no say in the execu-
tion of  payment by foreign banks in another country. 
3.5.  Obligation to execute in accordance with the 
payment order (Article 6) 
3.5.1.  In cross-border transfers each party has so far nor-
mally (in 94% of all cases) paid his own bank charges (the 
so-called SHARE regulation). But the proposed Directive 
will aim to make it the general rule for the sender to bear 
all costs so that the beneficiary is credited with the full 
value of the transfer without deductions. This so-called 
OUR regulation (all costs to  sender) is becoming increas-
ingly important in smaller transfers. New payment net-
works such as TIP  ANET or the ACH (automated clearing 
houses) alliance are based on, or are due to be based on, the 
OUR regulation. 
3.5.2.  The February 1993 study only looked at "OUR 
regulation" cross-border transfers.  It emerged that in 43% 
of cases the beneficiary also had to pay charges even 
though the sender had specifically agreed with his credit in-
stitution to pay all costs and have the beneficiary credited 
with the full amount without deductions (see point 2.7.2). 
In the event of such "double charging" the sender's bank 
should refund this "unjustified charge" to the sender, in ac-
cordance with Article 6(2), and forfeit the fee originally 
charged to  him, even if the beneficiary's bank is  the sole 
party responsible. For the sender, who can only hold his 
own bank liable, such a rule seems understandable. But for 
the sender's bank such a wide-ranging liability seems un-
reasonable in  view of the conditions mentioned in points 
2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 3.4.2., at least if the beneficiary's bank is 
insolvent. 3.5 .3.  For reasons of confidentiality the European credit 
industry's associations were not allowed to see the data for 
the February 1993 study. So they still do not know the rea-
sons for the reported cases of double charging. 
3.5.4.  The Commission should ensure that the second, 
1994 study referred to in  point 1.4.  gives exact details of 
any cases of double charging. The credit industry could 
then investigate these cases, which are quite contrary to 
normal banking practice but which might have been caused 
by incomplete or even incorrect information from  the 
sender. Article 6(2) should therefore, as a precaution, make 
an exception in the event of any contributory negligence on 
the part of the sender. 
3.6.  Obligation of institutions to refund in case of 
failed transfers (Article 7) 
3.6.1.  Article 7(1) lays down that if the transfer is not 
properly completed by the sum being credited to the benefi-
ciary's account, the sender's bank must refund the full 
amount of the transfer plus fees to the sender. For the 
sender's bank this would introduce the concept of no-fault 
liability. On the other hand, the sender's bank is entitled to 
claim a refund from  the other institutions involved in  the 
payment chain which have not carried out instructions 
properly. But the refund is by no means so certain as to off-
set the no-fault liability completely. 
3.6.2.  Article 7(2) lays down that the refund can be ap-
plied for no earlier than 20 working days after the date on 
which the cross-border transfer should have been made. 
Even with this time limit it is conceivable that the sender 
will get his money back, even though the beneficiary has 
been credited with payment in the meantime and has the 
sum at his disposal. 
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3.6.3.  It is not clear to what extent the refund obligation 
applies in the event of force majeure. In Article 7(2)(j) ref-
erence is made to the definition of force majeure in 
Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ No. L 158 of 23 June 1990, page 
59). It should be made clear whether the refund obligation 
still applies if the beneficiary's bank declares a moratorium 
or if bankruptcy proceedings are initiated before it can 
credit the transfer to the beneficiary. Such cases would ob-
viously not be regarded as force majeure, at any rate not for 
amounts of less than ECU 10,000. 
3.7.  Complaints centres (Article 8) 
3.7.1.  For customer complaints which are not resolved 
by the institutions concerned independent complaints cen-
tres are to have competence in all matters, in accordance 
with Article 8(3). Depending on the prevailing principle of 
subsidiarity within a country the centres may be set up ei-
ther by the banks themselves or by the central banks or au-
thorities in the Member States. 
3. 7  .2.  As  the  complaints centres cannot be part of the 
legal system, it seems to be going  too far to tell Member 
States in a European Directive (as in Article 8(5)) that they 
have to see that the decisions of the complaints centres are 
published regularly. 
3.7.3.  Cross-border cooperation between complaints 
centres may be a good idea. Customers could then apply to 
a complaints centre in their own country, which could then 
get in touch with centres in  the beneficiary's country. For 
such cooperation between centres, and for the setting-up of 
a European ombudsman, binding EU rules would be unnec-
essary. OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on 
Removing the legal obstacles to the use of the ECU Procedure 
The Economic and Social Committee decided on 
29 June 1993, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of 
Article 20 of the Rules of Procedure, to draw up an Opinion 
on 
Removing the Legal Obstacles to the Use of  the ECU. 
The  Section  for  Economic,  Financial  and 
Monetary Questions, which was responsible for the 
preparatory work, adopted its Opinion on 8 February 1994. 
The Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN. 
At its 313th Plenary Session (meeting of 23 
February 1994) the Economic and Social Committee adopt-
ed unanimously the following Opinion: 
1.  Preliminary Remark 
1.1.  On 23 December 1992 the EC Commission sub-
mitted to the European Council a White Paper on removing 
the legal obstacles to the use of the ecu54. 
In this White Paper the Commission calls upon the 
Member States to guarantee the legal status of the ecu as a 
foreign currency and take measures concerning: 
the use of the ecu in private contracts (e.g. ecu payment 
clauses); 
court decisions based on legal procedure; 
- business management and organisation (e.g. publication 
of  prices and accounts); and 
- customs and taxation (e.g. tax payments in ecus). 
1.2.  The Commission does not advocate a Community 
regulation; instead, it leaves it up to the individual Member 
States to take the measures they think fit in accordance with 
their own national laws, so that no-one is put off from using 
the ecu because of the laws or administrative procedures in 
force (§40). 
1.3.  The Commission points out in the White Paper that: 
the European Council declared that wider use of the ecu 
should be encouraged (Dublin, 25/26 June 1990); and 
- the European Monetary Institute has the task of facili-
tating use of the ecu and overseeing its development, in-
cluding the smooth functioning of the ecu clearing sys-
tem (Maastricht Treaty Art. 109f(2)). 
1.3.1.  The Commission feels  that wider use of the ecu 
during the transitional phase will facilitate its introduction 
as an independent single currency in the Community 
(Maastricht Art. 1091(4)) in the third phase (§77). 
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1.3.2.  The Commission sees the changeover to the single 
currency as a complex event requiring careful preparation. 
This includes giving citizens, businesses and administra-
tions the chance of getting some experience of using the 
ecu unhampered by legal restrictions (§74). 
1.4.  The Commission has described the type of legal 
obstacles to the use of the ecu in the White Paper and listed 
them in a 78-page Annex. The White Paper is based on a 
survey among banks and firms and on a vast study of sever-
al thousand pages which was completed at the end of 1991 
(§16). 
2.  General Comments 
2.1.  The ecu's status as a foreign currency 
2.1.1.  Use of the ecu will not be encouraged merely by 
removing legal obstacles. During the transition to economic 
and monetary union the ecu will remain a basket currency 
with many disadvantages and risks. The Commission itself 
rightly points out that the ecu is not always the best curren-
cy for transactions during the transitional phase (§74). A 
declaration to boost public confidence in the present and 
future role of the ecu therefore seems necessary (see point 
2.3.2). 
2.1.1.1.  But removing the legal obstacles to the use of the 
ecu is a  step in the right direction. For if, in a  few years 
time, the ecu is to be introduced, one cannot very well 
shortly beforehand still have legal constraints on the use of 
its precursor, the ecu basket currency. Article 1  091( 4) of the 
Maastricht Treaty states that the ecu is to be introduced "at 
the starting date of the third stage". However, removing the 
legal obstacles to the ecu'  s use should not go so far as to 
give it the status of a legal means of payment during the 
transitional phase. This would be irreconcilable with the 
unrestricted independence which the national central banks 
are to retain until the start of the third stage. During the 
transitional phase it is the national central banks alone who 
will remain competent and responsible for deciding what 
should be the legal means of payment on the territory of 
their respective Member States. 
2.1.1.2.  The key to removing the legal obstacles, as the 
Commission rightly sees it, is  the fact that no country is-
sues ecus as legal tender. (The Belgian and Irish ecu coins 
are not really legal tender; in practice they are  collectors' 
items)(§ 18). Some Member States recognise the ecu as a 
foreign currency in law (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal) or in practice (Denmark, 
Ireland and the Netherlands). 
In the UK there is no special legal rule concerning 
the ecu, so it can be used as a foreign currency. In Germany 
the ecu is regarded simply as a  unit of account. But the 
Bundesbank has said that banks in Germany can operate 
ecu accounts and grant loans in ecus  55. 
54  SEC(92) 2472 final 
55  e.g. Notice 1002190, Bundesanzeiger of 5 January 1990. 2.1.1.3.  If  the ecu were officially recognised as  a foreign 
currency in all Member States, many of the legal obstacles 
to  its use would disappear (§51). This remark by the 
Commission is correct. But this on its own may not neces-
sarily mean that use of the ec-u would increase. 
2.1.2.  Not only legal obstacles have to be removed if  the 
ecu is to be used more during the transitional phase. The 
hesitancy towards the ecu is due above all to the costs and 
exchange risks involved when converting national curren-
cies into ecus and back again. 
2.2.  The exchange risks of using the ecu 
2.2.1.  The economic barriers to using the ecu cannot be 
removed by order. 
2.2.1.1.  The risks of using the ecu and other foreign  cur-
rencies have become clear to  the  general public with  the 
changes in the exchange rates of the individual currencies 
against the ecu since August, the turbulence on the foreign 
exchange markets in autumn 1992 and summer 1993 and 
the decision of the finance ministers and central bank chair-
men on 2 August 1993 to widen the margin of fluctuation 
of exchange rates in the European Monetary System to 
15% either side of mid-rate. 
2.2.1.2.  The exchange risks- of using the ecu or any other 
EU currency can only be expected to decrease if a greater 
convergence of key national economic data is achieved. In 
conditions of recession and mass unemployment greater 
convergence will only be achieved in the foreseeable future 
if there is a corresponding political will.  In  its Opinion on 
policy during the transition to economic and monetary 
union56 the ESC has pointed this out and identified three 
preconditions for this to occur: 
2.2.1.2.1.  Better co-ordination of national economic poli-
cies at EC level. 
2.2.1.2.2. Intensive multilateral supervision of them at EC 
level; and 
2.2.1.2.3. Mutual synchronisation of convergence and re-
covery programmes. 
2.2.2.  As  long as  the preconditions mentioned in point 
2.2.1.2 are lacking, one cannot count on private households 
using  the ecu. Under these circumstances it is only right 
that the Commission should not propose any measures to 
forcibly promote use of the ecu. That could only lead to de-
ception and disappointment which would be bad for  the 
ecu's image. And such disappointments would be  prejudi-
cial to the introduction of a single currency with the name 
"ecu" in the third phase of economic and monetary union. 
2.2.3.  So,  initially the removal of legal obstacles to  the 
use of the ecu would, above all, benefit companies trading 
internationally. According to the White Paper (§7) the ecu 
so far  accounts for only 1 or 2% of the Member States' ex-
ternal trade. But by mid-1993 the volume of ecu credits 
50 
TRANSITION TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
was running at some ECU 200bn while clearing house pay-
ments in ecus amounted to some ECU 50bn per day. 
2.2.4.  The ecu is increasingly used in the clearing sys-
tems of international organisations such as EUROCON-
TROL for flight safety,  AMADEUS for flight and hotel 
reservations and the UIC for settling payments between 
railway companies, which for this purpose list their prices 
per kilometre each year in ecus.  According to the 
Commission's data bank in Directorate-General II-D/2 
turnover amounts to ECU 2,150m for EUROCONTROL 
and ECU 7,500m for the UIC57 . In 1993 over 35% of the 
expenditure from  the Community budget of around ECU 
70bn was settled in ecus (in 1987: less than 6%). 
2.3.  Informing the public and confidence in the ecu 
2.3.1.  In addition to the White Paper on the legal obsta-
cles to the  use of the ecu, the Committee recommends that 
the European citizen be informed in a suitable and under-
standable way about what will be going on during the phase 
of transition  to  economic and monetary union,  which will 
begin on 1 January 1994 58. The object of the folders, 
brochures, etc. should be to provide an answer to the ques-
tions which citizens ask, and in particular those concerning: 
2.3.1.1.  The impact of economic and monetary union on 
private households. 
2.3.1.2.  The advantages and risks of using the ecu during 
the transitional period. 
2.3.1.3.  The practical results of replacing national curren-
cies by  a single European currency, the ecu, in  the third 
phase, especially as  regards the circulation of notes and 
coins, pricing, accounting, issuing and redemption of secu-
rities and bookkeeping. 
2.3.2.  If the Commission does  inform the public in  co-
operation with  the  appropriate authorities in the Member 
States, as referred to in point 2.3.1, the European Monetary 
Institute should be consulted. 
2.3.3.  It seems necessary to inform the European 
Monetary Institute of all measures taken by the Member 
States to remove legal obstacles to the use of the ecu. This 
particularly applies to the prudential obligations applying to 
credit institutions' ecu risks (see point 3.1.2). 
2.3.4.  Informing the  public means covering the various 
possibilities of using the ecu basket currency during the 
transitional period with all  the risks involved (see points 
2.2.2 and 3.1.7.3) but also the many advantages. 
56  See Analysis  of the policies to  be followed in the transition to  economic and 
monetary union, OJ No. C 34/25 of 2 February 1994. 
57  See European Economy, Supplement A No. 4/93. 
58  See OJ No. C 34/25 of 2 February 1994, point 1.6.1. 2.3.4.1.  Among the advantages:  under Article 1091(4) the 
ecu basket would be converted into the independent - and 
ultimately only - EU common currency at a rate of 1:1, 
while the exchange rates of the individual national curren-
cies in ecus would remain uncertain until the end of the 
transitional period. So, even though it is only a basket cur-
rency at present, the ecu would legally change into the ecu 
of the third stage of monetary union. If, for example, 
money was invested during the transitional period in 
longer-term bonds denominated in ecus59 interest and re-
demption payments falling due during the third stage would 
be made in the future common European currency at a rate 
of 1:1 with the present ecu. 
2.3.4.2.  Another advantage, which is not generally known, 
is that under Article 109g of the Maastricht Treaty the com-
position of the ecu basket would be "frozen" in the second 
stage. So, the amounts of the individual national currencies 
making up the ecu would no longer change. But, depending 
on exchange rate developments, the weighting of the indi-
vidual currencies (and thus their respective percentage of 
the currency basket) can change. In other words: instead of 
the two risks which have existed to date -namely changes 
in the make-up of the basket and changes in the exchange 
rate - there is now only the exchange risk. For the markets 
it will be easier to obtain or liquidate ecu assets when these 
percentages become fixed60. 
2.3.4.3.  A further use for the ecu currency basket during 
the transitional period arises from the obligation incumbent 
upon  the  Member  States  to  pay  in  ecus  into  the 
Communities'  budget for the Structural Funds and with-
draw sums in ecus from Community funds for payment to 
beneficiaries. Because of the increased number of transfer 
payments in ecus the need for ecus and the possibilities of 
settlement will increase too  .. This may perhaps also lead to 
a greater interest in the Member States in receiving tax pay-
ments in ecus (see points 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). 
3.  Comments on the individual proposals 
3.1.  The ecu as a  means of payment, a  mortgage 
currency and its legal status. 
3.1.1.  We support the Commission's recommendation 
that all Member States should grant the ecu legal status as a 
foreign currency and expressly provide for the following 
possibilities (§49): 
3.1.1.1.  Use of the ecu in contracts (§50). 
3.1.1.2.  Issuing of bills denominated in ecus and payment 
of ecu paper issued by non-EC countries (§27, 52), quota-
tion of share prices in ecus (§33); 
3.1.1.3.  Operation of ecu sight and deposit accounts with 
interest, allowing payments in ecus (§53). 
3.1.2.  It also seems advisable to adjust the monitoring 
rules so that credit institutions' and insurance risks in ecus 
are not placed at a disadvantage compared with risks in 
other foreign currencies (§54). 
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3.1.3.  Finally, the rules of the individual Member States 
on the use of the ecu should no longer draw distinctions in 
business relations between residents and between residents 
and non-residents (§56). 
3.1.4.  The Belgian Law of 12 July 1991 (Moniteur Beige 
of 9  August 1991), the French Law of 16 July 1992 
(Journal Officiel de Ia Republique  Fran~aise of 18  July 
1992) and the Luxembourg Law of 29 July 1993 provide 
examples for removing legal obstacles to the use of the ecu 
as referred to in point 3  .1.1. 
3.1.4.1.  The Belgian Law, which amends Article 3 of the 
Law of 30 December 1885, stipulates that public and offi-
cial documents may be expressed not only in Belgian 
francs but also in ecus or in the currency of any one of the 
24 Member States of the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development). 
3.1.4.2.  The French Law concerns the promotion of and 
tax concessions for equity savings plans (PEA). But in its 
Article 14 it allows liabilities to be expressed in ecus. 
Before this condition is exercised, contracts between resi-
dents can be annulled if they stipulate a payment in foreign 
currency where there is no cross-border business involved. 
The Law has not changed the French franc's status as  the 
sole means of legal tender. Moreover, both parties to the 
contract must first agree to  the use of the ecu. Subject to 
this condition, use of the ecu is to be permitted by the au-
thorities in,  for example, public calls for tender, taxes and 
the issuing of government bonds (Article 37§44 of the 
French Finance Bill). 
3.1.5.  The Belgian and French laws referred to in point 
3.1.4 are steps in the right direction. But they still do notre-
solve the problem that in certain cases, such as auctions and 
property deals, some Member States' laws insist on cash 
payment in banknotes and do not allow funds on deposit to 
be made available through payment by cheque, bank trans-
fer etc. As no Member State has ecus in  circulation (see 
point 2.1.1), giving the ecu the same legal status as a for-
eign currency only allows ecus to  be actually used if pay-
ment by funds transfer is allowed, as funds in ecu accounts 
can then be made available. 
3.1.5.1.  Even the European Convention of 11  December 
1967 on foreign currency liabilities (Article 5 of the Annex 
thereto) draws no distinction between cash and deposit 
money. But legislation and case-law in many countries still 
does not allow deposit money to be treated in the same way 
as cash unless the contracting parties have expressly agreed 
to do so. Under these circumstances ecu payments may not 
be legally acceptable in certain cases for paying off obliga-
tions. 
59  By the end of 1992 the European Investment Bank alone had issued ecu bonds 
for a total value of ECU 13.4bn. 
60  See Appendix showing the changes in the composition of the ECU CWTency 
basket 
(Data from Commission Directorate-General II D 2). 3.1.5.2.  The removal of the legal obstacles to the use of the 
ecu would therefore be a good reason for legislators to 
make payment by funds  transfer generally equivalent to 
cash payments. Even today, in some Member States, cash 
payment can in fact be enforced if a creditor so wishes or if 
contracting parties cannot agree. But this seems to be on 
the way out because of the decline in  the use of cash and 
the measures to combat money laundering. 
3.1.6.  In court decisions, steps should be taken to ensure 
that payment obligations can be established and enforced in 
ecus if contracting parties have agreed to use of the ecu. 
The pledging of assets in ecu accounts should also express-
ly  be allowed to discharge a debt. The debtor should have 
to bear the costs of any conversion into local currency. Any 
conversion should be at the exchange rate prevailing on the 
day of the court's judgement (as provided for  in,  for in-
stance, Articles 1018 and 1650 of the Belgian Legal Code). 
3.1.7.  A further area for using ecus involves the legal 
possibility of registering mortgages in ecus and allowing 
mortgage loans in ecus. The Belgian Law of 12 July 1991 
already makes provision for this (in Article 3) and for con-
verting ecu mortgages into local currency. The changes in 
the ecu's exchange rate with national currencies since au-
tumn 1992 have shown that ecu mortgages involve consid-
erable risks for mortgage-holders if the national currency is 
devalued against the ecu, and these risks should be special-
ly brought to the mortgage-holders' attention. 
3  .1. 7  .1.  In recent years mortgage loans and other forms of 
credit in ecus have been offered at much lower interest 
rates  than those in  local currency. But the  fall  in value of 
some currencies against the ecu since autumn 1992 means 
that debtors now have to pay more than they  expected in 
local currency for their repayments. The exchange rate loss 
can be much greater than the gain from lower interest rates 
- at any rate when the debtor has no income in ecus and has 
to convert local currency to make repayments. 
3.1.7.2.  Another often overlooked disadvantage is when a 
primary mortgage is registered in ecus and the local curren-
cy falls in value against the ecu. The value of the mortgage 
may then become so close to the market value of the prop-
erty that it is impossible to take out any further mortgage. 
3.1.7.3.  The risk of ecu mortgages and loans described in 
points 3.1.7.1 and 3.1.7.2 are an example of the disappoint-
ments which private households using ecus may encounter 
during the transitional period. It is yet another reason to 
support the Commission's decision not to propose any 
measures to forcibly promote use of the ecu in the private 
sector before the third stage (see point 2.2.2). 
3.2.  Company capital, invoices and accounts in ecus 
3.2.1.  In  line with the  White Paper,  all Member States 
should allow their companies the possibility of: 
3.2.1.1.  Constituting, increasing and decreasing their capi-
tal in ecus (§19, 32, 63). 
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3.2.1.2.  Setting and displaying their prices in ecus and in-
voicing directly in ecus if the contracting parties so agree 
(§29, 64). 
3.2.1.3.  Keeping all their books in ecus and publishing the 
annual accounts and all other accounts in ecus (§34, 63). 
3.2.2.  The Member States could initially limit them-
selves to granting the possibilities referred to in point 3.2.1 
to companies which trade across borders (§66). Once in-
voked, the option mentioned in point 3.2.1.1 should always 
be linked to that in 3.2.1.3, and not just be used for one or 
two financial years. 
3.2.3.  Many firms, especially in the retailing, mail order, 
tourism, hotel and catering sectors, already display their 
prices in ecus, as described in point 3.2.1.2. Ecu pricing 
makes it easier to compare prices, particularly in border 
areas, holiday resorts and in international hotel chains. But 
to avoid disappointments care should be taken to see that: 
3.2.3.1.  Ecu prices constantly reflect exchange rate trends. 
3.2.3.2.  Ecu prices are not routinely rounded upwards; and 
3.2.3.3.  The rate used for converting prices into ecus is 
clearly visible in every case. 
3.2.4.  Firms which submit their company reports and ac-
counts in ecus, as well as in other currencies, should have 
to show clearly the rate used when converting figures from 
local currency. 
3.3.  Customs and taxation in ecus 
3.3.1.  The customs duties levied at the external frontiers 
of the EC go straight into the Community's budget, which 
is drawn up in  ecus.  It seems sensible to  change the EC 
Customs Code so that the following are possible (§71): 
3.3.1.1.  The expression of goods'  value for customs pur-
poses in ecus. 
3.3.1.2.  An ecu box on customs forms; and 
3.3.1.3.  The payment of customs duties in ecus. 
3.3.2.  It is  to be expected that many multinationals will 
keep all their accounts in ecus, as suggested in point 3.2.1.3. 
It would therefore be logical for them to also use the ecu for 
working out and paying their taxes.  Otherwise the "taxes 
payable" column would be the only entry in  the accounts 
still expressed in local currency. As tax payment is a direct 
relationship between companies and the state it would not 
be necessary for  the ecu to  be generally recognised as a 
legal means of payment with compulsory acceptance. 
3.3.3.  In  France and the Netherlands it is already possi-
ble to pay taxes in ecus. Such a facility could also be made 
available to private households who  have income in ecus. 
But paying taxes in ecus would primarily be considered by 
firms whose income in ecus exceeded their ecu costs. This 
would especially apply when the exchange rate against the local currency worsened during the business year and a sur-
plus in ecus would otherwise become an exchange loss in 
the accounts. 
3.3.4.  Tax payments in ecus could also become interest-
ing for national authorities when they needed ecus to pay 
their contributions to the Community budget (see point 
2.3.4.3). 
3.4.  The ecu in EC law 
3.4.1.  It seems a good idea to refer to the ecu systemati-
cally and expressly in EC law. 
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3.4.2.  This particularly applies to the proposals currently 
being prepared or discussed for regulations, directives and 
decisions in the fields of insurance, banking, securities trad-
ing and company law, and especially those relating to the 
European company, the European co-operative society, the 
European mutual society and the European economic inter-
est grouping (§76). 
3.4.3.  Provision should also be made  for using the ecu 
in public procurement where EC rules on this apply. TRANSITION TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
THE  ECU 
COMPOSITION OF 1 ECU, NATIONAL CURRENCY AMONTS 
PTA 
(6,885) 
FRF --------... 
(1 ,332) 
IRP-----~ 
(0,008552) 
.------OEM 
(0,6242) 
tTL 
(151 ,8) 
·-'+------- OKR 
(0,1976) 
NLG ------" 
'--------- BLF 
(3,431) 
(0,2198)  "------ ORA (1,44) 
(1,393)  ESC--------'  .___ ____  UKP  (0,08784) 
THE CHANGING ECU 
•  Up to November 1, 1993, a basket currency whose composition was 
revised every 5 years 
•  Currently: a frozen basket currency with fixed amounts of component currencies 
•  From the start of Stage Two: overseen by the EMI, which will also facilitate its use 
•  From the beginning of Stage Three: a currency in its own right, managed by the ECB 
•  During Stage Three: rapid introduction of the ecu as the single currency 
of the European Union, issue of notes and coins. 
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EVOLUTION OF THE MONETARY AMOUNTS (COMPOSITION) 61 
AND WEIGHTS OF THE CURRENCIES COMPOSING THE ECU BASKET 
Start of E.M.S.  First Revision  Second Revision  Present Situation 
17.09.1984  13.03.1979  21.09.1989  28.10.1993 
Monetary  Weights  Monetary  Weights  Monet~  Weights  Monetarl:  Weights 
Amounts  (in%)  Amounts  (in%)  Amounts  2  (in%)  Amounts  3  (in%) 
DM  0.828  32.98  0.719  32.08  0.6242  30.32  0.6242  32.63 
FF  1.15  19.84  1.31  19.06  1.332  19.29  1.332  19.89 
HFL  0.285  10.51  0.256  10.13  0.2198  9.48  0.2198  10.23 
BLF  3.8  9.63  3.85  8.57  3.431  8.08  3.431  8.28 
DKR  0.217  3.06  0.219  2.69  0.1976  2.52  0.1976  2.56 
IRL  0.00759  1.15  0.00871  1.20  0.008552  1.11  0.008552  1.06 
Sub Total!  77.17  73.73  70.80  74.66 
LIT  109  9.49  140  9.98  151.8  10.23  151.8  8.16 
UKL  0.0885  13.34  0.0878  14.98  0.08784  12.06  0.08784  11.45 
DRA  - - 1.15  1.31  1.44  0.95  1.44  0.53 
PTA  - - - - 6.885  5.15  6.885  4.50 
ESC  - - - - 1.393  0.81  1.393  0.71 
Sub Total2  22.83  26.27  29.20  25.34 
TOTAL (1 +2)  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
61  The monetary amounts (cotnposition) of the ECU are independent of the European Monetary System (EMS).  Whether a currency participates or not in  the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS has no influence on the composition of  the ECU basket 
62  Article 109 G has frozen this composition, which means that these monetary amounts will not change up to the beginning of Stage m. when exchange rates will be 
irrevocably fixed and the ECU will become a currency in its own right. 
63  The monetary amounts are those defined on 21.09.1989, frozen up to Stage m. The weights are in %and will change every time the exchange rate of one currency 
changes. Appreciating currencies will see their weight increase: depreciating currencies will see their weight decrease. Consequently, the frozen ECU will strengh-
ten along with the harder component currencies. 
55 OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on 
Minimum Reserves in the Context of the Internal Market Procedure 
On  23 November 1992 the Economic and Social 
Committee, acting under the fourth paragraph of Article 20 
of  its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an Opinion on 
Minimum Reserves in the Context of  the Internal Market. 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Mone-
tary Questions, which was responsible for preparing the 
Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 9 
March 1993. The Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN. 
At its 304th Plenary Session (meeting of 24 March 
1993), the Economic and Social Committee adopted the 
following Opinion unanimously: 
Introduction 
1.  Even in the 1960s the form, use and effectiveness 
of monetary policy instruments was being discussed in the 
European Community. In August 1962 the Monetary 
Committee published a  study on "The Instruments of 
Monetary Policy in the Countries of the European 
Economic Community". In it the minimum reserves policy 
introduced in the post-war years in most EC Member States 
was compared with the open-market policy and the refi-
nancing policy of the  centr~l banks. The study states that: 
"The minimum reserves system enables the monetary au-
thorities to act directly on bank liquidity, and thus on their 
ability to provide credit. The policy of minimum reserves is 
thus a useful addition to discount and open-market policies, 
which tend merely to modify the composition of the aggre-
gate liquidity of the banks" (Chapter 5, point 38). 
1.1.  Thirty years on in an enlarged Community the role 
of minimum reserves policy is less clear-cut. There is a 
marked alignment between the Member States in the use of 
monetary policy instruments, although the central banks 
continue to use their monetary policy instruments in differ-
ent ways in accordance with their own traditions, due to 
differences in the structure of their banking systems and the 
particular preferences of  central bank directors. 
1.2.  Besides the requirement to keep a minimum bal-
ance with the central bank, there were other, similar obliga-
tions which banks had to respect, namely minimum portfo-
lios of government securities. The purpose was to prevent, 
in the post-war years, a mobilization of the high volume of 
government bonds in the banks' portfolios. Until very re-
cently in some countries - namely Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Greece - the mandatory investments of the banks in govern-
ment securities helped to finance the public budget deficit 
through the central bank. 
1.3.  Since the beginning of the 1980s the so-called 
open-market policy - i.e. the purchase and sale of securities 
and certificates of deposit by the central banks - has played 
an ever greater role. The open-market transactions of the 
central banks have had far more impact on bank liquidity 
and the money supply than minimum reserves policy. 
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1.4.  Compared with open-market policy, central bank 
refinancing of banks by the redtscounting of bills and 
through loans against securities (Lombard loans) has also 
lost ground; clearly the complicated and costly credit rating 
entailed has played a part in this. On the other hand, central 
bank rediscounting of bills and loans against securities play 
an important role for the smaller banks and hence for the 
borrowing of their small and medium-sized business cus-
tomers. 
1.5.  The obligation of banks to maintain minimum re-
serves at the central bank is still used as a monetary policy 
instrument in most Member States. These minimum re-
serves are calculated in different ways and changed with 
varying degrees of frequency. The question is whether this 
is compatible with the Single Market completed on 1 
January 1993 and the Economic and Monetary Union pro-
vided for in the Maastricht Treaty, under which a European 
Monetary Institute is  to  be established from January 1994 
and a European System of Central Banks with a common 
monetary policy for the Community from 1997 or 1999. 
1.6.  The role alignment and future of minimum re-
serves policy is important for the national central banks, 
which are to form part of a  European System of Central 
Banks. In a monetary union with a common EC monetary 
policy, minimum reserves policy will be set by the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank, ruling 
out national differences. Even before the third stage of 
monetary union, the substantial differences in national bank 
methods of controlling bank liquidity - and hence the 
money supply - will prove difficult to reconcile with in-
creasingly close-knit money and capital markets. As long 
as  the national central banks remain responsible for their 
own monetary policy in the internal market, national differ-
ences in the application of minimum reserve requirements 
and in open-market policy will affect monetary policy in 
other countries and result in dependency, with the in-
evitable consequences for business and consumers. 
1.6.1.  Consequently, since 1992 a working party of the 
EC Committee of Central Bank Presidents has been prepar-
ing the ground for ESCB monetary policy, in particular the 
development of objective monetary policy indicators and 
compatible money supply targets. Also being discussed are 
comparable money supply definitions, the alignment of 
monetary policy instruments and the role of minimum re-
serves. 
1.6.2.  Under Article 1  09f of the Treaty on European 
Union signed in Maastricht on 7  February 1992, the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI) to be established in 
January 1994 will have the task of preparing the instru-
ments and procedures necessary for carrying out a single 
monetary policy in the third stage of  monetary union. 
1.7.  The alignment of minimum reserve requirements 
is important to banks even before monetary union, i.e. in 
the Single Market (as of January 1993) and in the European 
Financial Area. There is increased competition between the 
banks themselves and with the so-called non-banks and 
near-banks. 1.7.1.  Differing national minimum reserve requirements 
are a cost factor which influences inter-bank competition. 
Certain deposits (on which they must pay interest to  their 
customers) are not available to the banks concerned. This 
means a loss of revenue and a constraint on trading policy. 
To this extent those banks which are subject to minimum 
reserve requirements are at a disadvantage compared with 
their competitors in  other countries who have no - or less 
onerous- obligations. 
1.7.2.  Such substantial obligations mean that non-banks, 
such as large corporations, prefer to invest their liquid as-
sets on  the euromarket where they avoid any of the mini-
mum reserve requirements ..  In this way deposits are taken 
away from those banks which are subject to high minimum 
reserves in their own country.  With free movement of cap-
ital there is nothing inherently wrong with the increasing 
investment in the euromarket, but it can impede the mone-
tary policy of the central banks, which explains the US ini-
tiative in the 1980s for an internationally agreed minimum 
reserve requirement (see point 2.6.).  Furthermore, high 
minimum reserves in the Member States affect competition 
between EC banks and banks in non-EC countries. 
Resorting to  the euromarket has an adverse effect on cen-
tral bank monetary policy. 
1.8.  The circumstances described in points 1.5 to  1.7 
have spurred the Economic and Social Committee to put for-
ward some observations on minimum reserves policy in the 
European Community and to draw some conclusions. This 
Opinion confines itself essentially to the competitive situa-
tion of banks on the internal market. It does not go into the 
interplay between minimum reserves policy and other mone-
tary policy instruments, or the "mix" of monetary and finan-
cial policy at macroeconomic level. Rather,  the Opinion is 
intended as a contribution to the  current discussions of the 
central bank presidents on minimum reserves policy, espe-
cially those of the working party referred to  in  point 1.6.1. 
The Committee is, however, aware of the links between min-
imum reserve policy and the use of other monetary policy in-
struments.  These links are illustrated by the measures taken 
by the Bundesbank in February and March 1993 simultane-
ously in several areas - reduction in minimum reserves, offer 
of additional money market paper, securities-pensions trans-
actions at lower interest rates and reduction of central bank 
discount and Lombard rates.  The monetary policy of a cen-
tral bank which relies entirely on open-market transactions 
can even take the form of higher interest rates than would re-
sult if minimum reserves were high at the same time.  As far 
as current interest rate policy in the Community is con-
cerned, the Committee would refer to its Opinion on the an-
nual economic report (CES 213/93, point 3.7.). 
2.  Different ways of applying minimum 
reserves policy 
2.1.  The introduction of compulsory minimum re-
serves was originally justified in some countries on pruden-
tial grounds. According to this argument, the obligation to 
hold minimum reserves at the central bank ensured that 
banks maintained a certain level of liquidity with which 
they could cover the withdrawal of deposits by  customers. 
This argument no longer seems valid. 
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2.1.1.  Surveillance of bank solvency is primarily there-
sponsibility of the supervisory authorities. Thus, for in-
stance, it has been admitted that the minimum reserves in-
troduced by the Banca d'Italia in 1926 on prudential 
grounds have since 1975 been used solely as an instrument 
of monetary policy. 
2.1.2.  In the European Community credit institutions 
must respect certain liquidity and solvency ratios irrespec-
tive of central bank monetary policy. As a result of the 
alignment of the provisions on bank supervision, credit in-
stitutions must adhere to the same ratios in all the Member 
States - based on the recommendations of the Basel 
Committee of Central Bank Presidents (Cooke Committee) 
- and in non-EC countries. In addition, deposit guarantee 
schemes are to be obligatory in all Member States64. 
2.2.  In four of the twelve EC Member States monetary 
policy is not used as an argument for minimum reserves. 
- Luxembourg and Denmark have no minimum reserve 
requirements at all; 
in Belgium the central bank is  legally entitled to,  but 
does not, pursue a minimum reserves policy; 
in  Great Britain the - few  - minimum reserve require-
ments are not used for monetary policy, but merely as a 
source of revenue for the Bank of  England. 
2.2.1.  In  the eight Member States where minimum re-
serves are justified on grounds of monetary policy, the 
trend over recent years has been to reduce the minimum re-
serves ratios. For instance, the minimum reserves ratios 
were reduced: 
in  France between October 1989 and May  1992  from 
5.5  to  1%  for  sight deposits, from  3 to 1%  for savings 
deposits and from 3 to 0% for time deposits; 
in Spain between February  1990 and December 1992 
from 5 to 3% (though minimum reserve-like compulso-
ry investments remain (see point 2.4.)); 
- in Germany in February 1993 from 4.95 to 2% for time 
deposits and from 4.15 to 2% for savings deposits; 
in  Italy in  February 1993 the highest rate from 22.5 to 
17.5%. 
2.2.2.  Overall the importance of minimum reserves has 
diminished markedly in the Community compared with the 
money supply and banks'  total assets.  But as  the Single 
Market comes into operation at the beginning of 1993 there 
are still considerable differences in minimum reserves poli-
cy within the Community which affect competition be-
tween the banks of the individual Member States (see ap-
pended table). 
64  Cf. ESC Opinion of22.10.1992, OJ No. C 332 of 16.12.1992 2.3.  The differences in minimum reserves policy also 
involve methods of assessment, varying minimum reserves 
ratios according to type of deposit and the frequency with 
which the minimum reserves ratios are changed. 
2.3.1.  For sight deposits,  time deposits and savings de-
posits there are in  some cases different minimum reserves 
ratios, in some cases the same minimum reserves ratio for 
all categories of deposit: 
in Germany, for instance, the minimum reserve require-
ments are graduated for sight deposits (according to the 
total volume of deposits,  from 6.6%  for  sight deposits 
up  to DM  10 million,  up  to  12.1% for sight deposits 
over DM 100 million) and, up to February 1993, 4.95% 
for time deposits and 4.15% for savings deposits (since 
then a uniform 2% for time and savings deposits)65; 
in Spain, on the other hand, the minimum reserve ratio 
is a uniform 3% for all deposits (in addition to  the 
afore-mentioned minimum reserve-like compulsory in-
vestments, see point 2.4.). 
2.3.2.  A graduation of minimum reserves ratios accord-
ing to type of deposit can be justified on the grounds that 
the accessibility of the deposits varies. Many central banks, 
however, have been prompted by other reasons to vary the 
minimum reserves ratios according to type of deposit: 
the  Banque de France, for instance, changed the mini-
mum reserves ratios for time deposits in 1989 and 1990 
as a reaction to  the unwanted switching from  invest-
ments in  securities to money market paper and to  the 
flight of assets to off-shore financial centres and in May 
1992 changed them as a reaction to the interest-rate pol-
icy of the Deutsche Bundesbank; 
to counter an unwanted (from the point of view of mon-
etary policy) increase in the assets of non-residents,  the 
Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, for instance, ex-
pressly provides for the possibility of 100% minimum 
reserves for the assets of non-residents. The Deutsche 
Bundesbank last availed itself of this facility in  1978 to 
stem the inflow of foreign exchange at that time; 
in 1987 and 1989 the Banca d'Italia imposed minimum 
reserve requirements on the at that time unwanted hold-
ing of assets in foreign currencies. 
2.3.3.  Under the terms of the Single Market, the reasons 
cited in point 2.3.2 for a differentiation of minimum reserve 
requirements seem dubious. In the internal open-frontier 
market the movement of money and capital and switches in 
investments because of interest rate differentials will tend 
to increase, making it more difficult for individual central 
banks to pursue a separate minimum reserves policy. 
2.3.4.  Some central banks change minimum reserve ra-
tios very often, some only seldom. In the Netherlands, for 
instance, the minimum reserve ratios were changed more 
than twenty times in 1990, with the result that the minimum 
reserves of the banks fluctuated by 12,000 million guilders. 
In  Germany, on the other hand, minimum reserve ratios 
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have been changed only three times between 1980 and 
1993, in  Italy not at all  between 1984 and February 1993. 
The frequent alteration of ratios in  the Netherlands is put 
down to the fact that the central bank is hardly able to pur-
sue an open-market policy on account of the low volume of 
suitable NLG-paper. 
2.3.5.  The reference period for minimum reserves also 
varies from  one country to another. Minimum reserve re-
quirements are fulfilled primarily on the basis of the aver-
age deposit at the central bank over a reference period. 
Thus a shortfall in the minimum reserves requirement at the 
beginning of the reference period can be offset by an excess 
at the end of the period (or vice versa). Shortfalls/excesses 
can also sometimes be carried over to the next reference pe-
riod. The reference period is usually one month, but can be 
shorter (10 days) or be as long as six months. The some-
times complex calculation of and adherence to the mini-
mum reserves requirement can hamper the commercial pol-
icy of banks in the countries concerned. 
2.4.  In  some Member States the central bank obliges 
banks to invest in securities and certificates of deposit; this 
is  similar to  a minimum reserve requirement. These com-
pulsory investments play a particularly important role in 
Spain. In  1990 the Spanish minimum reserves requirement 
- then  17% - was split into a cash holding of 5%  to begin 
with and an obligatory investment in central bank certifi-
cates of deposit and in Treasury bills (investment ratio). As 
at September 1992, for instance, the deposits of the Spanish 
banks (18,826 billion* pesetas) were subject to a total mini-
mum reserve requirement of 18.1 %,  i.e. 3,408 billion pese-
tas.  Of this,  854,000 million pesetas was in non-interest-
bearing deposits with the Banco d'Espafia, 1,737 billion pe-
setas was invested in central bank certificates of deposit 
(with 6% interest), and 817,000 million pesetas in  other 
obligatory investments, mainly Treasury bills. These com-
pulsory investments mean that the Spanish banks are virtu-
ally obliged to help finance the Spanish budget deficit via 
the central bank. Bearing in  mind that it was agreed in 
Article 1  04(1) of the Treaty on European Union that budget 
deficits should no longer be financed by the central banks 
(see point 3.5), this form of minimum reserves policy 
would appear outmoded and no longer permissible from 
January 1994 (Article 109e (3)). 
2.5.  As  a rule the banks' minimum reserves with the 
central bank do not receive interest. Accordingly, banks in 
the countries concerned suffer a loss of income. To this ex-
tent minimum reserves constitute a kind of levy on the 
banks which varies in  line with the market interest rates 
which they would otherwise have received had they been 
able to place the tied funds on the money market. 
2.5.1.  In some countries minimum reserves with the cen-
tral bank receive interest, namely in the Netherlands, 
Greece and Italy. In Greece and Italy, however, the interest 
65  In Austria, Japan and the USA, too, there are minimum reserve ratios which 
are graduated according to the total volume of deposits and which favour 
smaller banb. 
*  =  1  ,000,000,000. is at far below market rates. In the case of Greece, the low 
interest applies to only half the compulsory minimum re-
serves, i.e.  to 4.5% of deposits. The 6% interest on the 
compulsory deposits of the Spanish banks in central bank 
certificates of deposit is only about half the market rate. 
Hence even in these few cases where minimum reserves 
bear moderate interest, the banks suffer a loss of revenue. 
2.5 .2.  The Dutch central bank pays interest on ''normal" 
minimum reserves (money market reserve requirements -
GKR), but slightly below market rates.  In addition, from 
time to time "fictitious" minimum reserves (monetary re-
serve requirements - MKR) have been imposed on an  ex-
ceptional expansion of business by the banks. The mini-
mum reserves were "fictitious" insofar as they did not have 
to be kept in the form of a balance at the central bank, but 
obliged the banks to pay the market interest rates on these 
amounts to the central bank. 
2.5.3.  The loss of income suffered by the banks from 
non- or low-interest-bearing minimum reserves puts them 
at a disadvantage in this respect vis-a-vis non-banks and 
near-banks. Large corporations, especially multinationals, 
can practice profit-oriented cash management and invest 
their liquid funds in "free ports" (where banks are not sub-
ject to minimum reserve requirements) and on  the Euro-
money market (free from direct bank supervision and the 
guiding influence of central ~ank  monetary policy). 
2.5.4.  Banks subject to minimum reserve requirements 
suffer a loss of income which tends to  make borrowing 
from them more expensive and the interest paid on deposits 
with them lower. To this extent depositors, small savers es-
pecially, and borrowers in countries with relatively high 
minimum reserves are at a disadvantage. 
2.6.  Varying minimum reserves mean not only a cost 
disadvantage for those banks, the bulk of whose business is 
subject to high minimum reserve requirements. The upshot 
is a "delocation", a  switch of assets to the Euro-money 
market with a risk which is difficult to calculate:  namely 
that in  the event of a liquidity squeeze the participating 
Euro-banks will have recourse to refinancing by "their" 
central bank. It should be noted that in the face of the 
stormy developments on the Euro-money markets there 
was a US initiative at the beginning of the 1980s for an in-
ternationally agreed minimum reserves requirement, but 
this was not followed up. 
3.  Assessment of minimum reserve and 
open-market  p~licy 
3.1.  In  the interests of a monetary policy which does 
not affect competition, under normal circumstances any re-
maining minimum reserves should be reduced to a uniform-
ly low level, such as results from the "working balances", 
i.e.  the balances which the banks would in any case keep 
with their central bank. At the same time the bases of as-
sessment for minimum reserves must be aligned (see point 
2.3.). Bearing in mind also the competition from the finan-
cial centres of major third countries such as the USA, Japan 
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and Canada, Community banks should not be encumbered 
with relatively higher minimum reserves. 
There are, however, various reasons for not com-
pletely abolishing the instrument of minimum reserves: 
the option enshrined in  Article 19(1) of the Maastricht 
Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, name-
ly for  the ECB to require the holding of minimum re-
serves; 
the continuing differences in open-market policy in in-
dividual Member States and the links between the vari-
ous monetary policy instruments as regards their impact 
on the money supply and interest rates; 
the particular circumstances of individual Member 
States' monetary policy, e.g. the case of the DM as an 
"anchor currency" which is subject to special pressures; 
the additional central bank duties in many countries in 
connection with refinancing and the settlement of pay-
ment transactions;  these additional duties may be seen 
as  to some extent a quid pro quo for the minimum re-
serve requirements. 
3.2.  Minimum reserves policy has been called upon 
much less in recent years in the Community. In particular, 
minimum reserves policy has no longer been used to influ-
ence bank liquidity in specific instances, i.e. rapidly and 
frequently, by changes in the minimum reserves ratio. 
3.2.1.  Hitherto relatively greater importance has been at-
tached to minimum reserves policy in Germany66. The 
Deutsche Bundesbank sees minimum reserves- even where 
the ratios do not change over many years - as a buffer and a 
continuous brake against money creation by the banks. It is 
the stated objective of the minimum reserve requirements 
of both the  Bundesbank and the Nederlandsche Bank to 
make the banks dependent on the central bank in terms of 
volume and predictability, i.e.  on a virtually constant de-
mand for central bank money. In Germany's case these ar-
guments certainly cannot be brushed aside in  view of the 
relative importance of the DM money supply. 
3.2.2.  It should be noted, however, that in February 1993 
the Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its relatively high mini-
mum reserve requirement by about DM 32,000 million 
from, lastly, DM 80,000 million. This brought the average 
burden on German banks down from about 6 to 3.5% of de-
posits. This reduction benefited above all the savings banks 
and credit cooperatives which accounted for about 69% of 
the 32,000 reduction. The express reason given by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank for this reduction was that it wished 
to strengthen the international competitiveness of the 
German banks. Instead of continuing unchanged with high, 
non-interest-bearing minimum reserves, the Bundesbank 
offered the banks, as well as non-banks and private individ-
66  See Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank 3/1990, p. 22 ff. uals, 25,000 million of interest-bearing new liquidity pa-
pers in three tranches with a life of 3, 6 and 9 months, thus 
availing itself for the first time of the new Article 49 of the 
Bundesbank Law.  But compared with the total minimum 
reserves of all American banks in the US  Federal Reserve 
System  (about 20,000 million US  $),  the  approx. 
DM 48,000 million minimum reserves of the German 
banks are still considerable. 
3.2.3.  The "lender of last resort" function of the central 
banks also argues for a retention of compulsory minimum 
reserves, but at a lower level, Minimum reserves can have a 
welcome compensatory function where they are used tem-
porarily as "working balances" to bridge over liquidity bot-
tlenecks. This can be seen when stock exchange prices col-
lapse and the banks are suddenly faced with fairly substan-
tial liquidity bottlenecks. If  the minimum reserves are not 
available or are  so low that they cover only the minimum 
balance required for payment transactions, the banks will 
immediately need greater liquidity assistance from the cen-
tral bank. Interest rates will be commensurate with the as-
sistance rendered. 
3.2.4.  The non-monetary policy-based minimum re-
serves requirement of the Bank of England is another mat-
ter. In fact,  the minimum reserves obligation of the British 
banks (down to 0.35%) may be seen as a levy for the super-
visory costs of the Bank of England. Corresponding levies 
are also raised for this purpose from  banks in other coun-
tries where there are special authorities for bank supervi-
sion. Such levies do not seem to influence competition be-
tween banks in the internal market. The same applies to the 
partial "deduction" of the costs of holding minimum re-
serves from certain payments services of the central banks. 
Furthermore, the example of the Bank of England shows 
that under present conditions monetary policy can make do 
without a minimum reserve requirement. 
3.3.  If the monetary policy of one or more Member 
States continues to employ high minimum reserve require-
ments, such reserves in excess of the 1 or 2% justifiable as 
a "working balance" should bear interest at market rates. 
3.3.1.  The banks of the countries concerned would not be 
at a disadvantage - including in competition with banks in 
other countries - if that portion of the minimum reserves in 
excess of the 1 to 2% bore interest. The central banks could, 
for instance, consider paying interest at the discount rate on 
all compulsory minimum reserves in excess of 1 or 2%. 
3.3.2.  Paying interest on minimum reserves is,  in  a way, 
inherently contradictory because, from  the point of view of 
the banks, the minimum reserves would then be like a money 
market investment.  However, this "investment" would lack 
the elements of free choice and instant access. On the other 
hand, compulsory minimum reserves can also be an induce-
ment to money market transactions if the banks can  obtain 
the funds required to comply with their obligations temporar-
ily and partially on the money market. Compliance with min-
imum reserve requirements ll).ay to this extent involve actual 
costs and not just theoretical loss of revenue. 
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an alignment of the way they are calculated. The minimum 
reserve ratios for the various types of deposits should also 
be as uniform as possible and possibly include banks' cer-
tificates of deposit, especially as these certificates are a pre-
ferred investment of money market funds. 
3.5.  The reduction of minimum reserve requirements 
should also include the analogous obligation which still ex-
ists in some Member States for banks to  invest in  central 
bank certificates of deposit and in government paper. From 
the beginning of the second stage of monetary union,  i.e. 
from  1 January 1994, the Commission is in any case to 
monitor the development of government debt (Article 
104c(2) of the Maastricht Treaty), with particular reference 
to excessive budget deficits. This includes central bank 
overdraft facilities in favour of public authorities which 
will be prohibited as from that date pursuant to Article 
104(1) in conjunction with Article 109e(3). 
3.5.1.  In preparation for Article 104 the Greek central 
bank has already reduced the requirement for banks to  in-
vest in Treasury bills from a "minimum reserve" of 40% in 
December 1990 to 15% in October 1992. 
3.5.2.  In Spain the central bank has announced a systemat-
ic abolition of the obligations to  invest in certificates of de-
posit and Treasury bills:  these "minimum reserves" in certifi-
cates of deposit are to be reduced grndually to  12% in 1993, 
6% in  1997 and about 2%  in  1999,  the "minimum reserves" 
in Treasury bills from 3.8% in 1992 to 0% at the end of 1996. 
3.5.3.  An  even more rapid general dismantlement of 
these minimum reserve-like obligatory investments for 
banks would help to make the central banks' monetary pol-
icy more neutral from the point of view of competition. 
3.5.4.  Article 19(1) of the Maastricht Protocol on  the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks stipulates 
that minimum reserve requirements may be imposed "in 
pursuance of monetary policy objectives"; in other words, 
minimum reserves may not be used by the central banks to 
finance public budget deficits or as a source of revenue for 
the central bank itself. 
3.6.  With uniformly low compulsory minimum re-
serves this monetary policy instrument would be ready for 
use if required by the ESCB, without influencing competi-
tion between the banks. There would be little point in total-
ly abolishing compulsory minimum reserves a few  years 
before monetary union if they were reinstated by the ESCB 
when set up in  1997 or 1999.  The basis for minimum re-
serves and their ratios is to be decided in  accordance with 
Article 19(2) and Article 42 of the ECB Statute. 
3.6.1.  Moreover, an alignment of minimum reserve re-
quirements at a low level should not have any conse-
quences for Member States whose cental banks do not have 
minimum reserves as a monetary policy instrument (such as 
Luxembourg and Denmark). These countries should be free 
to introduce a minimum reserves policy if such is provided 
for as part of the creation of a European System of Central 
Banks. 
3.4.  A general reduction of minimum reserve ratios to  3.6.2.  Keeping open the minimum reserves option 
a low level must be accompanied as speedily as possible by  should also be  seen against the background of liberalized 
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which the minimum reserves instrument should also be 
kept in working order. The exchange rate adjustments and 
dramatic changes in central bank foreign exchange reserves 
in September and October 1992 also showed that in the in-
ternal market minimum reserves can make a welcome con-
tribution to controlling the money supply in the wake of 
massive inflows or outflows of foreign  exchange. 
Furthermore, the lack of experience with the planned eco-
nomic and monetary union - common monetary policy with 
coordinated national economic policy - argue for a mone-
tary policy underpinned by minimum reserve requirements. 
3.7.  On the other hand it is understandable that the 
central banks have recently relied more heavily than in the 
past on open market operations as a monetary policy instru-
ment. An open-market policy offers a full range of options 
from expanding liquidity to partially reducing it, depending 
on  the volume of money required by the banks. In most 
Member States open-market- policy already avails itself of 
various options, in some cases simultaneously, i.e.  the sale 
and repurchase of central bank certificates, Treasury bills 
and other securities. An increasingly important role is being 
played by the so-called "fixed-rate repos",  where the cen-
tral banks withdraw from the market at a fixed interest rate 
the securities offered to them by tender. 
3.7.1.  Open-market operations are also seen as a form of 
monetary policy consistent with a market economy, after 
the lifting of the last quantitative credit restrictions at  the 
end of the 1980s (e.g.  in  1986 in  Italy). An even more in-
tensive use of open-market policy would seem possible in a 
European System of Central Banks in which the national 
central banks could play a role in open-market policy 
(Article  18(1) of the Statute). Under the monetary policy 
guidelines for the Community which the Governing 
Council of the ECB is to adopt (Article 12(1) of its Statute), 
the national central banks would have a certain latitude as 
to open-market policy in their own particular area, especial-
ly  in the selection of the appropriate "domestic" securities. 
The ECB  could then  concentrate on  open-market transac-
tions  on  the major markets of the most important 
Community financial centres. However, in view of its scale 
in a European monetary union, there must be a certain cen-
tralizing tendency in open-market policy. 
3.7.2.  On  the other hand, minimum reserves policy, be-
cause it necessarily ties all banks directly to their particular 
national bank, would underline the desired federative na-
ture of the ESCB. The holding of minimum reserves also 
makes for a rapid and reliable evaluation of the liquidity 
trend and requirement of each Member State of the ESCB. 
This can make it easier for monetary policy to control the 
money supply, which would make for greater monetary and 
banking stability. 
4.  Conclusions 
4.1.  The Economic and Social Committee considers 
that the basis for minimum reserves should be aligned and 
the minimum reserve ratios reduced to 1 to 2% of deposits, 
in all Member States; this should be done as soon as possi-
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ble without waiting for a common monetary policy in the 
third stage of monetary union. The reasons for an alignment 
of minimum reserves systems and for a reduction in the 
minimum reserve ratios to a uniformly low level of 1 to 2% 
are set out in points 4.2. and 4.3. 
4.2.  Different national minimum reserve bases affect 
competition between Member State banks. The minimum 
reserve policy pursued in most Member States also affects 
competition between Community banks and the banks of 
major non-EC countries, such as Japan, the USA and 
Switzerland. 
4.3.  Under normal conditions high minimum reserves-
if they are substantially in excess of the working balances 
at the central bank - raise the cost of the liabilities side of 
the banking business, restrict their lending to the disadvan-
tage of business customers and private households and 
work against better terms for their customers. 
4.4.  If  one or more central banks opt to retain higher 
minimum reserve ratios,  interest should be payable at the 
discount rate on that portion of the minimum reserves in 
excess of the banks' working balances of 1 or 2% with the 
central bank, so as to avoid the disadvantages mentioned in 
points 4.2. and 4.3. 
4.5.  As  a monetary policy  instrument, minimum re-
serves can be a last resort, especially during the completion 
of economic and monetary union and thereafter for the 
common monetary policy of the ESCB against a back-
ground of convergent national economic policies. To ward 
off inflationary tendencies, minimum reserve requirements 
can even be a welcome - from the point of view of mone-
tary stability - monetary policy instrument which influences 
bank liquidity in  a country rapidly and evenly.  Complete 
abolition of minimum reserves as a monetary policy instru-
ment would not therefore appear desirable. However, coun-
tries which do not currently have any kind of minimum re-
serve requirements should be free to introduce them if they 
are provided for in the ESCB. 
4.6.  The minimum reserve-like compulsory invest-
ments in  central bank paper and Treasury bills which still 
persist in  some Member States should be dismantled as 
quickly as possible. Such compulsory investments serve in 
practice to finance public budget deficits through the cen-
tral bank and will not be permitted from 1994. 
4.6.1.  A rapid general abolition of such compulsory in-
vestments would mean that central bank monetary policy 
had less impact on the competitive position of the banks. 
4.6.2.  With regard to the post-1994 ban on the financing 
of budget deficits by the central banks, consideration 
should be given to a schedule which stretches in part until 
the end of the  1990s and provides for a phased dismantle-
ment of compulsory bank investments in  securities. If the 
annual percentage increase in the deposits forming the basis 
for the compulsory investment were greater than the per-
centage decrease in  the ratios, the total amount would not 
decrease but could even increase. Country 
Gei"IIUUiy 
France 
Greece 
Great 
Britain  (1) 
Italy 
Japan 
Canada (2) 
Netherlands 
Austria 
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APPENDIX 
Minimum reserve regulations in selected countries 
Basis of  assessment 
Items subject to reserve 
requirements 
Deposits and monies received 
(sigk, time and savings deposits 
up to 4 years, bearer bonds up to 
2 years) 
Sight deposits, savings deposits, 
time deposits, etc., up to 2 years 
Sight, time and savings deposits, 
including of non-residents 
Duration of referen-
ce period/ reference 
date 
1month 
End of month 
Month 
Bank liabilities of up to 2 years  6 months 
in£ Stct'ling 
Oumges in sight and time depo- End of month, in 
sits in Italian Lira and  net foreign  some cases also 1 
exchange position  month 
Time and other deposits, securi-
ties issues, liabilities to off-shore 
centres 
Sight and time deposits 
1month 
I month 
a) Olangcs in net money creation  3 months 
(after deduction of monetary capi-
tal formation) if  this exceed.<~ a cer-
tain rate 
b) Bank liabilities . 
Sight, time and savings deposits  l month 
in  A  TS, certain securities issues, 
net foreign exchange position 
Bank assets subject to 
rae"e 
requirements 
Central bank balances, 
cash holdings (up to 
50% of the required re-
serve) 
Central bank balances 
Central bank balances 
Cmtral bank balances 
Cmtral bank balances 
Cmtral bank balances 
Central bank balances, 
cash holdings 
Cmtral bank balances 
Cmtral bank balances 
Reserve holdings 
Period  forcom-
pliance with reser-
ve  requirements 
Average of  4 weeks, 
with a 2  week lag 
between the refCl'en-
ce period and the 
compliance period 
Average of 4-week 
period covering the 
relevant month en-
ding 
Average  of  last 
month 
Reserve ratios 
Time liabilities and savings 
deposits:  2%  (since 
1.3.93), sight deposits: 
6.6% for the first DM 10 
million, 9. 9% for the next 
DM 90 million,  12.1%  for 
ovCl' DM 100 million, sight 
liabilities vis-a-vis non-re-
sidents: 12.1 %. 
1%  for sight and savings 
deposits under 2  years; 
0.5% for time deposits up 
to 1 year;  0% for time de-
posits between  1 and 2 
years and for foreign cur-
rency deposits 
9% since Oct.  1991  for all 
deposits (residents + non-
res.) on average of last 
month 
The balances are fro- 0.35% 
zen for 2 months at 
the Bank of  England 
Balances to be frozen  25%  of  growth,  until 
at the Danca d'ltalia  22.5% of total amount is 
at the latest 2 weeks  reached, since 8.2.93 until 
after the minimum  17.5% is reached 
reserve requirement 
is established 
Average of 4 weeks,  Between 0.05 and 1.3% 
2 week lag after refe-
rence pct"iod 
Average of 2 14-day  Between 10 and 1% 
periods, with time lag 
after the reference 
period 
The reserves are only  0% 
fictitious; the banks 
are charged their cost 
equivalent 
For4wedcs  Oto2.4% 
Central bank balances,  Average of 4 weeks,  Between 9 and 
balances with central in- with lag between re- 4 112% 
stitutions and the Post  ference  and  com-
Office, cash holdings,  pliance period 
some Treasury bills 
(1)  Minimum reserves in GB are not used for monetary policy purposes. 
(2)  In Canada the possibility of abolishing compulsory minimum reserves is being discussed. 
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Minimum reserve regulation-, in selected countries 
Country 
Basis of assessment 
Items subject to reserve 
requirements 
Duration of referen-
ce period/ reference 
date 
Switzerland (3)  Sight deposits, time deposits up  3 months 
to 3 months, 20% of savings 
Spain 
USA (4) 
deposits  · 
Sight, time and savings deposits 
and certified banking liabilities 
of  domestic  non-banks  in 
Pesetas 
lOdays 
Sight deposits and similar; time  2 weeks 
deposits not held by private indi-
viduals with a term of Jess and l 
l/2 years, Euro-market liabilities 
(3)  For Switzerland the data relate to the liquidity regulations. 
(4)  If the total of all sight deposits of an institution is less than$ 46.8 million: 3%. 
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Reserve holdings 
Bank assets subject to  Period  forcom- Reserve ratios 
reserve  pliance with reser-
requirements  ve requirements 
Central bank balances,  Average of 4 weeks  2.5% 
balances with central  (from 20th to 19th 
institutions and the Post  of following month) 
Office, cash holdings 
Central bank balances 
Central bank balances, 
cash holdings 
Average of 10 days, 
2 day lag after refe-
rencepenod 
3%  (1990:  min. reserves 
reduction from 17 to 6%; 
conversion of min.  reser-
ve balances of commer-
cial banks into central 
bank certificates of depo-
sit bearing 6% interest 
p.a.  and  redeemable 
between 1993 and 2000) 
Average  of  2  10% for sight deposits, 
weeks; for sight de- etc. 0% for time deposits 
posits there is a 2  and Euro-market liabili-
day lag between re- ties 
ference and com-
pliance periods; for 
other  liabilities 
subject to a com-
pulsory reserve, a 2 
week lag OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on 
The analysis of policies to be pursued in 
the Community during the transitional stage of EMU: 
secondary legislation Procedure 
On 23  March 1993 the Economic and Social 
Committee, acting under the fourth paragraph of Article 20 
of its Rules of Procedure, decided to  draw up  an  Opinion 
on: 
The analysis of  policies to be pursued in the Community 
during the transitional stage of  EMU. 
By  letter dated 1 October 1993,  the Commission 
sent the Committee, for  its members'  information, anum-
ber of proposals relating to secondary legislation for the 
implementation of the second stage of EMU, as provided 
for in  the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). 
This Opinion therefore deals with the secondary legislation, 
and the Committee will issue an additional Opinion on the 
economic and monetary considerations. 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Mone-
tary Questions, which was responsible for preparing the 
Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 5 
October 1993. The Rapporteur was MrMEYER-HORN. 
At  its  309th  Plenary  Session  (meeting  of 
20 October 1993) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by a large majority with two 
abstentions. 
l.  Preliminary comments 
This Opinion deals with  the Commission's - ini-
tially informal - proposals for secondary legislation imple-
menting the second stage of Economic and Monetary 
Union.  On 22 June  1993  the European Council asked the 
Commission to submit proposals. Until the Treaty on 
European Union enters into force,  the legislation  ba~ed on 
it cannot be formally proposed and adopted. 
The necessary discussions with the Community 
bodies involved (the European Parliament, the  Committee 
of Central Bank Governors, the Monetary Committee) 
have, however, already started informally, in order to accel-
erate the subsequent official procedures, to ensure that the 
legislation can be adopted as soon as the Maastricht Treaty 
enters into force, and before 1 January 1994. 
The draft proposals contained in  the Commission 
Communication of 22 July 1993  (COM(93) 371  final  -
SYN 466/467) are: 
- a Regulation aimed at specifying the prohibition (Article 
104 of the Treaty) of public sector access to Central 
Bank credit, and defining "overdraft facilities or any 
other type of credit facility", "public undertakings" etc; 
- a  Regulation aimed at specifying the prohibition 
{Article 104 of the Treaty) of privileged access for the 
public sector to financial institutions; 
- a Regulation on the application of the excessive deficit 
procedure (Article 104 c (14) of the  Treaty) in accor-
69 
TRANSITION TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
dance with the Protocol, and laying down detailed rules 
and definitions, including the definition of "public 
debt"; 
a Decision on the statistical data for the establishment 
of the key for the financial resources of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI) (Article 16.2 of the EMI 
Statute). 
2.  General comments 
The Economic and Social Committee regrets that 
decisions on secondary legislation are being drawn up in 
this informal way and in such haste. The decisions on defi-
nitions are, in some cases, of great importance for national 
and regional authorities, for the banking system, for  the 
Central Banks and for public-sector undertakings. The defi-
nitions, demarcation lines and procedures must therefore be 
discussed at  length with all concerned and drawn up with 
great clarity and attention to drafting detail. In some cases, 
the Explanatory Memorandum declares matters compatible 
or non-compatible with  the  Articles containing the  defini-
tions,  without the reference being covered in the Articles 
themselves. 
The Economic and Social Committee would like 
to  make a number of comments as  its contribution to the 
"informal discussion" of the four proposals for secondary 
law. 
3.  Comments on the draft Regulation specify-
ing definitions for the application of the pro-
hibition on direct Central Bank financing of 
the public sector (Articles 104 and 104b(l) of 
the Treaty) 
3  .1.  Article  1 and the Explanatory Memorandum state 
that the Central Banks' credit facilities to the public sector 
must be repaid or converted into fixed-maturity debt by  1 
January  1994. Claims acquired before 1 January 1994 do 
not count a~ credit facilities. The draft Regulation therefore 
confines Article 104 of the EC Treaty to  borrowings con-
tracted after 1 January 1994.  In view of the large public-
sector debt of some Member States, it would be realistic 
not to require all claims outstanding at the end of 1993 to 
be repaid, but rather to allow a reasonable period (e.g.  10-
15 years) for their conversion into debt instruments. 
3.2.  Articles 2 and 5 of the draft Regulation provide 
the useful clarification that open-market operations in gov-
ernment securities in  the framework of the Central Banks' 
monetary policy, and standby credits with the IMF and the 
EMS, do not fall under the credit facilities prohibition laid 
down by Article 104 of the Treaty. 
3.3.  The rules governing the role of the Central Banks 
as fiscal agents and in the circulation of coins, contained in 
Articles 3, 4,  and 5 of the proposal, do not, on the other 
hand, appear absolutely necessary. 
3.4.  The Central Banks maintain accounts in their ca-
pacity as fiscal agents for governments, a role specifically enshrined in Article 104(1) of the Treaty.  In the course of 
daily credit transfers, net debtor positions can arise which 
are tantamount to  Central Bank loans to the public sector. 
The Commission feels that the  very short-term and techni-
cal nature of these loans means that they will have practi-
cally no effect on the Central Banks' independent monetary 
policy. However, in order to prevent Article 104 being cir-
cumvented, the Commission proposes that loans arising 
from credit transfers be considered prohibited credit facili-
ties if they are extended overnight (Article 3). Is this appro-
priate?  The Commission itself points out that Article 104 is 
not intended to hinder the Central Banks' management of 
payments transactions. 
3.5.  The same consideration applies to cheque collec-
tion. The Central Bank sometimes credits cheques in favour 
of the government to the government's accounts before the 
accounts of the private sector drawees are debited. The 
Commission sees this difference in value dates as constitut-
ing loans incompatible with Article 104.  Although the ef-
fects of this are relatively insignificant, the Commission 
feels that there is still a need for regulation. Article 4 stipu-
lates that differences in value dates will not be held to con-
stitute prohibited overdraft facilities only if the time  lags 
involved are normal for cheque clearance in the country in 
question. Is secondary legislation really needed here? 
3.6.  Coins issued by governments and circulated by 
the Central Banks are also seen as giving rise to overdraft 
facilities requiring regulation. In  some Member States the 
value of coins is credited to  the  Treasury accounts before 
all the coins have gone into circulation;  the Treasury ac-
counts are not debited. however. when reflows to the 
Central Bank occur. 
For practical reasons the  Commission proposes 
(Article 5) that,  in  general, the Central Banks' stocks of 
coins should not be  regarded as  prohibited credit facilities 
provided that they constitute ·less than 10% of total coins in 
circulation. 
4.  Comments on the draft Regulation specify-
ing definitions for the application of the pro-
hibition of privileged access of the public sec-
tor to financial institutions (Article 104 a). 
The Explanatory Memorandum states that the pro-
hibition on privileged public sector access to financial insti-
tutions is intended to submit the public authorities to market 
discipline. This in turn is intended to help prevent excessive 
budget deficits.  This is by no means certain, however, 
given the low interest-rate sensitivity of the public sector. 
The enactment of the prohibition on privileged ac·· 
cess is of great significance for the whole banking system. 
It  is, t11erefore,  regrettable that important problems are dis-
cussed  too  briefly.  and  only  in  the  Explanatory 
Memorandum; the  Regulation will  ti1erefore  only  be  par-
tially binding therefore. 
On the other hand,  the  operation of t11e  financial 
system, and in particular public-sector financial institutions. 
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should not be hindered by the definitions (public undertak-
ings, financial  institutions. privileged access). This might 
be the result, however. 
4.1.  The Explanatory Memorandum to Article 1 ex-
cludes from the ban on privileged access: 
certain financial institutions'  obligation to finance so-
cial housing on special conditions; 
interest subsidies or other transfers from one area of the 
public sector to another. 
This is reasonable as we are dealing with ques-
tions of competition and/or prudential supervision, rather 
than potential obstacles to efforts to achieve improved bud-
getary discipline which might compromise stability-orien-
tated monetary policy. It is not clear, however, from the 
wording of Article 1 that the above, referred to in the 
Explanatory Memorandum, are compatible with Article 
104 a of the Treaty. 
Anomer question not addressed in the Explanatory 
Memorandum is the granting of credit facilities on special 
conditions to local authorities by their own financial institu-
tions, e.g. local credit institutions. Under the definition pro-
posed in  Article 3,  this  would be classified as privileged 
(and therefore prohibited) public-sector access to financial 
institutions, although public-sector budget discipline would 
in no way be affected. Whether a financial institution incurs 
higher loan costs for  its owners, and in return pays higher 
dividend5, or whether it keeps loan costs down and makes 
smaller profits has no bearing on budgetary discipline. 
Funds are  merely moved around the public sector without 
creating credit for the public sector which would affect 
monetary policy. 
Thus, it is debatable whether privileged access 
should be defined so that loans by publicly owned credit in-
stitutions and banks to the public sector fall under Article 
104 a,  as any loan granted by a publicly-owned financial 
institution to the public sector, in competition with private-
sector banks, would then give rise to  suspicion of privi-
leged access. 
This would effectively endanger the entire 
Structural and Regional Policy of the Community and the 
Member States, as the bulk of funding is channelled to  the 
local authorities and public-sector bodies via specialized -
and usually publicly-owned - financial institutions. This 
also applies to  the European Investment Bank's global 
loan~ and the  ch~mnelling of support progranune fund5  via 
credit institutions. It must he made clear therefore that such 
cases do not  constitute privileged access within  the  mean-
ing of Article  104 a.  It could at the same time he stipulated 
t1lat  t11e  grantmg of loans and channelling of funds  to  tile 
public sector  mu~t uot breach competition and prudential 
rules.  It  could also be  specifically stated that the proposed 
Regulation does not prejudice Articles 90 and 92 of the 
Treaty. 
4.2.  Article 2 states tilat prudential mea~ures leading to 
privileged access are  compatible with  Article  104 of the Treaty. This would appear justified, given the prudential 
treatment of (nonnally low-risk) claims on the public sec-
tor. EC rules which for the same reason give rise to privi-
leged treatment of public debt instruments, and thus consti-
tute privileged access, are also allowed (e.g. lower weight-
ing in  the calculation of solvency ratios, diversification re-
quirements for UCITS investment funds). 
The reason, based on monetary policy, given for 
the requirement that financial institutions hold public-sector 
debt  instruments  (fifth  recital,  and  Explanatory 
Memorandum to Article 3(2)) is quite a different matter. 
The minimum reserve requirements are quoted, under 
which all credit institutions have to hold part of their de-
posits with the Central Bank as minimum reserves 65.  The 
maintenance of such minimum reserves cannot be con-
strued as privileged access. 
In  some Member States, however, financial insti-
tutions are also required to maintain holdings of public-sec-
tor debt instruments and/or certificates which the govern-
ment requires the Central Bank to issue, which are at least 
like reserves. Such compulsory holdings undoubtedly con-
stitute privileged access, as they amount to the compulsory, 
long-term placing of public-sector debt instruments with fi-
nancial institutions. This form of privileged access has 
clearly been used to finance government budget deficits via 
the Central Bank, which will in future be illegal66. 
4.3.  The Explanatory Memorandum's comments on 
Article 3(3) are unclear; it is stated that the Central Banks' 
monetary policy should not be based exclusively on public-
sector debt instruments, as is customary with  loans at the 
Lombard rate,  loans with securities deposited as collateral 
and open market operations. 
The Central Banks do use these transactions to in-
fluence the money supply, either withdrawing liquidity 
from the economy by the issue or return of securities, or 
making additional liquidity available by the redemption of 
securities. This merely entails the temporary change of 
ownership of public-sector debt instruments, which were 
previously placed and which were not issued specifically 
for that purpose. This does not constitute privileged access 
of budgetary relevance. The exclusive use of public-sector 
debt instruments for monetary policy does however raise 
competition and prudential issues. 
4.4.  Article 4  excludes public-sector postal financial 
services from the definition of financial institutions within 
the meaning of Article 104 a. It is conceded in the 
Explanatory Memorandum that postal financial services are 
obliged to make funds available to the public sector. This 
would clearly constitute privileged access of budgetary rel-
evance, as by creating credit, postal financial services can 
directly contribute to the fmancing of public-sector deficits. 
Whether or not postal financial services are sufficiently 
separate from government makes little difference to their 
budgetary relevance within the meaning of Article 104 a, as 
the public sector has privileged access to them, irrespective 
of their legal or organizational form.  Article 4(1) and (2) 
should therefore be amended to state that postal financial 
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services are indeed financial institutions within the mean-
ing of Article 104 a. 
5.  Comments on the draft Regulation on the 
application of the provisions of the Protocol 
on the excessive deficit procedure  (Article 
104c (6) and (14)) 
Article 109 e (4) requires the Member States to 
endeavour to avoid excessive government deficits. (From 
the third stage onwards this becomes a Treaty obligation.) 
Article 104 c (2) charges the Commission to examine com-
pliance with these arrangements and monitor the develop-
ment of the budgetary situation and the stock of govern-
ment debt in the Member States. 
One of the Protocols to the Treaty on European 
Union lays down the reference values for the budget policy 
convergence criteria, as well as a number of definitions and 
procedures for the transmission of statistical data. In accor-
dance with Article 104 c (4),  the proposal contains further 
details,  including more detailed definitions with reference 
to  the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts 
(ESA)  of  the  Statistical  Office  of  the  European 
Communities (SOEC). 
5.1.  In Article  1(1), government is sub-divided into: 
central government, local government and social security 
funds, as defined in the ESA. ESA definition S62, used by 
the SOEC and referred to in the Annex to the proposal, de-
fines the local government sub-sector as "those types of 
public administration whose competence extends to only 
part of the economic territory". It is not clear whether re-
gional authorities like the German "Lander" or the Belgian 
"communautes/gemeenschappen" are covered by this defi-
nition. 
5.2.  Article 4 of the proposal requires the Member 
States to notify the Commission of their planned and actual 
government deficits and levels of government debt before 1 
February and 1 July of each year. They are also required to 
provide the Commission with "any relevant supplementary 
information" as it becomes available. These interim reports 
could be restricted to data relevant to  the assessment of 
trends in  the budget deficit, government debt, the relation-
ship between the deficit and public investment and the 
medium-term economic situation. 
The requirement that Member States report 
planned levels of government debt goes beyond the require-
ments of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty. This is justi-
fied however, as it will enable the Commission, in assess-
ing the budgetary convergence criteria in accordance with 
Article 104 c (2),  to consider whether the ratio of govern-
ment debt to GOP "is sufficiently diminishing and ap-
proaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace". 
65  ESC Opinion on minimum reserves  in the context of the Internal Market (OJ 
No. C 129 of 10 May 1993). 
66  Referred to above: see points 1.2., 2.4., 3.5. and 3.5.1. to 3.5.4. 5.3.  Article 6 requires the Member States to infonn the 
Commission of payments made or foreseeable in fulfilment 
of government guarantees or arising from the debts of other 
sectors taken over by the government. This requirement is 
also warranted, as it enables the Commission to assess the 
risk of an excessive deficit.  · 
6.  Comments on the draft Decision on the es-
tablishment of the key for the financial  re-
sources of the European Monetary Institute 
(Article  16 (1) and (2) of the Protocol on the 
Statute of the EMI). 
The administrative expenses of the EMI are to be 
funded by the Member States in accordance with the key 
laid down in Article 29(1) of the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central 
Bank (ECB). The proposal does not therefore, as the  title 
suggests, concern the key itself, but rather the statistical 
data on population, GDP at market prices (GDP mp)  and 
the method of calculation needed for the key. 
The definitions used are those of the ESA and 
Article 2 of Council Directive 89/130 EEC. The draft pro-
posal therefore contains little that  is  new.  More weight is 
given  to  the statistical data for  the ESCB  and ECB  key, 
which is then to be applied to the Member States' contribu-
tions to the EMI' s capital, the weighting of votes, the pool-
ing of foreign exchange reserves and the distribution of 
profits and losses. 
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6.1.  German GDP mp for the period before unification 
is to be calculated as follows (Article 6): notional GDP mp 
figures  for  the fonner GDR will  be added to those of the 
old Federal Republic for the period 1987-1990 on the basis 
of the respective 1991  GDP shares of the old and new 
"Lander". 
Although not historically accurate, this device 
would appear a suitable basis for calculating Germany's 
contribution to the financing of the EMI. 
6.2.  The key for individual Member States'  contribu-
tions (Article 8) is to be the arithmetic mean of the shares 
of the corresponding Member State in the population and 
GDP mp of the Community, calculated on the basis of the 
five-year average (1987-1991) (Articles 4 and 7). The GDP 
mp data are to be converted into ecu at the average ex-
change rates of all the working days of each year, as pub-
lished in the "C" edition of the Official Journal. The accu-
racy of this method of calculation is reflected in the fact 
that the weighting of the national Central Banks in the key 
is to be calculated to four decimal places (Article 9). 
As  the key is  to be applicable for the "entire life-
time of the EMI and will be calculated once only,  the 
Commission and Eurostat must ensure that the GDP mp 
data are in  fact  compiled in  accordance with the uniform 
procedure (Article 2)  laid down in Council Directive 
89/130 EEC and  that the economic aggregate calculations 
are compatible. OPINION 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
on the 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
Community action in the field of statistics 
(COM(94) 78 final) Procedure 
On the 30 March 1994 the Council decided to 
consult the Economic and Social Committee on the: 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on Community ac-
tion in the field of  statistics 
(COM(94) 78final). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Mone-
tary Questions, which was responsible for preparing the 
Committee  •  s work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 
12 April 1994. The Rapporteur was Mr MEYER-HORN. 
At its 315th Plenary Session (meeting of 27 April 
1994), the Economic and Social Committee adopted the 
following Opinion unanimously. 
1.  Legal basis of the Regulation 
1.1.  The European Commission has submitted a pro-
posal for a  Council Regulation (COM(94) 78 final) con-
cerning Community action in the field of statistics. 
1.2.  The legal basis for the Regulation is Article 213 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Union, and it will be 
passed once the Economic and Social Committee, the 
European Parliament and the European Monetary Institute 
have given their Opinions. 
1.3.  The proposed Regulation was drawn up in consul-
tation with the Statistical Programme Committee, the 
Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of 
Payments Statistics and the European Advisory Committee 
for Statistical Information in the Economic and .Social 
Spheres. 
1.4.  Article 23 states that the Regulation is to come 
into effect 20 days after publication in the Official Journal 
of the EU and then has immediate legal force in every 
Member State. 
2.  Purpose of the Regulation 
2.1.  For decisions to be made, the European Union re-
quires Community statistics which are up-to-date, reliable, 
meaningful and comparable from one country to another. 
Community statistics are particularly essential for the fol-
lowing purposes: 
2.1.1.  To prepare and achieve Economic and Monetary 
Union (e.g. financial and monetary indicators for conver-
gence criteria; national accounts, purchasing power parities, 
consumer-price indices, balance of payments, banking, in-
terest-rate and monetary statistics for the European 
Monetary Institute). 
2.1.2.  To promote economic and social cohesion (e.g. 
GDPs of the regions, unemployment rates, regional indica-
tors on active population and employment in order to assess 
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eligibility for Structural and Cohesion Fund assistance, 
REGIO database). 
2.1.3.  To create a European financial area (e.g. capital 
market statistics, including data on ecu bond issues, data-
bank on all ecu statistics). 
2.2.  In its Final Report of the Statistical Programme 
1989-1992 (COM(93) 454 final). the Commission points to 
the progress already made in these areas of statistics (chap-
ter I B 1 to I B 4, I C 1). In particular, work done over ten 
years has brought the European System of Integrated 
Economic Accounts (ESA) into line with that of the United 
Nations (SNA) and the methods used by the IMF to mea-
sure balance of payments. Within the ESA, collection of 
the now largely comparable data has been speeded up and 
provision made for the subsequent inclusion of Austria, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Finland. 
2.3.  Community statistics are based on the data sup-
plied by statistical offices in the Member States. This is in 
line with the subsidiarity principle. which, particularly in 
the field of statistics, has been proving its worth for some 
time now. However, subsidiarity also involves the follow-
ing requirements: 
2.3.1.  There must be a clearly defined division of re-
sponsibilities between the Statistical Office of the European 
Union (Eurostat) and the statistical authorities of Member 
States. 
2.3.2.  Member States must ensure that data passed on 
from their own authorities to the European Commission 
conform to principles agreed upon at Community level. 
2.3.3.  Confidential statistical data must be protected in 
equal measure at all levels to maintain the confidence of 
those required to provide information. 
2.3.4.  Arrangements must be made to ensure that non-
confidential Community statistics - are accessible to all citi-
zens of the EU and not just to a small group of immediate 
users. 
2.3.5.  In response to the particular needs and the respon-
sibility which the European Monetary Institute (EMI) or, at 
a later stage, the European Central Bank will have for cer-
tain statistics, a special form of cooperation must be agreed 
upon between the various statistical authorities at national 
and Community level, taking full  account of the indepen-
dent status of the European Central Bank and the EMI. 
2.4.  The proposed Regulation implements the mea-
sures necessary to meet the requirements set out in point 
2.3. The ESC therefore endorses it while making the com-
ments set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 below. 
3.  General Comments 
3.1.  The 23  Articles of the proposed Regulation lay 
down unified standards and hannonized methods for the 
preparation, collection, storage, processing, compilation, analysis and dissemination of Community statistics. Multi-
year statistical programmes, periodically updated if neces-
sary, are to be set up together with guidelines and objec-
tives, on the basis of annual work programmes. 
3  .1.1.  The Committee welcomes the fact that the pro-
posed Regulation also takes account of both financial con-
straints at national and Community level and the relevance of 
Community legal provisions governing such actions (Article 
4). In this connection, the ESC particularly approves of the 
following principles (Article 9(2) points 3 and 4): 
3.1.1.1.  The financial burden on respondents is minimized. 
3.1.1.2.  The amount of work and the cost involved in the 
production of Community statistics must be in proportion 
to the importance of the results/benefits sought. 
3.1.2.  In view of the extent and importance of the statis-
tical programmes, the ESC thinks it right to consult the 
committee specifically set up for this purpose within 
Eurostat (the Statistical Programme Committee), the 
European Monetary Institute and,  where appropriate, the 
Committee for Statistical Information in  the Economic and 
Social Spheres and the Committee on Monetary, Financial 
and Balance of Payments Statistics (Article 3(2) and (3)). 
3.1.3.  According to  Article 3(2), the Commission is to 
take the statistical requirements of the European Monetary 
Institute into consideration  "a~ far as possible". The ESC 
feels  that this qualification is  inappropriate given the im-
portance of the statistics which will presumably be required 
when laying the foundations of the common monetary poli-
cy, adjusting instruments of monetary policy and promoting 
closer cooperation between central banks. 
3.2.  Article 9 of the proposed Regulation states that 
Community statistics shall be produced in an objective 
manner, uninfluenced by political or other interest groups. 
In view of the importance of statistics in the process of 
completing economic and monetary union (cf. points 2.1.1. 
and 2.1.2.), the ESC endorses this principle, as well as the 
detailed rules on statistical confidentiality and protection 
against unauthorized disclosure (Articles 13 to 19). On this 
point, the ESC feels that suppliers of statistical data should 
be informed about the protective measures taken as well as 
about the legal basis and purpose of the statistics. 
3.3.  With the implementation of convergence and re-
covery programmes and plans for closer coordination of na-
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tional economic policies under multilateral supervision, it is 
essential that the relevant economic and social interest 
groups, especially the social partners, are kept informed. 
The ESC therefore welcomes the fact that the proposed 
Regulation guarantees impartial and therefore unhindered 
access to Community statistics which are not subject to sta-
tistical confidentiality (Articles 10 and 11). 
3.4.  The ESC is assuming that it will continue to be 
consulted on the multiannual Community statistical pro-
grammes referred to in Article 2( 1) of the draft Regulation 
4.  Specific comments 
4.1.  Although national authorities are normally respon-
sible for carrying out the work required under the statistical 
programme, Community statistics may also be produced by 
Eurostat with the agreement of these national authorities. 
The ESC feels that it makes sense to provide for this option 
(Article 7). 
4.2.  Article 11(4) states that the conditions of access 
for statistics' users shall be governed by the tariff policy of 
each authority and based on mutual information and coop-
eration between national and Community statistical authori-
ties.  This is in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 
However, the ESC is adamant that cooperation should pro-
duce a tariff policy which ensures that the citizens of one or 
other Member State do not have to pay considerably more 
than others for access to Community statistics. 
4.3.  Article  18  states that employees of national au-
thorities will continue to be subject to the ruling on statisti-
cal confidentiality even after the cessation of their func-
tions. The ESC welcomes this.  but wonders how it can be 
incorporated into contracts of employment or civil service 
and criminal law at national and Community level. 
4.4.  Article 20 lays down the rules for consultation of 
the Statistical Programme Committee (SPC), particularly 
the voting and decision procedure for Commission mea-
sures which are not in  accordance with the opinion of the 
SPC. The procedure is complicated, but the ESC feels it is 
indispensable if the decisions necessary for the production 
of Community statistics are to be taken without long de-
lays. The same goes for rules laid down in Article 21 on the 
functioning of the Committee on Statistical Confidentiality 
established under Council Regulation No.  1588/90 of 11 
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